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In both our everyday talk and our theorizing we characterise much of our 
psychology in terms of desires, along with beliefs. For instance, we attempt to 
explain peoples’ actions by attributing them with particular desires, and we 
attempt to predict what they will do, and how they will react to certain events 
on the basis of what we take them to desire. In Philosophy of Mind, for 
example, we attempt to understand what is involved in having each kind of 
state, what relations they have with other phenomena, and so on. Desires, in
particular, are appealed to by a variety of fields of philosophy to explain 
phenomena associated with things like moral judgments, and works of fiction. 
What must desires be like to be able to have these various roles?
A traditional and influential approach to understanding desires 
characterizes them in terms of relations with motivation. I call a particular 
version of this approach the Motivational Necessity of Desire (MN). 
According to this view it is necessary that if someone has a desire then they 
are disposed to act in ways that they believe will bring about what they desire. 
MN appears intuitively plausible: it is supported by familiar facts about desire 
and what we observe when people have desires. Also it is widely accepted, 
both within Philosophy of Mind and more broadly: it is presupposed by a 
number of important, thriving debates in other fields of philosophy. 
Nonetheless, a number of seemingly persuasive arguments have been made 
against MN. Some of these appeal to counter examples, either of particular 
kinds of desire, or particular kinds of individual, for which MN appears to be 
false, another claims that MN is incompatible with certain kinds of empirical 
evidence about desires, while others argue that MN is uninformative so it is 
not the a relation that helps achieve an understanding of desire.
In this dissertation I attempt to defend MN against what I take to be the 
strongest of these objections. After briefly motivating the view by 
highlighting its theoretical and explanatory advantages I discuss in turn each of
these main objections in detail. I argue that in each case the objection is either 
based on a misunderstanding of the kind of claim that is being made about 
desire by MN, or on a misunderstanding of precisely what this thesis entails. 
By making this clear, and by clarifying the precise complaint that is being 
made in each objection I attempt to show that each of them fails. But they do 
so for interesting, and different reasons that are revealing about other 
properties and relations of desires. I conclude that these objections give us no 
reason to reject this intuitively plausible thesis about desire.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Desire.
Desire plays a fundamental role in our lives: Spinoza called it ‘the very 
essence of man’ (Spinoza 1677, Ethics). Samuel Johnson agreed, saying that 
‘some desire is necessary to keep life in motion, and he whose real wants are 
satisfied must admit those of fancy’ (Johnson 1759, The History of Rasselus). 
We all know what it is like to desire something, the range of objects that 
people desire seems almost without limits, and people often go to tremendous 
lengths in an attempt to satisfy their strongest desires. They may even re­
structure their entire lives to do so. We all know what it is like both to have a 
desire satisfied and to have a desire frustrated, and we mainly prefer the 
former to the latter.
Despite their importance we do not think that our desires should go 
unconstrained, that we should let desiring and satisfying our desires be the sole 
aim of our lives. For example, Cicero advised people to ‘let your desires be 
ruled by reason’, while Lao-tzu, the founder of Taoism, blamed the fact that 
people desire for the problems faced by individuals and societies: he said that 
‘without desire there would be tranquility. In this way all things would be at 
peace’.
But what are desires? What are we saying about Amy if we say that 
she wants a cup of coffee? What do Bobby and Claire have in common if 
Bobby desires a sports car and Claire desires that there is world peace? How 
do Dean and Emily differ if Dean wants to drown his sorrows while Emily 
wants her Daddy to buy her a pony? How can Frances be the object of 
Graham’s desires like a bar of chocolate is the object of Harriet’s?
One influential and intuitive view is that desire has an essential 
connection with motivation: that necessarily having a desire motivates 
someone, ceteris paribus, to act to try to satisfy their desire. I call a particular 
version of this view the Motivational Necessity of Desire, or Motivational 
Necessity (MN) for short. According to MN, for example, if Isobel wants a 
cup of coffee she is motivated to do things like go to the kitchen, boil the kettle 
and make a cup, or go to the cafe, place her order with the barista and wait in 
line to collect her drink. And if Jim wants Kerry to marry him he is motivated, 
for example, to take her to a romantic restaurant, get down on one knee and 
present her with a ring. 1 will specify MN more precisely below, and my aim 
in this dissertation is to defend it against a number of seemingly persuasive 
objections.
The view that desire is necessarily connected with motivation has a 
long tradition in philosophy. Hume, for example, said that desires are 
‘motivating passions’ (Hume 1739/1965). Similarly, Locke said that desire is
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‘an uneasiness of the Mind for want of some absent good’ (Locke 1689/1975, 
p251). According to Locke all motivation to act in a particular way comes 
from having this kind of uneasiness, and if someone is unmotivated then this is 
because they lack such an uneasiness. He said,
[t]he motive, for continuing in the same State or Action, is only the 
present satisfaction in it; The motive to change, is always some 
uneasiness: nothing setting us upon the change of State, or upon any 
new Action, but some uneasiness. (Locke 1689/1975, p249).
More recently, in the 1940’s and 50’s Behaviourists like Skinner (1953) and 
Ryle (1949) attempted to analyse all kinds of mental states, including desires, 
in terms of patterns of actions and dispositions to act. According to Ryle to 
have a desire, or an emotion or some similar kind of state is ‘to tend to act in 
[...] innumerable [characteristic and related] ways’ (Ryle 1949, pp. 83-84). 
He said that attributions of these states are attributions of dispositional 
properties: these statements are ‘elliptical expressions of general hypothetical 
propositions of a certain sort’ (Ryle 1949, p83), namely that someone will act 
in particular ways in particular circumstances.
In current philosophy the view is prominent too. Functionalists about 
mental states, who attempt to analyse particular mental states in terms of their
3
relations, commonly claim that among the relations that characterise desire is a 
connection with action.1 Stalnaker, for instance says that, ‘[t]o desire that P is 
to be disposed to act in ways that would tend to bring it about that P in a world 
in which one’s beliefs, whatever they are, were true’ (Stalnaker 1984, p i5). 
Similarly, Michael Smith says that,
[w]e should think of desiring to cp as having a certain set of 
dispositions, the disposition to rp in conditions C, the disposition to _ in 
conditional C_, where in order for conditions C and C_ to obtain, the 
subject must have, inter alia, certain other desires, and also certain 
means-ends beliefs, beliefs concerning cp-ing by \p-ing, cp-ing by _-ing 
and so on (Smith 1994, pi 12).
However, this view that desire and motivation are necessarily 
connected is not accepted by everyone. Some of those who offer accounts of 
desire emphasize different properties and relations. Some, appeal to 
connections between desire and experiences of pleasure:2 Aristotle, for 
example, called desire ‘the craving for the pleasant’, while Mill said that 
‘desiring a thing and finding it pleasant [are] two modes of naming the same
1 See for example, Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (1996), Humberstone (1992), Lewis (1983),
Smith (1994), Stalnaker (1984), and so on.
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psychological fact’ (Mill 1863). Others have focused on the connection 
between desiring something and evaluating it favourably/ And some people 
have explicitly denied that desire is necessarily connected with motivation. 
Some of them highlight cases of extreme depression, accidie and 
disillusionment where people appear to lack all motivation despite seeming to 
have desires.2 *4 They also highlight cases of akrasia, in which someone appears 
to act in a way that is in conflict with obtaining what they desire.
As I understand it there are six main objections that have been made to 
this view. Of these, four are based on various kinds of counter example: they 
present cases in which a subject has a desire but seems to lack the kind of 
motivation that they would have if desire and motivation were necessarily 
connected in the way described by MN. Another objection argues that this 
connection is incompatible with relevant empirical information: it is argued 
that best current theories in neuroscience suggest that there is no necessary 
connection between having the brain structures that are responsible for having 
desires and having those that are responsible for being motivated to act. A 
further objection argues that the view is uninformative as opposed to being 
false. Because they think that it does not say anything interesting about desire
2 See for example, Aristotle in De Anima. Mill (1863), Fehige (2001), and Kim (1998) among 
others.
J See, for example, Anscombe (1957), Platts (1979), Oddie (2005), Stampe (1987), and so on.
4 Such as those described by Stocker (1979) for example.
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the people who make this objection deny that desire should be analysed in 
terms of a connection with motivation.
In this dissertation I offer a limited defense of this view, that desire and 
motivation are necessarily connected. In the following chapters I will consider 
each of these main objections in turn and argue that it fails to show that a 
particular version of the view is false or that it is uninformative. The thesis I 
will defend, and that I will hereafter mean by Motivational Necessity (MN) is 
the following:
(MN) If S  desires that p  then S  is disposed to act in ways S
believes will bring about p.
Notice a number of important features of MN: first, MN is a claim about a 
necessary condition for having a desire. It is not a claim about a sufficient 
condition. It is clear then that MN is not a theory or complete analysis of 
having a desire, if we take a theory of something to be a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions for having that thing. MN could be part of a theory of 
desire, most straightforwardly in a theory that identified having a desire with 
having this kind of disposition to act. But MN is not such a theory: it could 
equally be part of a more complex theory of desire in combination with other 
necessary conditions that together are said to be sufficient for having a desire.
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We might call any such theory of desire, that has MN as a necessary condition, 
a version of ‘Motivational Theory of Desire’.
Second, MN is a claim about desire in particular. This is the kind of 
state that we attribute when we say things like ‘Lionel has a desire to go to the 
Caribbean on holiday’, and ‘Marie wants a cup of coffee’. There are a number 
of kinds of pro attitudes, like desire, hope, wish and intention: these are 
sometimes together called ‘conative states’ to distinguish them from states like 
belief, assumption, imagination, supposition, sometimes together called 
‘cognitive states’. I will not attempt to give an account of what distinguishes 
one kind of conative state from the others. Rather, I take it that there is 
intuitively a difference between say, the mental state that someone has when 
they desire to have some chocolate and the mental state that someone has 
when they wish to have some chocolate. MN is only a thesis about one of 
these pro-attitudes or conative states: desire.
Third, as I understand them desires are states that have an object. That 
is, when someone has a particular desire there is something that they desire to 
have. In this respect, desires are like beliefs and unlike sensations, for 
example. When someone has a belief there is something that is the object of 
their belief. In contrast, when someone has a sensation of pain there does not 
seem to be something that is the object of their pain. But what kind of thing 
are the objects of desires?
7
In the case of beliefs it is generally assumed that the object is a 
proposition, where propositions are intentional objects of some kind and are 
what is expressed in the ‘that_’ clause of an intentional expression. For 
example, when Frank believes that Canberra is East of Sydney, the proposition 
that is the object of his belief is the proposition that Canberra is East o f 
Sydney. There are good philosophical reasons in support of this view about 
the objects of belief These are the familiar reasons for thinking that the object 
of belief cannot be some concrete object or state of affairs in the world: for 
example, when someone has a belief about a non-existent thing, like a belief 
that Santa Claus has a white beard, or if they have a belief that is false then the 
object of their belief cannot be the concrete object or state of affairs that is 
described by the belief: this state of affairs does not obtain in the world. 
Similarly, if someone has a belief that such-and-such does not exist, and this 
belief is true, then the object of the belief cannot be something that exists in 
the world. In addition, if someone has a belief like the belief that some dogs 
have three legs then it seems that there is no particular thing, no particular 
object or state of affairs that their belief is about5. Rather, it is a belief about 
dogs in general. Admittedly there are contexts in which we attribute beliefs 
that seem not to have propositions as their objects, when we say things like
5 This is like the problem, described by Locke, about how we can have think about general 
things, like a thought about man, but not about any particular man, or a thought about all 
triangles, where the triangle we are thinking about is neither isosceles, nor equilateral, nor 
scalene.
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‘Nancy believes Oliver’, or ‘Peter believes in the Ten Commandments’. But it 
is generally assumed that these can be paraphrased to the propositional form 
without changing the meaning of the belief attribution: in these cases as 
something like ‘Nancy believes that what Oliver said was true’, and ‘Peter 
believes that people should obey the Ten Commandments’ respectively.
As I understand it, the common consensus is that the objects of desires 
are propositions like the objects of beliefs.6 The reasons to accept this view 
about the objects of belief seem to apply to the objects of desire as well, 
mutatis mutandis. Again there are contexts in which we attribute desires in a 
non-propositional form, for example when we say ‘Queanie wants a bar of 
chocolate’, or ‘Roger has a desire to go swimming’. It seems more difficult to 
paraphrase these cases into the propositional form with precision than in the 
analogous cases of attributions of non-propositional beliefs. However, I will 
assume that it is possible to do this and, following the consensus I will assume 
that the objects of desires are propositions. Of course, there are complicated 
issues concerning what propositions are and what the relationship is between a 
mental state and its propositional object. However, such issues are not my 
concern in this dissertation.7
6 See for example Field (1978), Smith (1994), Stalnaker (1984), Stampe (1987). See also 
Strawson who uses takes his argument against MN to generalize to states like beliefs 
because both desires and beliefs have in common that their object is a proposition. He says, 
‘Chapter 9 considers the case of desire and hence, more generally, the case of the so-called 
“propositional attitudes’” (Strawson 1998, p434).
7 See for example Field (1978) and Stalnaker (1984, Chapter 1) for more detailed discussion.
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A fourth feature to notice about MN is that it claims that having a 
desire is necessarily connected with having a disposition to act. Contrast it 
with a thesis that might be called the Action Necessity of Desire (AN) that 
claims having a desire is necessarily connected in the same way with actually 
acting. AN says the following:
(AN) If S desires that p  then 5 will act in a way S  believes
will bring aboutp.
MN is not like this. Of course, MN says that having a desire is connected in 
some way with actually acting. But this is in terms of the relation between 
being disposed to act and actually acting.
But what does it mean to say that something has a particular 
disposition? Consider the case of solubility, a paradigm example of a 
disposition. To say that sugar is soluble in water is not to say that in all cases 
in which a sample of sugar is placed in water that it will dissolve. Rather it is 
to say that if a sample of sugar is placed in water and a particular set of 
conditions obtain then the sugar will dissolve. These might be called the 
‘manifestation conditions’, or ‘enabling conditions’ for the disposition: they 
can be thought of as a set of propositions that must be true for a particular 
sample of sugar to dissolve if it is placed in water. For example, to say that
10
sugar is disposed to dissolve in water is to say that if a particular sample of 
sugar is placed in water andx,y , z ...and n are true then the sugar will dissolve. 
It is a notoriously difficult task to specify what this list of propositions is for 
any particular disposition: there are complicated issues about how to specify 
them so as to avoid cases of interference like masking or finkishness, where 
intuitively the object has the disposition despite not manifesting it when we 
would expect. However, these issues are not something that I will address in 
this thesis.8
I understand MN as making an analogous claim about the connection 
between desire and acting. That is, it could be expanded in the following way:
If S  desires thatp, and x, y, z and...and n are true then S  will act in a 
way S  believes will bring about p.
In chapter 2 I will discuss again the problem of specifying which propositions 
are in the set that make up the manifestation conditions of a disposition to act:
8 See for example, Lewis (1973), Fara (2005), for more detailed discussion. Masking occurs 
when the external conditions are interfered with to prevent a disposition from manifesting 
when it normally would. For example if a vase were wrapped in bubble-wrap before it was 
dropped over a hard surface then it wouldn’t break. Nonetheless it is intuitive the vase is 
still fragile: its disposition to break when dropped has been masked. Finkish interference 
occurs when the internal structure of the object that intuitively has a particular disposition is 
altered just in those cases in which it would normally manifest: for example if a sorcerer 
magically changed a china vase into concrete just in cases in which it was dropped over a 
hard surface then again it would not break. But again it is intuitive that the vase is still 
fragile. Its disposition to break when dropped has been finkishly blocked.
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in particular I will discuss whether having an intention to act is a condition of 
manifesting a disposition to act.
What about the particular disposition that MN is concerned with, the 
disposition to act? For the purposes of this dissertation I take having a 
disposition to act to mean having a disposition to perform certain bodily 
movements. So acting entails moving your body. However, moving your 
body does not entail acting: someone’s actions are only a subset of their bodily 
movements. The important distinction here is the intuitive one between those 
movements that are things that you do and those that are merely things that 
happen to you. This is the distinction that Davidson attempts to explicate in 
his 1971 essay ‘Agency’9 when he asks,
[w]hat events in the life of a person reveal agency; what are his deeds 
and his doings in contrast to mere happenings in his history; what is the 
mark that distinguishes his actions? (Davidson 1980, p43).
Intuitively there is a genuine difference between those bodily movements that 
are someone’s actions and those that are mere bodily movements. For 
example, a case in which someone acts to straighten their leg at the knee is
9 Davidson, D.: 1971: ‘Agency’, in Agent Action and Reason [Binkley, R., Bronaugh, R., and 
Marras, A. (eds.)] (University of Toronto Press). Reprinted in Davidson, D.: 1980: Essays 
on Actions and Events (OUP: New York).
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different from a case in which it straightens merely as a reflex, because their 
patella tendon is struck: and these cases are different in certain real respects 
and not merely in the way that they are described. According to Davidson the 
difference is that the bodily movements that are a person’s actions are those 
movements that they do intentionally whereas the mere bodily movements are 
those movements that are not done intentionally:
Consider coffee spilling again. I am the agent if I spill the coffee 
meaning to spill [it], but not if you jiggle my hand. What is the 
difference? The difference seems to lie in the fact that in one case, but 
not the other, I am intentionally doing something. My spilling the 
contents of my cup was intentional (Davidson 1980, pp. 45-46).
I will follow Davidson here. So according to MN if someone has a desire then 
they are disposed to intentionally move their body in a particular way. I will 
discuss this further in chapter 2. There are other complicated issues here 
concerning deviant causal chains for example, but I will not attempt to address 
those in this dissertation at all.10 11
10 See for example, Davidson, D. (1980): ‘Freedom to Act’; Essays on Actions and Events 
(OUP: New York) for detailed discussion.
11 Does this assumption, that acting entails moving your body, rule out the possibility of 
disembodied minds? In fact it does not do this: Firstly all that it entails at most is that 
disembodied minds can have desires. It entails nothing about other kinds of psychological 
states. So it is consistent with there being a disembodied mind that can have beliefs,
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Another feature to note about MN concerns the particular actions that it 
says someone is disposed to perform if they have a desire: these are actions 
that are related to their beliefs about how to bring about what they desire. So it 
is consistent with their actions failing to bring about what they desire: 
something that might occur if their beliefs about which actions they can 
perform to do this are false for example. Contrast MN with a different thesis, 
call it ‘MN(success)’, that claims that having a desire entails having a 
disposition to act in ways that will succeed in bringing about what you desire. 
MN(success) says the following:
[MN(success)] if S' desires that p then S is disposed to act in ways that 
will bring about p.
sensations and so on. Second, it is not inconsistent with things like ghosts and angels having 
desires except where having a body is understood as having something with bulk, that is 
something that is physical, has mass, extension, and so on. There are people who take 
having a body to imply this: indeed some of these people take this to show that the 
disembodiment is incoherent, and that things like ghosts and angels are not possible [see for 
example Shoemaker, S. 1996: The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays, (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge)]. However, MN is not committed to that. MN merely 
requires someone to have something that it can move for it to be able to have desires. So 
MN is consistent with there being angels and ghosts, like Casper the friendly ghost, or the 
ghost of Jacob Marley in Dickens’s A Christmas Carol having desires. These things have a 
body in the sense of having something that they can move: Marley walks up the stairs in 
Scrooge’s house for example. So MN is consistent with these kinds of thing having desires. 
Third, there are some extreme cases, like a mere locus of thought, that MN entails cannot 
have desires. But this kind of extreme case creates problems for a wide range of otherwise 
plausible views: for example, they are a problem for causal theories of knowledge if they are 
supposed to lack any physical properties. They are a problem for various kinds of 
extemalism about meaning: if they cannot enter into causal relationships with anything in 
the world then what are their thoughts about? The fact that MN is inconsistent with such 
extreme cases having desires is not obviously a special problem for the view.
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MN(success) entails that if S  desires that p  and, as a matter of fact, doing cp is 
the only action that S  can perform that will bring about p  then S is disposed to 
do cp. Even if S  does not believe this about cp, or S  believes that doing cp would 
not bring about p  then S  is disposed to do cp nonetheless. According to 
MN(success), how someone is disposed to act if they have a particular desire 
is independent of their beliefs. MN(success) seems implausible, but MN is not 
like this: rather, according to MN the actions someone is disposed to perform 
if they have a particular desire depends on their beliefs about what they can do 
to satisfy their desire. For example, if Sarah believes that she can bring about 
world peace by picketing the White House then according to MN, if she has a 
desire that there is world peace, she is disposed to picket the White House. 
The beliefs that are relevant here are beliefs like a belief that by doing cp I can 
bring about p, what I will call ‘instrumental beliefs’, or ‘means-ends beliefs’. 
Someone might have more than one instrumental belief about different actions 
they can perform that would satisfy their desire, in which case according to 
MN they are disposed to act in more than one way: for example, Sarah might 
also believe that she can bring about world peace by writing letters to the UN, 
in which case if she has a desire that there is world peace she is disposed to 
write letters to the UN and she is disposed to picket the White House. On the 
other hand, someone might lack any instrumental beliefs that are relevant to 
their particular desire: it is possible that over the course of time Sarah comes to
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stop believing that she can bring about world peace by picketing the White 
House or by writing letters to the UN and forms no new beliefs about how she 
might bring about world peace. But suppose that she maintains her desire that 
there is world peace. This case might appear to be a problem for MN but in 
fact it is not. It is true that while Sarah continues to lack any appropriate 
instrumental beliefs she will not act on her desire that there is world peace. 
Nonetheless, she is still disposed to act to try to bring about world peace 
because if she regains her earlier beliefs or forms different instrumental beliefs 
then, if certain other conditions obtain she will act on this desire. What this 
suggests is that having an appropriate instrumental belief is among the 
manifestation conditions of the disposition to act that MN claims is necessarily 
connected with having a desire. But this should seem plausible given the way 
that MN differs from MN(success) with respect to the relation between a 
person’s beliefs and the particular actions that MN says they are disposed to 
perform.
People sometimes talk about desires being ‘satisfied’ and ‘unsatisfied’, 
but it is often unclear what is meant by these terms in different contexts. For 
instance, someone might claim that having a desire satisfied involves 
becoming aware in some way that what you desire has come about: that is, 
roughly, that if S’s desire that p  has been satisfied then S  is aware that p  is the 
case. Others might claim something stronger than this, having a desire
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satisfied requires not only becoming aware in some way that what you desire 
has come about but also having some kind of positive affect or feeling as a 
result of having this awareness: that is, roughly, that if S”s desire that p  is 
satisfied then S is aware that p  and S has a positive affect (caused in the right 
way by S’s awareness that p). This raises interesting issues, for example about 
the possible objects of desire, about whether desires can persist, or continue to 
be held following their satisfaction, about self-knowledge, how we come to 
know what it is we desire, what kinds of cognitive access and what kinds of 
positive affects or feelings are related to desires, about what the relation 
between desires and aversions is, about the relation between desires being 
satisfied and their being unsatisfied is, and so on. However, I will attempt to 
avoid questions like these here: for the purposes of this dissertation any 
reference to a desire being satisfied, or someone acting to try to satisfy their 
desire should be understood merely in terms of what is desired being the case. 
I take the relation between satisfaction and desire to be analogous to the 
relation between truth and belief. Just as S’s belief that p  is true iff it is the 
case that p, so S' s desire that p  is satisfied iff it is the case that p. And S' s 
desire that p  is unsatisfied iff it is not the case that p. So having one’s desire 
satisfied does not entail anything about one’s awareness of this or any 
affective response one might have to one’s desire being satisfied.
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One last feature of MN that I will highlight here is the kind of relation 
that MN is concerned with. According to MN if someone has a desire then 
there is a certain fact about them: that is, that they have a disposition to act in a 
particular way. This might consist in their having a certain natural feature, like 
a particular intrinsic property for example, that will cause them to move their 
body in a particular way if certain other conditions obtain. However, the thesis 
is not committed to any particular claim like this. Moreover, MN is not a 
claim about any normative relations of desire. Contrast MN with a different 
thesis about a relation between having a desire and what it is rational to do, 
call it ‘MN(rat)’. MN(rat) says the following:
[MN(rat)] If S desires that p  then S  is disposed to act in ways S 
believes will bring aboutp, insofar as S  is rational.
MN(rat) is a weaker thesis than MN: it says that MN is true of the rational 
subjects. Whereas MN says that it is true of all things that if they have a desire 
then the have a disposition to act, MN(rat) restricts this claim to a subset of all 
things, that is the things that are rational. So MN(rat) is entailed by MN and 
objections to MN(rat) will be objections to MN. However, for the purposes of 
this dissertation I will focus on the unrestricted thesis, MN.
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This is not to deny that there are normative facts about desire. It is 
commonly thought that having a particular desire can have implications about 
what it is rational for someone to do, for example that if someone desires that 
p  then, in virtue of this they have a reason to act in ways that they believe will 
bring about p . ]2 And it is often thought that there are facts about the kind of 
objects that it is appropriate to desire, for example that something is only 
desirable if it has value, either in virtue of having some valuable characteristic
i ^
or as a means to achieve something with a valuable characteristic. These are 
interesting issues: however, I will not address any normative features of desire 
like these in this dissertation.
I take it that my project here, to defend MN is not a trivial matter. 
Earlier we saw how prominent and important desire is in our personal lives. In 
addition desires are significant within many fields of philosophy. So there are 
philosophical reasons to want a better understanding of desire as well as 
personal reasons. Their most obvious relevance is within Philosophy of Mind. 
Many people working in Philosophy of Mind attempt to provide analyses of 
different kinds of mental state, that is give necessary and sufficient conditions 
for having that kind of state. People do this for belief, perception, intention,
12 See for example Stampe (1987) for discussion. 
lj See for example Anscombe (1957) for discussion.
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emotion and so on. 14 In light of the prominence of desire it is not 
unreasonable to expect some philosophers of mind to be trying to give the 
same kind of analysis of them . 15 But the notion of desire is also used 
extensively in other, less obvious fields, such as Meta-Ethics, Theories of 
Practical Reasoning, Aesthetics and Philosophy of Language, among others. 16
In Meta-Ethics, for example in the debate between Internalists and 
Externalists, in particular where this intersects with the debate between 
Descriptivists and Expressivists, certain positions in the debate appeal to 
desires to explain the practical character of moral judgments. People who hold 
certain versions of Expressivism and those who hold certain versions of 
Intemalism claim that making a moral judgment must consist in or entail 
having a desire to act in accordance with that moral judgment: that is that if 
someone judges that the right thing to do is to cp then this consists in or entails 
that they have a desire to cp. These Expressivists and Internalists say that this
14 See for example, Davidson (1980) and Bratman (1984) for analyses of intentions, Prinz 
(2005) for an analysis of emotions, etc.
13 As, indeed a number of people have attempted to do, and in a variety of ways, as I discuss in 
the next Chapter, in section 1.5. However, as I understand the field, the number of people 
who work on this kind of project, and the extent to which it is discussed and has been 
developed is significantly less than for the projects of giving analyses of other kinds of 
mental state.
16 However, caution must be taken here. Merely because a field of philosophy uses the term 
‘desire’ it should not be assumed that it is using it in the same sense as we do when we talk 
about the mental state of desiring. So it should not be simply assumed that the findings from 
an analysis of desire in philosophy of mind will be straightforwardly applicable to other 
fields in which the notion of desire is used. Nonetheless, it is perhaps reasonable to assume 
that there will be something in common between the notions used in other fields and desire 
as a mental state. If the relationship can be understood then it may be possible for an 
analysis of desire as a mental state to be relevant elsewhere.
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is the only way to account for the fact that people seem to be motivated to act 
in accordance with their moral judgments.
In Practical Reasoning, for example in an analogous debate between 
Internalists and Externalists, various positions in the debate appeal to desires 
to explain the practical character of judging that you have a reason to act in a 
particular way. Such Internalists claim that when someone judges that they 
have a reason to cp then ceteris paribus this entails that they have a desire to cp. 
Analogously, they take it that this is the only way to account for the fact that 
we seem to be motivated by our judgments that we have a reason to act in a 
particular way.17
In Aesthetics and Philosophy of Language, for example when 
attempting to explain our engagement with and reactions to fiction, some 
theorists appeal to desires when they claim that fictions are props for games of 
make-believe or pretense. Roughly, people who propose to analyse fictions in 
terms of pretense claim that works of fiction encourage people to engage in 
certain kinds of imagining and they provide the rules for how such imaginings 
should proceed and how it is appropriate to react [see for example, Walton 
(1990), Currie (2004)]. One of the debates here between different versions of
17 Interestingly, in light of the fact that many take the case of moral judgments to be just a 
particular instance of this kind of practical judgment, where we judge that the reason we 
have to act in a particular way is a moral reason, there is less explicit debate about 
expressivist and descriptivist positions about reason judgments [although see e.g. Gibbard 
(1990). Blackburn (1984) also has expressivist views about statements in other areas of 
discourse, such as modality and causation].
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this account is whether our reactions to fictions involve us having genuine 
desires, say to behave in a way that is similar to how someone would behave 
in the imagined situations [see for example, Nichols and Stich (2003)] or 
whether these reactions involve us having another kind of state that is only 
desire-like but that is not a genuine desire [see for example, Currie and 
Ravenscroft (2002), Velleman (2000)].
Perhaps surprisingly, in light of this personal and philosophical 
importance, desire has been under-researched in its own right. In contrast to 
the other kinds of mental state that we most commonly have, states like belief, 
perception, intention, and emotions, there has been little recent study of desire 
as a mental state. For example, there are reasonably well established views 
about belief and we take ourselves to have a good understanding of many of its
1 o
important features. In addition there has been considerable discussion of, and 
detailed attempts to explain, various puzzles about belief.19
The other common kinds of mental state have also received a 
significant amount of attention in recent philosophy: for example, there is a
18 For example, for work on the propositional objects of belief see e.g. Adams (1987), 
Chalmers (1996), (2000), (2006), (2006), Chisholm (1982), (1984), (1989), Frege (1879), 
Jackson (1988), (1996), Kaplan (1978), Kripke (1980), Lewis (1979), (1986), Perry (1979), 
Pollock (1982), Russell (1903), (1910), Sorensen (1988) (2002), Tienson (1984), Van 
Inwagen (2003), etc, for work on the metaphysics of belief see e.g. Baker (1987), (1993), 
Cohen (1996), Dennett (1983), Garfield (1988), Sobel and Copp (2001), Schwitzgebel 
(2002), van Gulick (1994), etc.
9 For example, for work on the lottery and preface paradoxes, in which people appear to have 
inconsistent beliefs see e.g. Appiah (1987), Cohen (2005), Haack (1996), Sorensen (1988), 
Weintraub (2001), Wheeler (2005), Williamson (1996), etc, for work on delusional beliefs
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large and rapidly growing literature on the emotions.“ The study of perception 
is arguably even more established than the study of emotion, and a distinct 
field has developed that is dedicated to it. People that work in this field 
attempt, among other things, to characterise various different kinds of 
perceptual state and their features.21 Similarly, the study of intention has 
developed a degree of autonomy from Philosophy of Mind and is much 
discussed in Philosophy of Action, and in Practical Reasoning: “
see e.g. Bayne and Pacherie (2005), Coltheart (2005), Fine et al (2005), Davies (2001), 
Hohwy and Rosenberg (2005), Stone and Young (1997), and so on.
20 For example, for cognitive theories of the emotions see e.g. Nash (1989), Neu (2000), 
Scheffler (1991), for perceptual theories see e.g. Clarke (1986), Griffiths (1997), (2003), 
James (1884), Kerner (1970), Prinz (2004), (2005), Roberts (1992), (1996), Tappolet 
(2005), for evaluative theories see e.g. Blackburn (1998), Greenspan (1988), Plelm (2002), 
Hookway (2003), Oddie (2005), Nussbaum (2004), for work on the connections between 
emotions and rationality see e.g. Audi (1977), Badcock (2004), Ben-Ze’ev (1997), (2003), 
De Sousa (1987), (2003), Jones (2004), Goldie (2004), Greenspan (1988), (2003), Helm 
(1994), Solomon (1977), etc, for work on the relations between emotions and action see 
e.g. Lyons (1978), Pacherie (2002), Prinz (2004), etc.
21 For example, for work on the content of perception see e.g. Ayers (2002), Bermudez (2000),
(2003) , Brewer (1999), Byme (2003), Chalmers (2006), Crane (1992), Davies (1992), 
Kelly (2001), MacPherson (2003), (2005), Martin (2002), McDowell (1994), Millikan 
(1991), (1993), Pacherie (2000), Peacocke (1983), (1992), (1998), Siegel (2004), (2006), 
Tye (1994), (2000), for work on the connection between perception and belief see e.g. 
Austin (1964), Clark (1981), Evans, (1982), McDowell (1994), Millar (1991), Noe (1999), 
Pendlebury (1990), Soltis (1966), Tye (1995) for work on the connection between 
perception and action see e.g. Clark (2002), Hurley (1998), Noe (2005), for discussion of 
perceptual illusions see e.g. Armstrong (1968), Crane (1988), (2002), Fisher (1978), 
Johnston (2004), Maynard (1994), Mellor (1988), etc, for work about Direct and Indirect 
Realism in perception see e.g. Armstrong (1961), Austin (1964), Ayer (1940), Brewer
(2004) , Crane (1992), McDowell (1994), Russell (1912), (1921), Smith (1999), Thau 
(2004), Valberg (1992), for work on the phenomenal character of perception see e.g. 
Chalmers (2006), Hellie (2005), Jackson (1982), Tye (2002), etc, for work on the relations 
between perception and aesthetics see e.g. Crick (1976), Gombrich (1960), Gombrich, 
Hochberg and Black (1972), Lycan (1971), Morton (1974), Wolheim (1973), Ziff (1951),
22 Significant writers here include e.g. Anscombe (1957), Audi (1973), (1991), (1993), 
Bratman (1984), (1987), (1991), (1993), (1999), Blackburn (1998), Broome (2004), Dancy
(1999) , Davidson (1980), Dretske (1988), (1999) Hampshire (1965), Harman (1983), Kavka 
(1983), Mele (1992), (1999), (2005), Millar (2004), Millikan (1993), Quinn (1989), Pacherie
(2000) , Raz (1999), (2001), Smith (1994), Searle (1979), (1983), Velleman (1989), (2000), 
etc.
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In contrast there are few well-worked out theories about desire.2j And 
there has been little similar research into analogous questions and problems 
about desire, for example, what desire has in common with other connative 
states like hopes and wishes and in what ways they differ, what the possible 
objects of desire are and how they are related to our beliefs about those things, 
the role of desire in motivating and actually bringing someone to act in 
different ways, whether there are standards of correctness distinctly applying 
to desire such that it can be reasonable to criticize someone for having certain 
desires in a similar way that someone can be criticised for having false beliefs 
or for believing things that are inconsistent, and so on. The importance of 
desires in our mental lives is not reflected in the extent to which they are 
studied and in the amount that is understood about them. This dissertation can 
contribute to setting that right.
Structure of the Thesis.
The approach of this thesis is mainly defensive. I take there to be six principle 
kinds of objection to MN and in the following chapters I will address each in 
turn in detail and attempt to defend MN against it. However, I begin, in the
2j See again footnote (15) above.
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first chapter Motivations for Motivational Necessity, by giving some prima 
facie reasons to accept MN. First, it is presupposed by a number of important 
debates in various fields of philosophy and by the majority of people currently 
working in philosophy of mind. This alone might suggest the intuitive 
plausibility of the view: there would be extensive philosophical consequences 
if in fact MN was false. Second, MN provides a number of theoretical 
advantages for work within philosophy of mind in particular. I highlight some 
of these that have been offered by people who have explicitly accepted MN as 
part of a particular analysis: they appeal to MN’s potential for answering some 
persistent problems in philosophy of mind. In addition I highlight some of the 
explanatory advantages that MN has with respect to certain facts about desire 
in particular. I argue that MN provides explanations of these facts that are 
better than the explanations that could be provided in terms of other features 
that are commonly proposed as necessary conditions for having a desire.
In the second chapter, Motivation, Desire and the Weather 
Watchers, I address Galen Strawson’s objection to MN based on his example 
of the Weather Watchers (1994). These are creatures that, according to 
Strawson can have desires but cannot act or be disposed to act. Fie claims that 
it is intuitive that creatures like the Weather Watchers are possible. If 
Strawson is right then they are a counter example to MN: they show that it is 
possible for someone to have a desire and not have a disposition to act.
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However, I argue that the example fails. It is under-described and although it 
appears to be a case in which the Weather Watchers have desires and are not 
disposed to act, if the additional details necessary to properly understand the 
example are filled in then this is not the case. I argue that there are two ways 
in which this can be done but that according to the first of these the Weather 
Watchers cannot have dispositions to act but cannot have desires either, while 
according to the second the Weather Watchers can have desires but if they do 
then they will have dispositions to act as MN claims. So neither of the ways in 
which the example can be properly understood is a case in which the Weather 
Watchers both have a desire and do not have a disposition to act: they are not 
counter examples to MN. However, the counter example fails for interesting 
reasons: it suggests that there are further relations both between desires and 
intentions to act and between intentions to act and dispositions to act.
Next, in Troublesome Desires, I address three more putative counter 
examples to MN. Each of these is a case in which the specific content of a 
particular kind of desire, its propositional object, is claimed to make it a case 
in which a subject who has such a desire cannot be disposed to act to try to 
satisfy it. The first, what I call self-passive desires, are desires to have 
something without having to do anything yourself to get it: for example a 
desire that ones child passes an exam on their own. I argue that self-passive 
desires are not a counter example to MN if they are properly understood:
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moreover MN can accommodate these cases in a very plausible way when 
they are described in full detail. The second kinds of case are desires for 
something that is necessarily true and obviously so, like a desire that 2 + 2 = 4, 
while the third kinds of case are desires for something that is obviously 
impossible, like a desire that I have a square circle. I argue that these two 
cases are merely specific instances of a more general problem, what Stalnaker 
calls ‘the problem of equivalence’ about how it is possible to represent one and 
not another of a set of propositions that are necessarily equivalent to one 
another. This is not specifically a problem for giving a theory of desire and 
something that we should expect to be answered in this context. Rather, it is 
plausible to think there must be some solution to this general problem and that 
if this general solution is applied to these two cases then it will show that they 
are not counter examples to MN.
The fourth chapter, Defending Dispositional Direction of Fit, is 
concerned with the difference between beliefs and desires. A popular way of 
characterizing what distinguishes these kinds of mental states is in terms of 
their having different directions-of-fit. But what does it mean to have a 
particular direction-of-fit? I argue that the most plausible kind of account 
analyses this in terms of a state’s functional role, its characteristic properties 
and relations. According to this kind of account it is necessary for a kind of 
state to have the direction-of-fit of desire that if someone is in that state then
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they are disposed to act in ways they believe will bring about what they desire. 
So this plausible way of distinguishing between beliefs and desires entails that 
MN is true.
In the chapter I defend this account of direction-of-fit against different 
objections that argue, for different reasons, that it is uninformative. They 
argue that it fails to provide information about the features of each kind of 
state that are essential for its being a state of one kind and not the other, that it 
merely tells us about the features that are not relevant to this particular 
difference. But these objections fail: in one case the objection is based on a 
misinterpretation or failure to recognise certain significant details of the 
account that are relevant to this particular difference. In the other case the 
objection is based on implausible and overly demanding assumptions about 
what is required for an analysis to be informative. So these objections fail, and 
we should accept this way of characterizing the difference between beliefs and 
desires, which entails that MN is true
Finally, in Desire and Reward I address an objection to MN that 
claims that there is a conflict between MN and the kind of empirical 
information that we have from current neuroscience. According to Timothy 
Schroeder, who makes this objection, this kind of information must be 
incorporated into an analysis of desire if that analysis is to be informative. 
Yet, he claims that it supports what he calls a ‘Reward Theory of Desire’, and
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according to such a reward theory MN is false. However, 1 argue that both of 
Schroeder’s conclusions here are false. First, I argue that to the extent that the 
neuroscientific evidence supports a reward theory it also supports an analysis 
that entails MN is true, what we might call a ‘Motivational Theory of Desire’. 
In addition, I argue that the most plausible versions of reward theory are, in 
fact also versions of motivational theory: plausible versions of reward theory 
themselves entail that MN is true. So MN is consistent with and supported by 
the empirical evidence.
I will then briefly conclude by summarizing the arguments that I have 
given in the different chapters of the dissertation and what I take them to show. 
I will also briefly discuss some of the further issues, and areas of interest for 
research that come up during the dissertation but that I am not able to talk 
about in detail.
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CHAPTER 1
MOTIVATION FOR 
MOTIVATIONAL NECESSITY.
1.1 -  Introduction.
What turns on the truth of MN? In the following chapters I will defend the 
thesis against what I take to be the main objections to it. But what is the 
significance of this project? In this chapter I will attempt to highlight the 
importance and widespread acceptance of MN. It is presupposed by a number 
of flourishing, keenly contested debates in different fields of philosophy, the 
landscape of which would be significantly altered if MN were false. In 
addition MN has theoretical and explanatory benefits for work in Philosophy 
of Mind: it provides a plausible way of answering some traditional problems 
within this field. And it provides the most plausible explanations of certain 
prominent facts about desire. So this is not a trivial issue: it matters, both for 
Philosophy of Mind and more broadly in philosophy, whether MN is true.
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1.2 -  MN in Different Debates.
Recall from the Introduction, I described a range of fields of philosophy that 
appealed to the notion of desire in different debates. I described debates 
between Internalist and Externalist views in both Meta-Ethics and in Practical 
Reasoning, and a debate in Aesthetics and Philosophy of Language between 
different versions of make-believe, or pretense accounts of fiction and our 
reactions to works of fiction. In fact, these debates not only appeal to the 
notion of desire but they presuppose the truth of MN.
Consider again the example from Meta-Ethics: this is where the 
debate between Internalists and Externalists and the debate between 
Descriptivists and Expressivists intersect. It is often considered the crucial 
issue within Meta-Ethics and is what Smith calls ‘The Moral Problem’ (Smith 
1994). He presents the issue as the apparent conflict between three common 
and powerful intuitions about moral judgments and about human psychology: 
first, what Smith calls ‘the objectivity of moral judgment’ which suggests that
there are moral facts, wholly determined by circumstances, and that our 
moral judgments express our beliefs about what those facts are (Smith 
1994, pi 1).
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Second, ‘the practicality of moral judgment’ which suggests that
moral judgments seem to be, or imply, opinions about the reasons we 
have for behaving in certain ways, and, other things being equal, 
having such opinions is a matter of finding ourselves with a 
corresponding motivation to act (Smith 1994, p7).
Finally, according to ‘the standard picture of human psychology’ [due to 
Hume (1975)]
there are two main kinds of psychological state. On the one hand there 
are beliefs, states that purport to represent the way the world is. Since 
our beliefs purport to represent the world, they are assessable in terms 
of truth and falsehood, depending on whether or not they succeed in 
representing the world to be the way it really is. And on the other hand 
there are desires, states that represent how the world is to be. Desires 
are unlike beliefs in that they do not even purport to represent the way 
the world is. They are therefore not assessable in terms of truth and 
falsehood. Hume concludes that belief and desire are therefore distinct 
existences: that is, that we can always pull beliefs and desire apart, at 
least modally. For any belief and desire pair that we imagine, we can
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always imagine someone having the desire but lacking the belief, and 
vice versa (Smith 1994, p7).
In addition, this standard picture provides the following model for explaining 
human action:
Crudely our beliefs tell us how the world is, and thus how it has to be 
changed, so as to make it the way our desires tell us it is to be. An 
action is thus the product of these two distinct existences: a desire 
representing the way the world is to be and a belief telling us how the 
world has to be changed so as to make it that way (Smith 1994, p9).
The idea is that beliefs cannot motivate someone to act, rather that only desires 
can do this, so to be motivated to act in a particular way it is necessary that 
someone has both a desire and a belief that that desire can be satisfied by 
acting in that particular way.
The Moral Problem then is that it seems as though moral judgments 
express beliefs about facts and it also seems that having such a belief either 
itself motivates someone to act or entails that they have a corresponding desire 
that provides this motivation when had along with such beliefs. Yet we think 
that beliefs cannot do either of these things: they neither motivate people to act
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nor are they necessarily connected with having particular desires. This 
conflict suggests that, in fact, we cannot make moral judgments as there is no 
psychological state that we can have that has the properties necessary to be 
such a judgment. Hence, the Moral Problem threatens us with moral nihilism 
if it cannot be solved (Smith 1994, p i3).
A range of responses have been made to try to solve the Moral 
Problem. Some like Frankena (1958), Foot (1972), Scanlon (1982), Railton 
(1986), Brink (1989), Copp (1997), Svavarsdottir (1999) and Shafer-Landau 
(2003) respond by denying the practicality of moral judgment: such 
externalists deny that making a moral judgment necessarily motivates 
someone to act. Rather they claim that the connection with being motivated to 
act is ‘external’ to making a moral judgment, that whether or not someone will 
be motivated depends on what other mental states, like desires, they have.
Others like Ayer (1936), Carnap (1937), Hare (1952), Mackie (1977), 
Blackburn (1984), and Gibbard (1990), respond by denying the objectivity of 
moral judgment: such expressivists deny that making a moral judgment is a 
matter of forming a belief about certain facts. They claim that moral 
judgments are actually expressions of, for example, our approval or 
disapproval of certain things and ways of behaving, or expressions of our 
desires for such things, or commands to others to behave in certain ways, and 
so on. They typically claim that it is because the surface grammar of moral
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judgments is like that of expression of beliefs that we are misled into thinking 
that moral judgments express our beliefs.
Others still, like Nagel (1970), McDowell (1978), Platts (1979), 
McNaughton (1988), Darwall (1983), Dancy (1993), Scanlon (1998) and 
Shafer-Landau (2003) reject the standard picture of human psychology: these 
‘Anti-Humeans’ typically claim that having a belief either can be sufficient for 
being motivated to act or that it can entail having a particular desire. So 
according to anti-Humeans making a moral judgment can be an expression of 
one’s beliefs, and it can motivate someone to act in accordance with their 
judgment.
1 do not intend to enter into this debate here. Rather what is 
illustrative for my purposes is that all sides of the debates typically assume that 
if those positions that claim that making a moral judgment is a matter of 
having a desire to act in accordance with that judgment, or if it entails having 
such a desire then the practicality of moral judgment follows straightforwardly 
from this. It is a presumption of the debates that if someone has a desire to act 
in accordance with a moral judgment then necessarily they are motivated to act 
in that way. For instance, even externalists typically accept that if 
expressivism is true and moral judgments express our desires then the 
practicality of moral judgment follows from this, and intemalism is true. But 
they will deny that such versions of expressivism are true. On the other hand,
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even expressivists typically accept that if extemalism is true and moral 
judgments are not necessarily connected with being motivated to act then 
expressivism, or at least those versions that claim that moral judgments are 
expressions of desires, is false. But they will deny that extemalism is true. 
And even Anti-Humeans typically accept that if expressivism is true then their 
denial of the standard picture of human psychology is unmotivated. That is, 
they accept that if moral judgments are expressions of desire then this is 
sufficient for there to be a necessary connection between making a moral 
judgment and being motivated to act. There would be no need, in this context 
at least, to deny the standard picture. So, all sides of this debate typically 
presuppose that there is a necessary connection between having a desire and 
being motivated to act. If we understand someone being motivated to act in 
terms of their having a disposition to act in ways that they believe will bring 
about what they desire [as for example Smith does (1994)] then it is MN that 
is presupposed by this debate.
The analogous debate between in Practical Reasoning presupposes 
MN in a similar way. Indeed, moral judgments are often considered to be just 
a particular example of judgments about what reasons you have.24 Analogous
24 See for example Rosati (2006) who says, ‘Moral motivation is an instance of a more general 
phenomenon—what we might call normative motivation—for our other normative 
judgments also typically have some motivating force. When we make the normative 
judgment that something is good for us, or that we have a reason to act in a particular way, 
or that a specific course of action is the rational course, we also tend to be moved.’ (Rosati, 
C.S. 2006: ‘Moral Motivation’: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed online
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positions are available with respect to judgments about your reasons to act in 
particular ways as are available with respect to moral judgments, with 
analogous relations between the different views. For example, Internalists 
about practical reason judgments typically claim that judging that you have a 
reason to act in a particular way is necessarily connected with being motivated 
to act in that way. In contrast, Externalists about practical reason judgments 
deny this and typically claim that whether or not you will be motivated to act 
in accordance with your judgments about your reasons depends on whether 
you have, in addition, desires to act in this way, or that you believe will be 
brought about by acting in this way. This debate intersects with the debate 
between Expressivists about practical reason judgments, who will say these 
judgments are an expression of approval of acting in that way, or of a desire to 
act in that way, for example and Descriptivists who say that these judgments 
are expressions of beliefs about what reasons you have. Again, these debates 
presuppose MN in an analogous way to the debates in Meta-Ethics.
Finally, consider the debate within Aesthetics and Philosophy of 
Language between different make-believe or pretense accounts about fictions 
and our responses to fictions. Recall, the relevant debate is between those 
views that attempt to explain our responses to fiction in terms of our having 
genuine beliefs and desires, for example beliefs about how people tend to act
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-inotivation/ (17-02-2007)). See also (Smith 1994, pp.
61-62.)
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in the fictional situations and desires to act in similar ways, and those views 
that attempt to explain these responses in terms of our having merely belief­
like and desire-like attitudes about and towards the fictions. One of the 
arguments given by those who propose the second kind of account appeals to 
the fact that people are rarely motivated to act in response to fictions in the 
same ways that they would be motivated to act in similar real situations. For 
example, someone who is watching Invasion of the Body Snatchers is not 
motivated to actually run away, or to actually call the police, and so on. The 
presumption seems to be that if someone had the kind of genuine desires when 
responding to fictions that the first kinds of account propose then this would 
entail that they had such motivations. Hence, they claim that what people 
have instead are attitudes that are desire-like: and one of the ways that these 
desire-like attitudes are said to differ from genuine desires is in terms of 
lacking a necessary connection with being motivated to act. In contrast, those 
who give the first kind of account attempt to explain this apparent lack of 
motivation away in terms of the content of their beliefs about the appropriate 
responses to fictions, or in terms of their having other desires that entail 
motivations to act in ways that conflict with these and over-ride their 
dispositions to act (say, desires to not be embarrassed or desires to act like the 
others in the cinema, and so on). So again, it is presupposed in this debate that
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having a desire entails being motivated to act, and if this is understood in terms 
of having a disposition to act then it is MN that is presupposed.
As we can see, it is not merely desires that have widespread 
importance in philosophy but MN itself has similar widespread importance. 
These lively and important debates appear to presuppose that MN is true, they 
presuppose that there is a necessary connection between having a desire and 
being disposed to act in ways you believe will bring about what you desire. So 
people involved in such debates should also be interested in defending MN. If 
it turned out to be false it is likely that there would be significant implications 
for those debates, with respect to the relations between and plausibility of 
different views, the kinds of argument that are or might be relevant to them, 
and so on.
1.3 -  MN in Philosophy of Mind.
As I have described, MN is presupposed by those working in a number of 
fields of philosophy. In a similar way the common consensus among those 
working in Philosophy of Mind is that MN is true.” Indeed, it is sometimes
2:1 For example, Schroeder calls the theory that having a desire consists in having a disposition 
to act 'the Standard Theory’. According to this theory it is both necessary and sufficient for 
having a desire that someone is disposed to act in ways they believe will bring about what
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taken to follow from adopting a functionalist approach to analysing mental 
states, which is currently the most popular and plausible approach. Of course, 
MN is not entailed by the functionalist approach itself: functionalism, in 
philosophy of mind for example, is just a technique for deriving necessary and 
sufficient conditions for having a particular kind of mental state from a 
collection of claims about the features and relations of that kind of state. So 
what is entailed by a functionalist account of a particular kind of mental state 
depends on the initial claims that the account is derived from. MN will be 
entailed by a particular functionalist analysis only if it was presupposed 
beforehand.
To see this, consider how someone might proceed to give a functional 
analysis of desire.26 Suppose they begin by distinguishing the following two 
claims that they take to describe the essential features and relationships of 
desire: that people are motivated to act to try to satisfy their desires, and that 
people are usually pleased if their desires are satisfied. The first step towards 
an analysis of desire is to make these claims more precise. Suppose this yields 
the following:
they desire, so it entails MN. He attributes the lack of recent research into desire on the fact 
that this theory is so established (Schroeder 2004, pp. 10-11).
26 Thanks to Daniel Stoljar: this way of presenting the functionalist technique here is directly 
due to discussions with him.
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If 5 desires that p  then S is disposed to act in a way S believes will 
bring about p.
If S desires that p  then S is pleased if S believes that p.
Next they conjoin these claims and rearrange this conjunction around ‘5 
desires that /?’:
If S desires that p  then S is disposed to act in a way S believes will 
bring about p  and S is pleased if S believes that p.
The third step is to identify all of the psychological terms in this conjunction 
and replace them with appropriate variables to yield the following open 
sentence:
If S R T s that p  then {S is disposed to R2 in a way S R3's will bring 
about p  and S has F  if S R3’s that p).
The penultimate step is to generalize this by existentially quantifying:
3(R1, R2, R3, F) If S RFs that p  then (S is disposed to R2 in a way S 
R3's will bring about p  and S has F if S R3's that p).
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Finally, this is presented in the form of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
having a desire:
S desires that p  iff:
[3(7?/, R2, R3, F) If S R F s that p  then (S  is disposed to R2 in a way S
R3's will bring about p  and S has F if S R3's that p)\ and [S R V s that
p i
This is sometimes called the Ramsey sentence for this analysis. It effect it 
says that having a desire consists in being in a state that has a particular set of 
properties and relations. Which state this actually is in a particular kind of 
individual, or in the same individual at different times, is a further issue about 
what realizes desire in that kind of individual. But it should be obvious that a 
particular functionalist analysis of desire will only entail MN if something like 
the first claim I used here is among the claims that the analysis begins from. 
Presumably if someone denies MN then they will deny that the correct 
analysis of desire incorporates this claim.
Nonetheless, MN is widely accepted in Philosophy of Mind. Among 
the reasons for this, discussed by Smith (1994) and Stalnaker (1984) for 
example is that MN has significant theoretical benefits for work in the field: it
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can provide a way of giving an analysis of two traditionally problematic 
features of our mental lives that is consistent with naturalism.27 Naturalism is 
the view that all the facts about the world are natural facts: that is, the view 
that everything that exists can potentially be explained in the terms of the 
natural sciences, like physics, chemistry and biology, or the social sciences, 
including psychology (Smith 1994, p l7).28 There is an overwhelming 
consensus that naturalism is true, so any adequate theory of the mind, and of 
desire, must respond to these problems.
What are these traditional problems that Smith and Stalnaker 
highlight? They are both examples of what is sometimes called ‘the Problem 
of Intentionality’ or ‘ Brentano’s Problem’ after the Italian philosopher 
Brentano who discussed it in the 19th Century (Field 1978, p9). Stalnaker 
describes the problem in the following way:
For various familiar reasons, intentional or representational relations 
seem unlike the relations holding between things and events in the
27 Note that it is not being claimed that these two are the only features commonly associated 
with desire that have traditionally proven difficult to explain in a way that is consistent with 
naturalism. Also, these are not the only reasons that have been offered as motivation for 
accepting MND. Smith for instance also highlights that MND can explain a number of other 
features of desires, such as the fallibility of our epistemic access to our own desires and the 
possibility of particular desires both having or lacking an associated phenomenal character 
[see Smith (1994) pp. 108-115 for discussion]. These particular reasons are presented here 
as examples of the kind of motivations that particular theorists have offered in support of 
MND.
28 See also Moore (1903), Ayer (1936), Wiggins (1987), etc.
43
natural world: causal interactions, spatiotemporal relations, various 
notions of similarity and difference. One can, it seems, picture, 
describe, or think about such things as gods and golden mountains 
even if they do not exist. And one can picture, describe, or think about 
a triangle or a sunset without there being any particular triangle or 
sunset that is pictured, described, or thought about. Some philosophers 
have used these distinctive features of intentional relations to argue 
that they are irreducible to natural relations. From this conclusion it is 
argued that mental phenomena cannot be a species of natural 
phenomena. Any account of thinking things as natural objects in the 
material world, these philosophers argue, is bound to leave something 
out. The challenge presented to the philosopher who wants to regard 
human beings and mental phenomena as part of the natural order is to 
explain intentional relations in naturalistic terms (Stalnaker 1984, p6).
Brentano himself denied that this challenge could be met. He claimed that 
necessarily mental states have intentional relations29 but that intentional 
relations are semantic relations, and that these cannot be reduced to natural 
relations. Hence, Brentano thought that the mind is not purely physical and 
that naturalism, or materialism is false. However, the current view is that
29 This is expressed in the slogan often taken to be Brentano’s main idea, that intentionality is 
‘the mark of the mental’.
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Brentano was wrong to conclude this. The overwhelming consensus is
expressed by Field when he says
I take it as unquestionable (given what we know about the world) that 
materialism is true. I also take it as unquestioned [...] that people do 
believe and desire. These two assumptions together amount to the 
assumption that Brentano’s problem can be solved (Field 1978, p9).j0
We see a particular instance of this problem in philosophy of mind in the 
problem of characterising the relationship between mental states like belief 
and desire and their objects. As I discussed in the Introduction, it is common 
to describe mental states like belief and desire as having an object: when 
someone has a particular belief there is something that they believe is the case. 
And when someone has a particular desire there is something that they desire 
to have, or desire to be the case. But such objects cannot be concrete states of 
the world for those familiar reasons mentioned by Stalnaker above [and in 
more detail in Stalnaker (1984), and by Field (1978)] and that I discussed
j0 Two caveats deserve mention here: first although there is in fact some disagreement about 
the possibility of giving an analysis of certain kinds of mental states in material terms, in 
particular those mental states with phenomenal character like being in pain or having a 
visual sensation of red, it is almost uncontroversial that propositional attitudes like beliefs 
and desires can be analysed in material terms. Second, although some people [see for 
example Churchland (1981)] do deny that people have beliefs and desires, such Eliminativist 
theories of belief and desire are very much a minority view and are generally taken to be 
implausible [see for example Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (1996) pp. 242-247 for 
discussion].
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briefly in the Introduction. These reasons suggest that the objects of beliefs 
and desires must be intentional objects, or representations of some sort. The 
relations between a person and the objects of their beliefs and desires are 
therefore intentional relations. Someone trying to give an account of belief or 
desire therefore faces Brentano’s problem if they are trying to characterise 
these relations.
A common response here, and one I am adopting in this dissertation, 
is to say that the objects of beliefs and desires are propositions: the problem 
then becomes the problem of characterizing the relation between a person and 
a particular proposition in terms of a natural relation. But merely saying that 
the objects of belief and desire are propositions does not suffice to provide any 
obvious solution. An answer to Brentano’s problem must give an account, in 
naturalistic tenns of the relational property that someone has when they have a 
belief that /?, a desire that p, or some other kind of intentional mental state, 
where p stands for the proposition that is the object of that state. The standard 
way of characterizing a proposition is as a set of possible worlds at which the 
proposition is the case. But to say that the object of someone’s belief or desire 
is the set of possible worlds where a particular proposition is true is merely to 
say what has this relational property. Saying this does not show that this 
relation can be analysed in terms of a natural relation, and nor does it say what
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this natural relation is like. So it does not provide an answer to Brentano’s 
Problem (Field 1978, pi 1).
The relevance of MN here is that it does provide a way of answering 
this problem, at least for the case of characterizing the relation between a 
person and the object of their desire. According to MN if someone desires that 
p then they are disposed to act in particular ways in particular conditions. 
What this is often taken to mean is that they have a certain intrinsic property 
that will cause them to act in such ways if the appropriate conditions obtain. 
For example, such intrinsic properties might be certain physical states, 
typically caused in particular ways and that typically cause the person to be in 
certain other physical states, some of which cause them to act in particular 
ways in certain circumstances. Although MN need not be interpreted in this 
way, if it is then it says that if someone has a desire that p then they have a 
particular set of physical and causal properties and relations. Furthermore, this 
is a different from the set of physical and causal properties and relations they 
have if that have a desire that q. But physical and causal properties are 
uncontroversial examples of natural properties and relations. So MN offers a 
way of giving a naturalistic analysis of desires having a particular object. As 
we can see, in the context of this problem of analysing intentional relations
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this is a significant theoretical benefit and it is often given as motivation for 
accepting MN.jl
The second of these traditional problems that I will mention here is 
similar, again a particular example of Brentano’s Problem: it is the problem of 
giving a characterisation of being motivated to do something. This problem is 
particularly relevant to the project of giving a characterisation of desires as 
desires have traditionally been said to have a relation with motivation (recall, 
for example the passages from Hume and Locke in the Introduction). One 
natural way of understanding what it is for someone to be motivated in one 
way or another is in terms of their having a goal. Indeed, according to Smith, 
to be motivated at a particular time just is to have a goal at that time (Smith 
1994, pi 16). But this is problematic as having a goal is a teleological notion: 
it involves being directed towards something, or having a purpose. But 
analogous problems arise here as discussed above concerning what kind of 
thing the goal of motivation can be, what it is that someone is directed towards 
when they have a purpose: for example it is possible that the goal does not 
exist at the time someone is motivated towards it, and so on. So there is a 
similar problem of giving an analysis of motivation that is consistent with 
naturalism. MN again offers a way of giving such a naturalistic analysis. It
jl See for example Stalnaker (1984): he offers this reason in support of MN (or more precisely 
in support of a view that entails MN), when he says ‘[djesires have determinate content 
because of their dual connection with belief and action’ (Stalnaker 1984, pi 9).
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characterizes being motivated towards a particular goal in terms of having a 
desire for it, that is, characterizing this goal as the object of a desire. Then in 
tum MN claims that if someone has a desire for this object then they are 
disposed to act in certain ways. And as discussed above this can be 
understood in terms of having a particular set of physical and causal properties 
and relations, which are natural properties and relations. So MN offers a way 
of giving a naturalistic analysis of motivation: this is another significant 
theoretical benefit and is similarly given as another reason to accepting the 
thesis.32
MN is widely accepted within Philosophy of Mind and there are good 
philosophical reasons for this. It provides ways of giving naturalistic analyses 
of certain important features discussed in the field, like the relations between 
people and the objects of their mental states, and the property of being 
motivated in a way. This is important as these features have proven 
persistently difficult to analyse in a naturalistic way. So there are significant 
theoretical benefits for general work in Philosophy of Mind if MN is true
1.4 -  A Fact About Desire.
j2 See for example (Smith 1994, p 103 and p 115).
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In addition to these benefits for Philosophy of Mind in general, if MN is true it 
has explanatory advantages that are particularly relevant when attempting to 
give an analysis of desire: MN provides the most straightforward explanation 
of a certain, very prominent fact about desire. It is not obvious that this can be 
explained in terms of the properties and relations that are said to characterise 
desire by standard, alternative theories of desire that reject MN.
It is a fact that having a desire is regularly correlated with acting in 
ways that you believe will bring about what you desire. This is empirically 
established and widely acknowledged: it is plausible that our recognition of 
this correlation underlies our everyday practices of trying to explain peoples’ 
behaviour by attributing them with certain desires, and making predictions 
about peoples’ behaviour on the basis of what desires we believe they have. 
As Stalnaker describes,
[i]t is, I think, intuitively clear that however often we may fail to act 
according to our beliefs [about ways that we could act that would 
satisfy our desires3J], there is a presumption that we do. Where people 
don’t do what is appropriate, given their beliefs, we expect there to be 
some explanation for this; we may appeal, for example, to incapacity, 
absentmindedness, or self-deception (Stalnaker 1984, p i9).
See, for example (Stalnaker 1984, p i5) for his account of beliefs as dispositions to act in 
ways that would tend to satisfy one’s desires if one’s beliefs are true.
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It is also plausible that the widespread recognition of this correlation can 
explain why it is that we take acting in certain ways to constitute evidence that 
someone has particular desires. As Anscombe says, ‘[t]he primitive sign of 
wanting is trying to g e t  (Anscombe 1957, p68)74 Anscombe here uses ‘want’ 
as roughly synonymous with ‘desire’. She seems to be saying that we consider 
the ways that someone acts, along with what we take them to believe about 
what their actions will achieve, to be the most basic evidence of what their 
particular desires are. This seems uncontroversial: not only do we pay 
particular attention to the way that people actually act when attributing desires 
but also how they act is sometimes taken as more reliable evidence of their 
desires than what they say about what it is they desire. For example, even if 
someone says that they desire to exercise more and get fit we will tend to 
doubt that they do really desire this if they take no steps to get more exercise 
even when given a number of opportunities and where there are no obvious
j4  It seems that Anscombe’s aim in the passage that this is taken from is to distinguish desire as 
the pro-attitude that is relevant to practical reason and action, as opposed to other pro­
attitudes like hopes or wishes that she says are not connected in this way with acting. 
However, it is the claim about someone’s actions being ‘the primitive sign o f desire that is 
relevant here: she seems to be saying that how someone acts is the most basic evidence of 
their having certain desires. Indeed, Anscombe may even be claiming that there is a 
stronger connection between desiring and try to get than just an evidential connection. A 
different way of understanding the claim that a is a sign of b, is as a claim that b is partly 
constituted by a, that a is necessary for b. It is in this way that the term ‘sign’ is sometimes 
used in medicine, for example where a distinction is drawn between signs of a certain 
disease or condition, which are diagnostic criteria for it, and symptoms of a certain disease 
or condition, which are evidence for it. However, I will here take Anscombe to be making 
only the weaker claim, that there is an evidential connection between desiring and trying to
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factors that might interfere with their doing so (such as the lack of affordable 
and convenient facilities for taking exercise, pressing deadlines at work, 
commitments to other projects, and so on). Moreover, we think that these 
doubts are legitimate, that the behavioural evidence can outweigh the 
testimonial evidence in such cases. Of course, we cannot straightforwardly 
conclude from this that it is their claims about what they desires that are false 
when there is this conflict between different kinds of evidence: for example, 
the mismatch might be explained in terms of their having mistaken beliefs 
about how to act to satisfy the desires that they claim to have. And even if we 
do reach the straightforward conclusion this does not show that were being 
insincere in making those claims as there are other possible explanations: for 
example, they may be self-deceiving, or may be ignorant of what they really 
want. But consistent failure to act to try to satisfy a desire when there are no 
obvious factors preventing someone from doing so is taken as good evidence 
that they do not actually have such a desire.
It is plausible that a person’s actions are taken to be such good 
evidence for what they desire because there is a regular correlation between 
having a desire for something and acting to try to satisfy that. Of course, this 
correlation is not exception-less: there might be a number of reasons why 
someone who has a particular desire does not actually act in a particular way
get. The stronger claim is, according to a natural interpretation of trying to get in terms of
being disposed to act, just the thesis MN.
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as a result of having that desire. For example, they might lack any 
opportunities to act on it or fail to recognize such an opportunity, they might 
have other, stronger desires that they act on instead, and so on. But it is 
uncontroversial that there is such a regular correlation, and this is a fact that 
stands in need of explanation.
1.5 -  Explaining this Fact.
This regular correlation between having a desire and acting in ways you 
believe will bring about what you desire is among the prominent phenomena 
associated with having a desire. So it is something that should be explained by 
an analysis of desire: it is reasonable to expect that a specification of the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for having a desire will explain why 
desires are associated with certain other phenomena in particular. This 
particular fact about desire, its correlation with action, is better explained in 
terms of MN than it is explained in terms of the other features that are 
standardly proposed as necessary conditions for having a desire. This is good 
reason to accept that MN is true.
What different properties and relations do the standard competing 
theories of desire propose for giving their respective analyses? And how
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might they each explain this fact? Recall, MN is not a theory of desire: it is 
not a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for having a desire. Rather it is 
just a necessary condition. There do not seem to be any prior restrictions on 
what other necessary conditions a particular theory can claim are sufficient for 
having a desire in addition to MN: so there are no prior restrictions on how 
different theories of desire that have in common that they entail MN can differ 
from one another in terms of their other necessary conditions. Call any theory 
that entails MN a Motivational Theory of Desire: all motivational theories 
entail that having a desire entails having a disposition to act in ways you 
believe will bring about what you desire.
Among non-motivational theories, those that do not entail MN, what 
different properties and relations are claimed as being necessary conditions for 
having a desire? One traditional view is that there is a necessary connection 
between having desires and having experiences of pleasure. This is proposed 
by what are sometimes called Hedonic Theories of Desire, the kind of theory 
that has been given by, for example Mill (1863), Kim (1998), and Fehige 
(2001) for example. As with motivational theories, no plausible hedonic 
theory will claim that having a desire entails having an experience of pleasure: 
rather they will say that it entails being disposed to have an experience of 
pleasure when they have certain thoughts or beliefs about the object of their 
desire. Different versions of hedonic theory have in common that they entail
54
something like the following claim: necessarily if S  desires that p  then S is 
disposed to have an experience of pleasure if S  believes that p  has come about.
A different kind of account claims that there is a necessary 
connection between having a desire for something and making an evaluation 
of that object. Different versions of this kind of account, that might be called 
Evaluative Theories of Desire, vary with respect to what they say the nature of 
this evaluation is: for example, some versions say that having a desire entails 
having an evaluative belief about what you desire,35 while others say that 
having a desire entails having a non-cognitive evaluative state of some kind/ 6 
often said to be like an evaluative perception of the object of desire. Different 
versions also vary with respect to what evaluation is made of the object of 
desire: for example, some versions say that having a desire entails evaluating 
the object of desire as good, others says that having a desire entails evaluating 
it as valuable, or desirable, and so on. But different versions of evaluative 
theory tend to agree that the object of desire is evaluated in a positive way.37
35 See for example Lewis (1988): according to what Lewis calls the Desire as Belief (DAB) 
theory S desires thatp  iff S  believes that p is good.
j6 See for example Oddie (2005) who says that having a desire that p  is constituted by having 
an experience ofp  as being valuable (where this is analogous to perceptual experiences)
l7 It is plausible that such theories are motivated by discussions by people like Anscombe, for 
example, about the possible objects of desire: Anscombe famously claimed that it always 
makes sense to ask about the object of a desire what its desirable characteristics are, which is 
often taken to suggest that it is not possible to desire something unless you take it to have 
some positive characteristic (either intrinsically or in virtue of being a means to getting 
something that you take to have positive characteristics intrinsically) (Anscombe 1957, p70).
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So we can characterise evaluative theories as having in common the claim that 
if S  desires that p  then S  represents p  in a positive evaluative way.
Another, more recent proposal, by people like Dretske (1988) and 
Schroeder (2004), attempts to analyse desire in terms of relations with 
rewards. These Reward Theories of Desire typically claim in common that if 
S  desires that p  then S  represents p  as a reward. But versions of this kind of 
theory may differ with respect to what it is to represent something as a reward: 
Schroeder for example, characterizes this in terms of the notion of reward 
commonly used in behavioural science, that is, something is a reward for 
someone if it has characteristic effects on them by processes of conditioning, 
or reinforcement learning.
As far as I am aware, these four kinds of theories are the standard 
alternatives for analysing desire: particular theories tend to be a version of one 
or another (or more than one) of these theories. They attempt to analyse desire 
in terms of relations with dispositions to act, experiences of pleasure, 
evaluations or rewards. The other proposals about how to characterise desire 
that are not theories of one of these kinds are more accurately described as 
denying that it is possible to analyse desire. For example, Galen Strawson 
claims that having a desire is not necessarily connected with any other kind of 
property or relation. He claims that any such connections that desires have to 
other phenomena are merely contingent [Strawson (1994) (1998)]. According
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to Strawson what makes a mental state a desire that I have some ice cream, as 
opposed to a belief that I have some ice cream, is the fact that it is a desire, 
rather than a belief. And what makes it a desire that I have some ice cream as 
opposed to a desire that I have some chocolate is the fact that it is a desire for 
ice cream and not chocolate. We might call this a Primitivist Theory of Desire 
where according to primitivist theories S desires that p  iff S has a sui generis 
state that is a desire that p.
The other kind of ‘non-analysis’ would be given by an Eliminitivist 
Theory of Desire, as held by Churchland (1981), for example. As the name 
suggests eliminativists deny that there are such things as desires: they typically 
claim something like, there is no particular state x such that S has x when S is 
described as having a desire that p. Eliminativists such as Churchland tend to 
claim that the term ‘desire’ is just a term from an outdated folk-psychological 
theory of the mind and that it does not actually refer to a kind of psychological 
state that we actually have. Rather they claim that this folk-psychological 
theory will be superceded by advanced neuroscience, and the mental state 
terms used in this folk psychology, like ‘desire’, should be replaced with those 
of this neuroscience to give a more accurate account of the different mental 
states and processes that we actually have. There will be nothing in this 
account that fits the folk-psychological concept well enough to deserve the 
name ‘desire’: so in effect there are no desires.
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Clearly these last two alternatives cannot explain the fact that there is 
a regular correlation between having a desire and acting in ways you believe 
will bring about what you desire. A primitivist claims that this is merely a 
contingent fact and that it is completely independent of the kind of mental state 
desire is. On the other hand an eliminativist denies that this is a fact at all: 
they deny that there is a particular kind of mental state, a desire, that these 
actions are regularly correlated with. For an eliminativist there is no fact to 
explain whereas for a primitivist the fact is not in need of any special 
explanation.
But how do the other alternative kinds of theory compare? Which of 
the four different relations provides the best explanation of this fact? First 
consider motivational theories. According to motivational theories MN is true, 
so they claim that if someone has a desire then they are disposed to act in ways 
they believe will bring about what they desire. Of course, this disposition will 
only manifest in their actually acting in this way in certain circumstances, if 
certain conditions obtain. But if we assume that such conditions can obtain 
quite regularly then if someone has a desire this will regularly result in their 
acting in a way they believe will bring about what they desire. On this 
assumption this fact, that there is a regular correlation between having a desire 
and acting in these particular ways follows straightforwardly from
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motivational theories. So if MN is true there is a straightforward explanation 
of this fact about desire.
In contrast neither hedonic theories, evaluative theories, nor reward 
theories provide any explanation of this fact. Note, this is not to say that any 
of these kinds of theories is incompatible with there being an explanation: they 
are not like primitivist theories of desire that deny that there is anything 
interesting to say about the regular correlation between desire and action. 
Rather, these theories leave the correlation unexplained. This is because there 
is no obvious connection between acting and the properties and relations that 
each kind of theory claims is necessary for having a desire. Recall, hedonic 
theories, evaluative theories and reward theories claim respectively that having 
a desire that p  entails being disposed to have an experience of pleasure if you 
believe that p  has come about, or that you represent p  in a positive evaluative 
way, or that you have representations of p  as a reward (such that these 
representations have characteristic effects on you by processes of 
reinforcement learning, for example) / 8 Yet none of these properties and 
relations have an obvious connection with acting. So, saying that having such 
a property or relation is necessary for having a desire does not say anything 
that is obviously relevant to the regular correlation between having a desire 
and acting in ways you believe will bring about what you desire. It might be
j8 Of course, there will be some variation about what specifically these conditions are between 
different versions of each kind of theory.
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possible for theories of these kinds to explain this fact: for example, someone 
who held a hedonic theory might claim that there is a necessary connection 
between being disposed to have experiences of pleasure if you believe that 
something has come about and acting in ways you believe will bring it about. 
Analogously, an evaluative theorist might claim that there is a necessary 
connection between representing something in a positive evaluative way and 
acting in ways you believe will bring it about. And a reward theorist might 
claim that there is a similar connection between representing something as a 
reward and acting in these ways: for example, someone like Schroeder might 
claim that one of the characteristic effects that representations that p  have on 
you if you desire that p is that they condition you to act in ways that you 
believe will bring about p. By making some kind of claim like these the 
people who held these different kinds of theory could thereby explain why 
desire is regularly correlated with particular actions. But note that to do this 
they must make a further claim about the property or relation that they claim is 
necessarily connected with desire. Note also that these further claims 
themselves must be argued for as none of these connections between the 
respective features and actions is true a priori. So none of these kinds of 
theory can explain the regular correlation between desire and particular actions 
in virtue of the property or relation that they claim is necessary for having a 
desire: by saying that having such-and-such property or relation is necessary
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for having a desire they do not thereby explain the fact we are interested in 
here. This is in contrast to motivational theories of desire as we saw above: 
this fact follows in a straightforward way from the truth of MN. So, 
motivational theories of desire provide the best explanation of the regular 
correlation between having a desire and acting in ways you believe will bring 
about what you desire. As this correlation is one of the prominent phenomena 
associated with having a desire, something that should be explained by an 
analysis of desire, this is a significant benefit of motivational theories: it is 
good reason to think that MN is true.
1.6 -  Conclusion.
There is a widespread presumption both in philosophy in general and in 
Philosophy of Mind in particular that MN is true. It is presupposed by a 
number of important debates in various fields of philosophy. And there are 
good philosophical reasons to accept it: it provides a way of giving plausible 
accounts of certain features that are important in Philosophy of Mind and that 
have proven persistently difficult to analyse in naturalistic terms. In addition, 
it provides the most straightforward explanation of certain facts about desire 
from among the alternative proposed analyses: this is something that is
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especially relevant to the issues in this dissertation. So there would be 
significant implications for the possibility of giving an adequate analysis of 
desire, for issues in Philosophy of Mind in general, and for philosophy more 
broadly if MN turned out to be false. All of this is good reason to think that 
MN is true and to be concerned to defend it against the various, seemingly 
persuasive, objections made against it.
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CHAPTER 2
MOTIVATION, DESIRE AND 
THE WEATHER WATCHERS.
2.1 -  Introduction.
The Weather Watchers are a race of sentient, intelligent creatures. 
They are distributed about the surface of their planet, rooted to the 
ground, profoundly interested in the local weather. They have 
sensations, thoughts, emotions, beliefs, desires. They possess a 
conception of an objective, spatial world. But they are constitutionally 
incapable of any sort of behavior, as this is ordinarily understood. 
They lack the necessary physiology. Their mental lives have no other- 
observable effects. They are not even disposed to behave in any way 
(Strawson 1994, p251).
According to Galen Strawson, who gives this example, the Weather Watchers 
are ‘an evidently possibility’ (Strawson 1994, p256). They are a counter 
example to MN: they can have desires but they cannot act and they cannot be
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disposed to act yet MN says that having a desire entails having such a 
disposition to act. So if Strawson is right and the Weather Watchers are 
possible then MN is false.
However, in this chapter I argue that the Weather Watchers are not 
possible, contrary to Strawson’s claim: the case is under-described and on 
closer examination the example is not one in which they both have desires and 
lack dispositions to act. So there is no counter example to MN. But the reason 
the example fails is revealing: it suggests that there are interesting relations 
between desires and intentions, and between intentions and dispositions to act. 
I will attempt to explicate these relations while defending MN against 
Strawson’s objection.
2.2 -  Strawson’s Objection.
As we have seen, Strawson argues by counter example against MN. His 
objection is, on the surface, like the following simple argument:39
j9 Strawson’s stated target with the example is actually a view he calls ‘Neo-Behaviourism’. 
This is the view that ‘mental life is linked to behavior in such a way that reference to 
behaviour enters essentially and centrally into any adequate account of the nature of almost 
all if not all mental states and occurrences, like emotions, sensations, thought, beliefs and 
desires’ (Strawson 1994, p29). From this it is not clear exactly what follows from the view 
about desire in particular. However, in the symposium on Mental Reality in Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research (June 1998) Michael Smith characterizes Neo-Behaviourists as 
claiming ‘that a subject’s desire that p is a state that necessarily manifests itself in her 
behaviour, though perhaps only indirectly’ (Smith 1998, p450). Again, ‘manifesting’ in
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1) If MN is true then it is not possible that S  desires that p  and S  is not 
disposed to act in ways S believes will bring about p.
2) It is possible that S  desires that p  and S  is not disposed to act in ways 
S  believes will bring about p.
C) So MN is false.
But if someone accepts MN then they will respond by denying premise 2, so 
why does the objection not straightforwardly beg the question against them? 
Strawson gives the Weather Watchers example to support this premise. But 
the way that it is supposed to provide this support is subtle and needs 
explicating in detail. This is my aim in this section and the next.
Recall from above, the features in Strawson’s description of the 
Weather Watchers that are relevant here are the following: first that the 
Weather Watchers can have desires, and second, that they cannot actually 
perform any behaviour or have a disposition to do so. By ‘behaviour, as this is 
ordinarily understood’ Strawson means ‘actions’ as I characterized them in the 
Introduction, that is someone’s intentional bodily movements as opposed to 
movements that merely happen to them, like reflexes. He says,
behaviour could be understood in a number of different ways. However, the rest of the text 
suggests that it should be read in terms of having a disposition to act. So Neo-Behaviourism 
entails MN. And the Weather Watchers example, as I understand it, is clearly intended to 
support an argument against this thesis.
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[i]t may be noted that the point of the present story would be 
unaffected if one supposed that there were observable changes in the 
Weather Watchers that were not instances of intentional behavior but 
that could nevertheless be supposed to constitute evidence for their 
having mental lives (Strawson 1994, p257).
For Strawson, the relevant feature of the case is that the Weather Watchers 
cannot intentionally move their bodies or be disposed to do so. It is irrelevant 
whether their bodies can undergo unintentional movements, say if they have 
reflexes. So the Weather Watchers are supposed to lack exactly the kind of 
disposition that MN says they have if they have a desire. Hence they are a 
counter example to MN.
To this point there is nothing in the example beyond a straightforward 
denial of MN. But there is a further feature that Strawson highlights about the 
Weather Watchers that the example seems to turn on: the Weather Watchers 
do not have intentions (Strawson 1994, p252). It is this feature that he says 
makes the example ‘potentially more revealing’ (Strawson 1994, p252) about 
the connection between desire and action than a case where someone cannot 
actually act but can have an intention to do so. Although he does not state it 
clearly, the idea seems to be that having an intention to act is a necessary
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condition for having a disposition to act.40 So if the Weather Watchers can 
have desires yet cannot have intentions to act in ways that they believe will 
bring about what they desire then, in virtue of this they cannot have a 
disposition to act in ways they believe will bring about what they desire. 
Thereby they are a counter example to MN as MN claims that having a desire 
entails having such a disposition to act. Rather than being just the simple 
argument above, Strawson’s objection is like the following extended argument 
(this is what I will call Strawson’s objection hereafter):
1) If MN is true then it is not possible that S  desires that p  and 5 is not 
disposed to act in ways S' believes will bring about p.
2) If S  is disposed to act to in ways S  believes will bring about p  then S 
can have an intention to act in a way S  believes will bring about p.
3) It is possible that S desires that p  and that S  cannot have an intention 
to act in a way S  believes will bring about p.
C) So MN is false.
2.3 -  Options.
40 Strawson uses the expression ‘trying to but it is plausible from the text that he means by 
this ‘intending to (Strawson 1994, p275).
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The argument is valid. But by making explicit the additional premises in 
Strawson’s objection in this way we see that there are in fact two ways for 
someone to respond in defense of MN: they could either deny premise 2 or 
deny premise 3. Strawson gives the Weather Watchers example in support of 
premise 3. In the following sections I will argue that the example fails to do 
so, so will deny that premise. But what about premise 2, why should we 
accept this?
In fact this premise is very plausible: it seems to follow from the way 
that action is understood here, in terms of intentional bodily movement. 
Consider the following example from Davidson:
Suppose that a man boards an aeroplane marked ‘London’ with the 
intention of boarding an aeroplane headed for London, England [...]. 
[This] explains why he intentionally boarded the plane marked 
‘London’. As it happens, the plane marked ‘London’ was headed for 
London, Ontario, not London, England, and so [it] cannot explain why 
he boarded a plane headed for London, England. [It] can explain why 
he boarded a plane headed for London, Ontario, but only when [it is] 
conjoined to the fact that the plane marked ‘London’ was headed for 
London, Ontario; and of course [it] cannot explain why he intentionally
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boarded a plane headed for London, Ontario, since he had no such
intention (Davidson 1980, p84).41
As I understand him Davidson is arguing that to do something intentionally 
requires that one have an intention to do that particular thing. Note two 
important points here. First, having such an intention does not necessarily 
involve having a conscious, mental event that is the intention and that is 
accessible to introspection. In this respect intentions are most plausibly 
thought of like beliefs, desires and other kinds of propositional attitudes. 
There can be conscious intentions, just as there can be conscious beliefs. But 
it is not necessary for someone to have a belief that p  that they have a 
particular mental event that is this belief. I might believe that Bugs and Roger 
are both rabbits without ever consciously entertaining that belief. And even if 
I do have that belief consciously on occasion, other things being equal I 
continue to believe it between different episodes of consciously entertaining it, 
at those times when I am not doing so. The same seems plausible in the case 
of intentions, mutatis mutandis.
What kind of mental state is an intention? There are currently two 
standard ways of characterizing intentions, either reductively or non-
41 From essay 5: Intending, in Essays on Actions and Events (1980).
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reductively. Davidson gives the first kind of account when he says the 
following:
An action is performed with a certain intention if it is caused in the 
right way by attitudes and beliefs that rationalize it.
If this account if correct, then acting with an intention does not require 
that there be any mysterious act of the will or special attitude or 
episode of willing (Davidson 1980, p87).
By ‘attitudes and beliefs’ here he means desires and belief: indeed, Bratman 
calls it the ‘desire-belief model’ when he describes reductive accounts like 
Davidson’s (Bratman 1984, p 375). According to these accounts, having a 
particular intention is constituted by having a particular complex of desire(s) 
and belief(s).
On the other hand there are non-reductive accounts of intentions such 
as Bratman’s own. According to non-reductive accounts intentions are a sui 
generis kind of mental state: having an intention is not constituted by having 
some complex of other kinds of states but rather by having a distinct kind of 
state that typically stands in certain relations. Bratman tries to illustrate this in 
the context of peoples’ actions over time. These extended periods of acting 
can be thought of as following plans that
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help guide our later conduct and coordinate our activities over time in 
ways in which our ordinary desires and beliefs do not. Intentions are 
typically elements in such coordinating plans. Once we recognize this 
central role intentions play in our lives the natural view to take, I think, 
is that intentions are distinctive states of mind, not to be reduced to 
clusters of desires and beliefs (Bratman 1984, p376).
But even though intentions are not reducible to desires and beliefs on this 
account, they have characteristic relations with desires, beliefs, other kind of 
mental state, and actions. In light of this it is plausible that they are a state of 
the same general kind as desires and beliefs: that is intentions are a kind of 
propositional attitude. It is just that they are a distinct kind of propositional 
attitude, in the way that a hope is a distinct kind of propositional attitude from 
a belief or a desire. So on either reductive or non-reductive views, it is 
plausible that having a particular intention is a matter of having a particular 
propositional attitude or set of propositional attitudes. We typically do not 
think that there must always be some mental event or conscious state when we 
have other kinds of propositional attitudes, so there is no reason to think this is 
necessary when having an intention.
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A second point to note is that what is necessary for doing something 
intentionally is having an intention to do that particular thing. This is an 
intention de re, not an intention de dicto.42 In addition, this intention must be 
causally connected in the right way with the movement4j So the intention that 
I must have for the event of my arm rising to be an action, an intentional 
bodily movement, is an intention that /  raise my arm. It is not necessary that I 
have an intention that I act to raise my arm, or to paraphrase, an intention that 
/  raise my arm by having an intention that I  raise my arm.
In light of these considerations premise 2 seems very plausible. It says 
that it is necessary for S  to have a disposition to act in a particular way, m, that 
S' can have an intention to act in that way, an intention that S does m. And 
recall from the Introduction, having a disposition to act is a matter of acting 
just in case a particular set of conditions obtain. That is, saying that S  is 
disposed to act is to say that for a particular set of propositions, x, y, z, if x, y, z, 
are true then S  will act. For the purposes of this dialectic, acting in a particular 
way entails intentionally moving your body in a particular way. And as we
42 The alternative, that it is necessary for doing something intentionally that someone has an 
intention to do it de dicto, is not plausible. It suggests that someone would have to have the 
concept of action, or the concept of having an intention as a necessary condition for acting. 
But conceptually unsophisticated creatures, like young children and animals, can act. So it 
is not necessary to have these concepts.
4j Treating intentions as propositional attitudes raises a number of complicated issues. For 
example, it implies that the objects of intentions are propositions. Yet, it is controversial 
whether attributions of intentions that are not expressed in the propositional form can be 
paraphrased into the propositional form without changing the meaning of the attribution. An 
analogous problem comes from taking the objects of desires to be propositions, as discussed
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have seen, intentionally moving your body in a particular way is a matter of 
having an intention to move in that way that causes the movement (in the right 
way). So to say that S is disposed to do action m is to say that for a particular 
set of propositions, x, y, z, if x, y, z, are true then S' will do m caused (in the 
right way) by S having an intention that S does m. But now premise 2 seems 
trivial. It says that it is necessary that if there is a particular set of propositions 
x, y, z, such that if x, y, z, are true then S will do m caused (in the right way) by 
S  having an intention that S does m, then S can have an intention that S does 
m.
However, there are some who might deny premise 2: those like 
Hursthouse, for example, might do so. But if so this would be because she 
rejects Davidson’s account of intentions in particular. According to Davidson, 
having an intention to act in a particular way consists in having a complex of 
desire(s) and belief(s) that rationalizes the action. Hursthouse claims that there 
can be cases where someone acts, they do something intentionally, yet they do 
not have such a complex of desire(s) and belief(s) that rationalize the action.44 
She gives examples like ‘rumpling the hair of, or generally messing up the 
person or animal one loves; talking to her photograph as one passes it,’ and 
‘violently destroying or damaging anything remotely connected with the
in the Introduction. However, as I am doing for desire, I will not attempt to address such 
problems here: rather, I will assume that there is some solution available.
44 Hursthouse, R. 1991: ‘Arational Actions’, The Journal o f Philosophy, Vol.88, No.2 (Feb., 
1991), pp. 57-68.
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person (or animal, or institution)’ one’s [anger or hatred] is directed toward, 
e.g. her picture, letters or presents from her’ (Hursthouse 1991, p58). These 
are cases where someone clearly does something intentionally but where they 
cannot plausibly be attributed some beliefs or desires that would rationalize 
what they do. If Davidson’s account of intentions is correct then these are 
cases in which someone does something intentionally yet lacks an intention to 
do it. So they would be counter examples to premise 2.
As we have seen, however, Davidson’s account is only one of a 
number of accounts of intentions. So even if Hursthouse is right, that it is 
possible to act, to intentionally move your body, without having some 
combination of desire(s) and beliefs) that rationalizes the action this does not 
show that it is possible to intentionally move your body without having an 
intention to do so. What these cases show is that either having an intention to 
do m is not necessary for intentionally doing m or that having an intention to 
do m is not constituted by having a complex of desires and beliefs that 
rationalizes doing m\ that either premise 2 is false or Davidson’s account of 
intentions is false. So Hursthouse’s examples do not show that we should 
reject premise 2. In light of what both Strawson and I mean by acting here, 
and the plausibility of that premise in relation to this I will accept it for the 
purposes of this discussion.4'
43 I will discuss a different aspect of this issue, the relationship between having a disposition to 
act and having an intention, in the dissertation’s Conclusion.
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2.4 -  Two Versions of the Weather Watchers.
Returning to the main argument, I will defend MN by denying premise 3 of 
Strawson’s objection. Recall, premise 3 says the following:
3) It is possible that S  desires that p  and that S cannot have an intention 
to act in a way S believes will bring about p.
If we accept premise 2 of the objection then the third premise seems to amount 
to a straightforward denial of MN. So why should we accept it?
Strawson attempts to support premise 3 with the Weather Watchers 
example. But the example is under-described in an important way: he says 
that the Weather Watchers do not have intentions, but is this a necessary fact 
about them or merely contingent? We can distinguish two cases: first, there is 
Wayne the Weather Watcher, who does not have intentions necessarily. 
Wayne cannot have that kind of mental state, perhaps in a similar way that 
someone who is blind cannot have visual perceptions, or someone who is a 
complete amnesiac cannot have memories. In the next section I will argue that 
Wayne cannot have desires either, so is not an example of someone who has a
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desire and lacks an intention to act. If this is right then Wayne does not 
support premise 3 and is not a counter example to MN.
Second, there is Dwayne the Weather Watcher, who never actually has 
an intention but where this is just a contingent fact about Dwayne. Unlike 
Wayne, it is not necessary that Dwayne does not have intentions. Clearly 
Dwayne does not support premise 3 of Strawson’s argument as Dwayne can 
have an intention to act. Moreover, it is plausible that if Dwayne has a desire 
that p  then Dwayne does have a disposition to act in ways that Dwayne 
believes will bring about p. Suppose that Dwayne desires that he has an apple 
and he believes, falsely, given that he is a Weather Watcher and cannot 
actually move, that he can get an apple by raising his arm to the apple tree 
above him. According to MN, Dwayne is disposed to raise his arm to the 
apple tree. Recall, from section 2.3, to say that S  is disposed to do action m is 
to say that for a particular set of propositions, x, y, z, if x, y, z, are true then S 
will do m caused (in the right way) by S having an intention that I do m. So 
according to MN if Dwayne has this desire that he has an apple there is a 
particular set of propositions such that if they are true then Dwayne will raise 
his arm to the apple tree caused (in the right way) by Dwayne having an 
intention that he raises his arm to the apple tree. As I have discussed, it is a 
difficult task to specify which propositions will be in this set, and in this case it 
is likely that some of them would require large scale changes in Dwayne for
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them to be true.46 One of the propositions in this set will be the proposition 
that Dwayne has an intention that he raises his arm to the apple tree. But in 
Dwayne’s case this particular proposition might easily be true without him 
undergoing any significant changes that might make us doubt that the person 
that acts is the same person, Dwayne the Weather Watcher, that the disposition 
to act is attributed to .47 From the way that he describes the original example, 
highlighting the possibility of having an intention to act, Strawson seems to 
suggest that whether or not someone can have an intention to act is the crucial 
fact about them that determines whether they can have a disposition to act. He 
seems to consider other facts, such as whether or not their bodies can actually 
move as unimportant to whether they can have such a disposition. So by 
Strawson’s own lights it is plausible that if Dwayne has this desire that he has 
an apple then he does have a disposition to act in a way that he believes will 
bring about that he has an apple. So Dwayne is not a counter example to MN.
46 For instance, one of the ways that Dwayne would have to change is that his body would 
have to change physically so that it could actually act. However, Strawson does not seem to 
think that the fact that these kinds of changes would be necessary for a disposition to 
manifest make it problematic to attribute someone with that disposition (Strawson 1994, pp. 
268-274).
47 Another way of putting this is to say that in order to manifest the disposition and actually act 
Dwayne need not undergo any changes that might make us doubt whether he was still the 
same individual that we attributed the disposition to. Strawson claims that if it were 
necessary that Dwayne change to such an extent in order to actually act then he could not be 
attributed with the disposition to act (Strawson 1994, pp. 268-274).
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2.5 -  Wayne the Weather Watcher.
Wayne the Weather Watcher cannot have an intention to act: this is a 
necessary fact about him. If Wayne can have a desire then Wayne is an 
example that does support premise 3: his case would show that it is possible 
that someone can have a desire that p  but cannot have an intention to act in a 
way that he believes will bring about p. As it is a necessary condition for 
Wayne to be disposed to act in this way that he can have this intention then he 
would be a counter example to MN. However, if Wayne cannot have an 
intention then it is plausible that he cannot have a desire. Recall from section 
2.3, according to the standard accounts of intentions they are either reducible 
to a complex of desire(s) and belief(s) or they are not reducible. If a reductive 
account is true having an intention consists in having certain desires and 
beliefs. So if Wayne cannot have any intentions then this must be because he 
cannot have either desires or beliefs, or cannot have both together. Each of 
these alternatives is prima facie equally plausible, and according to at least the 
first one Wayne cannot have desires.48 If that is the reason then the example
48 Note that Strawson says explicitly that the Weather Watchers can have beliefs. So he would 
not claim that the fact that Wayne cannot have intentions here is because he cannot have 
beliefs. Moreover, it is plausible that if Wayne cannot have beliefs then he cannot have 
desires either (and conversely that if he cannot have desires then he cannot have beliefs). 
Current consensus is that both beliefs and desires should be defined functionally, in terms of 
their characteristic relations. And the relations with the other kind of state are among the 
paradigm relations of both beliefs and desires. So someone who cannot have one of these 
kinds of state could not have the other kind either.
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does not support premise 3 of Strawson’s objection: Wayne is not obviously 
an example of someone who can have a desire but cannot have an intention so 
does not show that this is possible. It is just as plausible that Wayne cannot 
have a desire as that he can. And if he cannot have a desire then it is irrelevant 
to MN that he cannot have an intention and cannot have a disposition to act.
But what about if a non-reductive account of intentions is correct? 
Even on this kind of account it is plausible that if someone cannot have an 
intention then they cannot have a desire. According to non-reductive accounts 
of intentions they are a sui generis kind of state, not reducible to a complex of 
other states like beliefs and desires. Nonetheless, as we saw from Bratman, 
according to these accounts intentions have characteristic relations with 
beliefs, desires, and actions, for example. But now recall from Chapter 1, the 
common consensus is that functionalism is the correct approach to analysing 
desire. This approach gives an account like the following (although most 
likely involving many more relations and properties):
S desires that p  iff:
[3(R1, R2, R3, F) If S RFs that p  then S is disposed to R2 in a way S
R3's will bring aboutp and S has F if S R3’s that p\ and [S R F s that p].
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What the relations and properties Rl, R2, R3 and F are will vary between 
versions of functionalist account of desire. But if a non-reductive account of 
intentions is correct then some of them will be relations of having an intention 
to do something. And as desire is defined in terms of these relations according 
to functionalism, if someone cannot have the relations then they cannot have a 
desire. So if someone cannot have an intention then they cannot have a desire. 
Hence, even on a non-reductive account of intentions Wayne cannot have 
desires, so is not a case that supports premise 3 of Strawson’s objection.
If Wayne cannot have an intention then, whether a reductive or non- 
reductive account of intention is correct, it is plausible that he cannot have 
desires. So Wayne does not support premise 3: he does not show that it is 
possible that there can be someone that can have a desire yet that cannot have 
an intention. But neither does Dwayne support premise 3: he can have a desire 
but he can also have an intention. And Wayne and Dwayne seem to exhaust 
the possible ways of understanding the Weather Watchers example. So it fails 
to support Strawson’s objection to MN.
2.6 -  Shane the Weather Watcher.
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In fact there is another way of reading the Weather Watcher’s example 
although this departs slightly from what Strawson actually says when 
describing it. Recall, Strawson says that the Weather Watchers have desires 
but do not have intentions (Strawson 1994, p252). But all that is needed to 
support premise 3 is an example of someone who has desires yet cannot have 
intentions to act. So, consider Shane the Weather Watcher who cannot have 
an intention to act. With respect to having this kind of intention Shane is like 
Wayne is with respect to having any kind of intention. Shane cannot have 
intentions like an intention that he raises his arm, or an intention that he opens 
the door. However, Shane can have other kinds of intentions. For example, 
Shane can have intentions like an intention that he will be as good as he can 
be, or an intention that he does not kill his plant.49 With respect to having 
intentions that are not intentions to act Shane is like Dwayne is with respect to 
having any kind of intention.
Compare for illustration an analogous case with beliefs about a 
particular kind of thing: suppose I cannot have beliefs about fresh fruit but can 
have all other kinds of belief. For example, I can have beliefs like a belief that 
Canberra is East of Sydney, a belief that kicking cats is wrong, a belief that I 
am over six feet tall, and so on. But I cannot have beliefs like a belief that
49 This assumes that having this kind of intention does not reduce to or entail having an 
intention to act. If that were the case then Shane would be exactly like Wayne: Shane could 
not have any intentions at all. In which case Wayne and Dwayne would exhaust the possible 
readings of the Weather Watchers example and there would be no counter example to MN.
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apples grow on trees, or a belief that mangos and bananas are the same colour, 
or a belief that tomatoes have gone up in price recently. No propositions that 
make reference to fresh fruit can be the object of my beliefs. With respect to 
having intentions to act Shane is like me with respect to having beliefs about 
fresh fruit.
If Shane is possible then premise 3 of Strawson’s objection is true: 
Shane is an example of someone who can have a desire that p  but cannot have 
an intention to act in a way that he believes will bring about p. If he cannot 
have such an intention then, from premise 2, he cannot have a disposition to 
act in a way that he believes will bring about p. But MN entails that he will 
have this disposition if he has a desire that p, so Shane is a counter example to 
MN.
2.7 -  Responses to Shane.
How can we respond in defense of MN? Note that we cannot 
straightforwardly deny that Shane can have desires as we could with Wayne. 
As discussed already, according to functionalist accounts of desire having a 
desire consists in being in a state that has a certain set of relations, and among 
these are relations of having an intention. Wayne cannot have any intentions
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so there are no states that Wayne can be in that have the set of relations 
necessary for being a desire. But Shane can have at least some relations of 
having an intention, those that are not relations of having an intention to act in 
particular ways. In practice, functionalists typically allow some flexibility 
here:50 the set of relations that a particular account might give as an analysis of 
a particular kind of state will typically be large and complex. People usually 
concede that it is not necessary to have all of the relations in that set in order to 
have that state. Provided that someone has enough of them then we will 
typically say that they have that kind of state. Of course, there are difficult 
questions about how many is enough, and which ones are most important to 
have. If, in fact, intentions to act make up a significant proportion of these 
relations, and they are central to the analysis of desire then it will be necessary 
for having a desire that someone can have intentions to act. In which case 
Shane, like Wayne, cannot have desires and fails to be a counter example to 
MN for the same reason as Wayne. But if intentions to act are more peripheral 
to the analysis of desire then the fact that Shane cannot have them will not 
prevent him having desires. This turns on the details of the correct 
functionalist account of desire, something that it is difficult to predict in
?0 See for example, (Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 1996, pp. 46-48) for discussion. They say, 
‘[tjhere is a list of features that we regard as paradigmatic of [the mental state being 
analysed]...But nothing in that list is sacrosanct...What matters is that enough of the list is 
satisfied or near enough satisfied, and what counts as enough may itself be a vague matter, 
and may change with time. But enough of the list must be satisfied or near enough satisfied’ 
(pp. 47-48).
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advance. And whereas it is very plausible that Wayne cannot have desires 
however this turns out, it is less obvious that Shane will be the same.
Instead we should respond by straightforwardly denying that Shane is 
possible. Notice how closely this case has to be specified so that Shane has 
exactly the properties described in premise 3 yet so that the problems for the 
examples of Wayne and Dwayne can be avoided. But premise 3 is effectively 
a denial of MN. So in an argument against MN it is not a legitimate 
argumentative step to support premise 3 with an example that has been 
specified so precisely to show that the premise is true unless there is 
independent motivation to think that the example is possible. Otherwise 
saying that the example is possible is merely asserting that MN is false. 
Compare the analogy with belief from above: the case where I cannot have 
beliefs about fresh fruit but can have other kinds of belief. If we tried to argue 
against a particular view about belief with this case then there would have to 
be some reason to think that it is actually possible that is independent of 
thinking that that theory was false. The case is an unusual and unfamiliar one, 
so someone who held that theory of belief would be justified in demanding 
such a reason. Otherwise the example would beg the question against that 
theory. The situation is similar here with Shane and premise 3 of Strawson’s 
objection. Without independent reason to think that Shane is possible then we 
should simply deny that he is. But in the following sections I will argue that
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the only obvious motivations are not convincing.51 So in the absence of a 
further argument to support it the example is implausible.
2.8 -  Motivation for Shane.
What reasons are there for thinking that someone like Shane is possible other 
than already thinking that MN is false? What other features of the example are 
there that could make it plausible that Shane cannot have intentions to act 
despite being able to have intentions of other kinds? There do not appear to be 
any psychological facts about Shane that can do this. According to Strawson 
the Weather Watchers are like us psychologically: they can have the same 
kinds of mental states as we can, aside from intentions, and they are 
conceptually sophisticated. For example, Weather Watchers can have beliefs 
about acting in particular ways and desires about acting in particular ways, so 
Shane can have the appropriate concepts for having intentions to act. 
However, the Weather Watchers are unlike us physically: they cannot actually 
act in any particular ways because they cannot intentionally move their bodies.
51 There are difficult and controversial issues here concerning the legitimacy of denying the 
possibility of a putative counter example as a response to an argument. However, I will not 
attempt to engage with those here. See e.g. D. Stoljar, ‘Two Conceivability Arguments 
Compared’ (forthcoming in Proceedings o f the Aristotelian Society) for further discussion of 
such issues in the context of comparing the perfect actor argument against behaviourism and 
the zombie argument against physicalism.
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Does this physical fact about Shane, that he cannot act, make it plausible that 
he cannot have intentions to act but can have other kinds of intentions?
Note that there are analogies of this kind of relation: according to 
certain plausible and widely accepted theories there are particular kinds of 
mental state that someone can only have if certain contingent facts are true. 
For example, if external ism about content, and certain causal theories of 
meaning are true then someone can only have thoughts about water if they 
have come into the right kind of causal contact with samples of H20.^2 It is 
because Twin Oscar has not had this kind of relationship with samples of H20 
that his ‘water’ thoughts are not about water. Rather they are about twin 
water, that is XYZ, which is the substance in the lakes and rivers on Twin 
Earth and that he has this kind of causal contact with. Similarly, Jackson’s 
example of Mary in the black-and-white room suggests that someone can only 
have thoughts that employ phenomenal concepts, like visualizing what red 
looks like, if they have had the right kind of phenomenal experiences.50 
Before her release Mary cannot say, visualize what red looks like, and perhaps
32 See e.g. Putnam, H. 1975: ‘The Meaning of Meaning’, Language, Mind and Knowledge. 
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy o f Science, vol. 7, ed. Keith Gunderson (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press), pp. 131-193. Repr. in Mind[ Language and Reality (1975), 
pp. 215-271.
53 See e.g Jackson, F. 1982:'Epiphenomenal Qualia', Philosophical Quarterly, 32, 127, pp. 
127-136, (April, 1982), and 1986:'What Mary didn't Know', Journal o f Philosophy, 83, 5, pp. 
291-295, (May, 1986).
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as a consequence cannot know what it is like to see red, because she has not 
had any red experiences.
But note also that in these cases it is some event that is missing from 
the history of Twin Oscar and Mary that prevents them from having the 
respective mental state. At time t Twin Oscar cannot have thoughts about 
water because he has not come into the right kind of causal contact with 
samples of H20 before t. The obvious suggestion for an analogous event that 
is missing from Shane’s history that is necessary for having an intention to act 
at time t is that he has actually acted before t. Is it plausible that someone can 
only intend to act in a particular way at t if they have actually acted before ft
What is not plausible is that it is necessary for having an intention to 
act in a particular way that someone has previously acted in that specific way. 
It is not plausible, for example, that at t someone can have an intention that I 
raise my arm only if at some time before t they have actually raised their arm. 
This would entail that someone could not intend to perform a particular 
movement unless they had previously performed that exact movement. But 
clearly it is possible to think of some movement that you have never actually 
performed before and intend to do it. Suppose that before now I have never 
wiggled my left little finger yet have wiggled each of my other fingers at some 
time or other. Clearly I could now have an intention that I wiggle my left little
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finger. So it is not necessary for having an intention to act in a particular way 
that someone has previously acted in that exact way.
Rather, the suggestion is that someone can have an intention to 
perform a particular action only if they have previously acted in some way or 
other. Call this claim (1A). For a particular action m, (IA) says the following:
(IA) If S  at t can have an intention to m then there is an
action n such that S' at /-I has n-ed.
According to (IA) if I can now have an intention that I raise my arm then at 
some time before now l have acted in some way or other-, before now I have 
wiggled my fingers or lifted my leg, or walked to the door, or intentionally 
moved my body in some other way. If (IA) is true then there is independent 
motivation for thinking that a case like Shane the Weather Watcher is possible, 
and Shane can be used to support premise 3 of Strawson’s argument.
2.9 -  A Regress of Intentions and Actions.
Unfortunately for Shane the Weather Watcher, (IA) is false: it is not necessary 
for having an intention to act in a particular way that you have previously
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acted in some way or other. If it was true then it would not be possible to 
perform a first action. There would be a regress of what is necessary for 
having an intention to act and what is necessary for acting. The regress 
develops in the following way:
1) If S' at t can have an intention to m then there is an action n such that 
S  at /-I has n-ed [from (IA)]
2) If there is an action n such that S at M  has n-ed then S  at t- 1 can 
have an intention to n.
3) If S at t-\ can have an intention to n then there is an action o such 
that S at t-2 has o-ed [from (IA)]
4) If there is an action o such that S at t-2 has o-ed then S  at t-2 can 
have an intention to o.
5) If S  at t-2 can have an intention to o then there is an action q such 
that S  at t-3 has g-ed [from (IA)]
And so on ad infinitum.
The problem arises because of what both Strawson and I mean here by acting, 
that is intentional moving your body. As discussed in section 2.3 an 
intentional bodily movement is a bodily movement that is caused in the right 
way by having an intention to make that movement. Steps 2 and 4 in the
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regress are just examples of this. But (IA) says that it is necessary for having 
an intention that someone has previously acted, that is that they have 
previously made an intentional bodily movement. This is steps 1,3,  and 5. 
Together these entail that someone can have an intention to act only if they 
have already acted and that they can have already acted only if they can have 
an intention to act: no one could perform a first action, and consequently no 
one could act. Obviously people do act, so either (IA), and steps 1, 3 and 5, is 
false, or acting does not require intending to act, and steps 2 and 4 are false. 
But this second claim, and steps 2 and 4, seems to follow naturally from what 
we mean by acting: indeed it seems to follow from premise 2 of Strawson’s 
objection. So there would be little point for Strawson in rejecting it to save 
(IA) so as to motivate an example that is supposed to support premise 3 of his 
objection. Moreover, as I discussed in section 2.3 it is a familiar claim in 
philosophy, and it is prima facie more plausible that (IA). So it is (IA) that we 
should deny here.
If (IA) is false is there any other independent reason to accept that 
someone like Shane is possible? As I understand it there are no other facts 
about the Weather Watchers, as Strawson describes them that make it 
plausible that there could be a Weather Watcher with the psychological 
limitations that Shane has. So there is no reason to accept that a case like 
Shane is possible unless you already think that premise 3 of Strawson’s
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objection is true: the example cannot support that premise. But neither Wayne 
nor Dwayne, the other versions of the Weather Watchers example support that 
premise either. So Strawson has not given a successful counter example to 
support his objection to MN.
2.10 -  Conclusion.
According to MN if someone has a desire then they are disposed to act in ways 
they believe will bring about what they desire. Galen Strawson attempted to 
show that MN is false with his example of the Weather Watchers. Strawson 
appealed in his objection to the relation between having a desire and having an 
intention, and the relation between having an intention and having a 
disposition to act. He claimed that necessarily someone can have a disposition 
to act only if they can have an intention to act. And he gave the Weather 
Watchers example to show that it is possible that someone can have a desire 
but cannot have intentions. This would entail that MN was false. However, 
Strawson’s example fails to show that this is possible. The case is under­
described in crucial respects. Moreover I have argued that none of the ways in 
which the example can be adequately described without begging the question 
against MN are a counter example to it. Either it is a necessary fact about the
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Weather Watchers that they cannot have intentions, in which case they cannot 
have desires, or it is only a contingent fact about them that they do not have 
intentions, in which case if they have desires then they do have dispositions to 
act. So Strawson’s objection fails.
Nonetheless, the objection raises an interesting issue: how are desires, 
intentions and dispositions to act related to one another? Strawson claimed 
that there is a necessary connection between dispositions to act and intentions. 
And he denied that there is a necessary connection between desires and 
intentions. While it does seem that there is some kind of connection between 
dispositions to act and intentions has Strawson characterized it correctly? And 
if, as I have argued, there is a necessary connection between desires and 
intentions might this provide an explanation of the connection between desires 
and dispositions to act? These are interesting questions and I will return to 
them briefly in the final Conclusion, but I will not attempt to address them in 
detail in this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 3
TROUBLESOME DESIRES.
3.1 -  Introduction.
MN is a thesis about all things and all desires. It says that if any thing has any 
kind of desire then it is disposed to act in ways it believes will satisfy that 
desire. In the previous chapter I discussed an objection to MN made by Galen 
Strawson. Strawson attempted to show that MN is false by giving an example 
of a certain kind of thing, the Weather Watchers that could have desires and 
not be disposed to act. I argued that his example failed to show this, that either 
the Weather Watchers cannot have desires, or that if they do have desires then 
they do have dispositions to act.
In this chapter I will discuss objections that are directed at the other 
universally quantified aspect of MN: these objections claim there are particular 
kinds of desire that someone can have without being disposed to act. In these 
cases it is the specific content of the desire, what it is a desire for, that makes 
them counter examples MN.
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These troublesome cases for MN are typically of one of three kinds: 
first, desires for something the desirer wants without having to get it through 
their own actions. Call these ‘self-passive desires’: they are desires like a 
desire that your child passes an exam on their own. Second, desires for things 
the desirer believes are necessarily the case. Call these ‘necessity desires’: 
they are desires like a desire that there are infinitely many prime numbers. 
Third, desires for thing the desirer believes are necessarily not the case. Call 
these ‘impossibility desires’: they are desires like a desire that I have a square 
circle. If someone can have desires like these and not be disposed to act in 
ways they believe will satisfy them then they are a counter example to MN: 
MN says that, for all p, if someone has a desire that p then they will be 
disposed to act in ways they believe will bring aboutp.
However, I will argue that none of these kinds of desire succeed as 
counter examples. For most of the chapter I will discuss self-passive desires. 
I argue that these desires only appear to be counter examples to MN because 
people have misunderstood their content. Once we see clearly what the object 
of these desires really is they are no longer a problem for MN.
At the end of the chapter I will more briefly discuss necessity desires 
and impossibility desires together. I argue again that these desires appear to be 
counter examples to MN because of a misunderstanding of their content. But 
in these cases this misunderstanding is an artifact of this kind of content
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specifically: it is because their propositional objects are propositions that are 
necessarily true or necessarily false. There is a general problem concerning 
how it is possible to represent propositions like this: it is not specifically a 
problem for the case of desire. But we can represent these propositions so 
there must be a solution to the general problem. It is plausible that once we 
have this solution it will also apply to the specific case of desire: it will allow 
us to understand what the objects of necessity desires and impossibility desires 
really are. Once we see this clearly it is plausible that these desires will no 
longer appear to be counter examples to MN.
3.2 -  Self-Passive Desires.34
According to MN, if S  desires that p  then S is disposed to act in ways that S 
believes will bring about p. This is a thesis about all kinds of desire, that is, it 
is supposed to be true of someone if they have any desire no matter what its 
object is. However, there is a common and seemingly reasonable kind of 
desire, for a particular kind of thing, where it appears that people who have 
these desires are not disposed to act as MN says. Timothy Schroeder describes 
the objects of these desires as
34 Thanks to Daniel Friedrich for extensive discussions about this kind of counter example.
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ends that the agent hopes to obtain but that the agent would not be 
willing, under any circumstances, to cause to obtain. Suppose I desire 
that a committee makeup its mind in my favour without my 
intervention. This is a state of affairs I might want very much, yet 
because of the very nature of the desire it makes no sense to try to act 
so as to satisfy it. What 1 want is that the committee make a certain 
decision without my needing to do anything (Schroeder 2004, p i7).
Call desires of this kind ‘self-passive desires’. Schroeder’s example is a desire 
that the committee chooses me without my needing to do anything. That is, a 
desire that the committee chooses me and that I do not act to bring it about that 
the committee chooses me. Why is it a counter example to MN? It seems that 
what Schroeder wants here is that the committee chooses him. According to 
MN if he desires that the committee chooses him then he is disposed to act in 
ways he believes will bring about that the committee chooses him. But it 
seems that when Schroeder has this desire he is not disposed to act in any way 
that he believes will bring about that the committee chooses him. According 
to Schroeder he cannot sensibly be disposed to act if he has this kind of desire: 
if he manifested this disposition and acted in a way that he believed would 
bring about that the committee chooses him then in virtue of doing so he
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would not get what he desires. He would not bring about that the committee 
chose him and that he did not act in a way he believed would bring this about. 
So this seems to be a desire for which S  desires that p  and S  is not disposed to 
act in ways S  believes will bring about p. If so then it is a counter example and 
MN is false.
3.3 -  Options.
How can we respond in defense of MN? One response is to deny that when 
Schroeder has this desire he is not disposed to act. According to this flatfooted 
response all the case shows is that Schroeder has a desire and does not act. 
But this does not show that he is not disposed to act. Note that this is similar 
to the kind of responses I gave in the previous chapter to the different versions 
of the Weather Watchers example. Is it convincing here?
It is difficult to adjudicate in this kind of disagreement where there is a 
conflict of intuitions about a particular example. However, there are a number 
of differences between the Weather Watchers cases and the examples of self­
passive desires. When I denied that Wayne the Weather Watcher, who cannot 
have intentions, could have a desire I attempted to support this by arguing that 
it is implied by standard and plausible accounts of intentions. So I gave an
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independent motivation for denying that Wayne was a counter example to 
MN. Conversely when I denied that Shane the Weather Watcher was possible 
I attempted to support this by arguing that it needed to be independently 
motivated because that kind of case is unfamiliar and it appeared to be ad hoc: 
it seems gerrymandered to have all and only those precise features necessary 
to be a counter example to MN. But I argued that there was no obvious 
independent motivation for it. Yet Schroeder’s example of a self-passive 
desire is unlike the Weather Watchers cases in these respects. First, self­
passive desires are not unfamiliar and do not appear to be ad hoc stipulations. 
Schroeder’s own example, a desire that the committee chooses him without his 
needing to do anything to bring this about seems to be a familiar and 
reasonable desire that someone might have in the situation he describes. Also, 
there lots of everyday situations in which it would be reasonable for someone 
to have a self-passive desire. Consider some further examples: (a) Mrs. 
Cunningham desires that Joanie passes her high-school exams on her own. (b) 
Richie desires that Lori-Beth goes on a date with him because she is attracted 
to him for who he his. (c) Fonzie desires that Chachi chooses to work with 
him at the bike-shop of his own volition, (d) Mr. Cunningham desires that the 
Bucks win the NBA Championship play-offs in a fair contest. These are all 
familiar and reasonable desires for someone to have and are all examples of 
self-passive desires.
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In addition, Schroeder does give independent motivation for saying 
that in this case when he desires that the committee chooses him without his 
needing to do anything to bring that about he is not disposed to act in ways he 
believes will bring about that the committee chooses him. Recall, Schroeder 
says that ‘because of the very nature of the desire it makes no sense to try to 
act so as to satisfy it’ (Schroeder 2004, p i7). The idea seems to be that 
because this desire is a desire that he has something that he does not act to get 
himself then, if he were to act in a way he believed will bring about what he 
desires then, in virtue of doing so he would frustrate his desire. Moreover, if 
he understood what it is that he desired and had thought things through then he 
could not fail to recognize that by acting in that way he would frustrate that 
desire: he would also believe that by acting in that way he would not bring 
about what he desires. So if MN entails that someone who has this desire does 
have a disposition to act in a way they believe will bring about what they 
desire then MN entails that someone who has this desire is disposed to act in a 
way that they also believe will frustrate that very desire.55 But according to
55 In addition, MN seems to entail that if someone has a self-passive desire then they will have 
contradictory beliefs. If there is some action, m, that they believe they can perform that will 
bring about what they desire yet they will recognize that by doing m they will fail to bring 
about what they desire, if they think things through, then they will both believe that by doing 
m I can bring about p, and believe that by doing m I cannot bring about p. However it is the 
kind of irrationality discussed in the main text, that MN entails that in virtue of having a self­
passive desire someone is disposed to act in ways that they believe will frustrate that desire 
that Schroeder seems to focus on in his discussion. And it is that kind of irrationality that 
appears more relevant to being rational in practical matters, concerning the relations 
between one’s beliefs, desires and actions. There are interesting questions about the relation 
between such practical rationality and what might be called theoretical rationality, 
concerning the relations between one’s beliefs alone, but I will not engage with them here.
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Schroeder insofar as someone is rational they will not be like this: they will 
not knowingly frustrate their desire in virtue of having it. So, insofar as 
someone is rational they will not have the disposition that MN entails. It 
seems that if MN is true then no one who is rational can have a self-passive 
desire. But that is clearly false, as we can see from the examples: in each case 
there is nothing unreasonable in that person having a self-passive desire. So 
Schroeder does not merely assert that that his example is one in which 
someone has a desire and is not be disposed to act in a way they believe will 
bring about what they desire. He supports the claim by suggesting that what it 
is for someone to be rational implies that they will not have this disposition.36 
Of course, it then appears that Schroeder’s explicit target with the example is 
not MN but rather the related thesis I distinguished in the Introduction, 
MN(rat). Recall, MN(rat) says that if S  desires that p  then S is disposed to act 
in ways S believes will bring about p  insofar as S  is rational. But MN(rat) is 
entailed by MN so this is a counter example to MN nonetheless.
56 Is this in fact what Schroeder is claiming? That is, is the case supposed to be one in which 
someone has a desire and they do not have a disposition to act in a way they believe will 
bring about what they desire, and they are rational? Or is he claiming more than this: is the 
case supposed to be one in which someone has a desire and they do not have a disposition to 
act in a way they believe will bring about what they desire, and this is because they are 
rational? That is, is Schroeder claiming that it is being rationality that is somehow 
responsible for his lacking a disposition to act when he has this desire? If this is what 
Schroeder intend the example to show then it is not clear that it would be a counter example 
to MN(rat) or MN as neither thesis is committed to anything about what is responsible for 
the relation between having a desire and being disposed to act. This is another difficult issue 
to judge, exactly how Schroeder intends the example to be taken but for the purposes of this 
discussion I will assume he is making the weaker claim and that he does intend the case to 
be a counter example to MN(rat) and MN.
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So it seems that the flatfooted response to Schroeder’s case is not well 
supported here: it is not very plausible to respond by straightforwardly denying 
that in the example when Schroeder has the self-passive he is not disposed to 
act. However, we can sidestep the problems about arbitrating between 
conflicting intuitions: we can grant to Schroeder that in the example he is not 
disposed to act in ways he believes will bring about that the committee 
chooses him. Nonetheless, as I will argue in the next section the case fails to 
be a counter example to MN.
3.4 -  Self-Passive Desires are not a Counter Example to MN.
What would a counter example to MN be like? According to MN if S desires 
that p  then S is disposed to act in ways S believes will bring about p. So a 
counter example would be a case in which someone desires that p  and is not 
disposed to act in a way they believe will bring about p. But Schroeder’s 
example is not like this. Recall, in his example Schroeder desires that the 
committee chooses him and that he does not act to bring about that the 
committee chooses him, and he is not disposed to act in ways he believes will 
bring about that the committee chooses him. But MN does not entail that he 
will have this disposition. This is because Schroeder’s desire here is not a
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desire that the committee chooses him. Rather, his desire is a desire that the 
committee chooses him and that he does not act to bring about that the 
committee chooses him. The content of his desire is a conjunction, that a 
particular state of affairs comes about and that it does not come about in a 
certain set of ways. MN entails that he is disposed to act in ways he believes 
will bring about this conjunction: he is disposed to act in ways he believes will 
bring about that the committee chooses him and he does not act to bring about 
that the committee chooses him. Schroeder says nothing about whether in this 
case he has this disposition, and it is irrelevant to MN that he lacks a 
disposition to act in ways he believes will bring about that the committee 
chooses him. So Schroeder’s case is not a counter example to MN.
We can make this response more precise: consider again his example 
and the examples of other self-passive desires I gave in the previous section. 
They all have in common that the propositional object of the desire is a 
conjunction, that a particular state of affairs come about and that they do not 
act in a way that they believe will bring about this state of affairs. We can 
represent them all as a desire that p and that I do not act to bring about p. Call 
this conjunction ‘q \  According to MN if S desires that q then 5 is disposed to 
act in a way S  believes will bring about q. In Schroeder’s example he has a 
self-passive desire that q and he is not disposed to act in a way he believes will 
bring about p. And this is not a counter example to MN.
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Moreover, in Schroeder’s example, and the other examples of self­
passive desires it is plausible that each person has the disposition that MN 
attributes to them. They are disposed to act in ways they believe will bring 
about q, or more precisely, they are disposed to act in ways they believe will 
bring aboutp  and /  do not act to bring aboutp. Consider Mrs. Cunningham’s 
self-passive desire that Joanie passes her high-school exams on her own. 
Making the object of her desire more explicit, Mrs. Cunningham desires that 
Joanie passes her high-school exams and that she does not bring about that 
Joanie passes her high-school exams. It is plausible that she is not disposed to 
act in ways she believes will bring about that Joanie passes the exams: she is 
not disposed to do things that she might believe will straightforwardly make it 
the case that Joanie passes her exam, such as provide Joanie with the answers 
to the exams beforehand, or bribe Joanie’s teachers to mark her exam scripts 
leniently. But suppose Mrs. Cunningham believes that if she encourages 
Joanie to study then, although this will not make it the case that Joanie passes, 
it will make Joanie more likely to study and pass on her own. It is plausible 
that if Mrs. Cunningham has this belief and a self-passive desire that Joanie 
passes her high-school exams on her own then she is disposed to encourage 
Joanie to study. Hence, she has a desire that p  and I do not act to bring about 
p  and she is disposed to act in a way she believes will bring about that p and I 
do not act to bring aboutp. So MN is true in this case.
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Similarly, consider Schroeder’s own example: Schroeder desires that 
the committee chooses me and he does not act to bring about that the 
committee chooses him. As he says, he is not disposed to act in ways he 
believes will bring about that the committee chooses him: he is not disposed to 
do things like bribe committee members to promote him to their colleagues, 
nor to spread rumours about the other candidates to undermine their 
applications. But suppose that he believes that if he wears a nice suit, prepares 
in advance for the interview, and gives firm handshakes to the committee 
members then, although this will not make it the case that the committee will 
choose him it will make them more likely to choose him of their own accord. 
If Schroeder does have this belief and a self-passive desire that the committee 
chooses me and he does not act to bring about that the committee chooses him 
then it is plausible that he is disposed to wear a nice suit, prepare in advance 
for the interview and give firm handshakes to the committee members. Like 
Mrs. Cunningham, in Schroeder’s example he has a self-passive desire that p  
and I do not act to bring about p  and he is disposed to act in ways he believes 
will bring about that p  and l  do not act to bring about p. This is just what MN 
entails. So these cases of self-passive desires, like Schroeder’s are not counter 
examples to MN.
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3.5 -  Self-Passive Desires and Straightforward Desires.
Might there be a counter example to MN in a more complex case, closely 
related to Schroeder’s example? Recall, a counter example would be a case in 
which someone has a desire that p  and is not disposed to act in ways they 
believe will bring about p. In Schroeder’s example he has a desire that p  and I 
do not bring about that p  and is not disposed to act in ways he believes will 
bring about p. So it is not a counter example to MN. But consider a different 
case: suppose the next interviewee on the shortlist, call him ‘Schroeder*’ has a 
similar desire to Schroeder’s, a self-passive desire that the committee chooses 
me and that he does not act to bring about that the committee chooses him. 
But suppose that in addition to this self-passive desire Schroeder* also has 
what I will call the corresponding ‘straightforward desire’, a desire for the first 
conjunct of the propositional object of the self-passive desire alone. In this 
case Schroeder*’s straightforward desire is a desire that the committee chooses 
him. So this is a case in which Schroeder* has two desires: he has a desire that 
p  and also a distinct desire that p  and I do not act to bring about p. According 
to MN Schroeder* is disposed to act in ways he believes will bring about p  
and he is disposed to act in ways he believes will bring about p  and I do not 
act to bring about p. So if, as in Schroeder’s example, Schroeder* is not 
disposed to act in ways he believes will bring about p  then this is a counter
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example to MN: it is a case in which Schroeder* has a desire that p, his 
straightforward desire that the committee chooses him, and he is not disposed 
to act in ways that he believes will bring about p, ways he believes will bring 
about that the committee chooses him. If this combination of desires and 
dispositions that Schroeder* seems to have is possible then MN is false. The 
argument can be summarised as follows [where SD(/f) stands for S desires that 
/?, and SM(p) stands for S is disposed to act in ways 5 believes will bring about 
p\-
1) If MN is true then it is not possible that SD(/?) & not SM(p).
2) It is possible that [SD(p) & SD{p and I do not bring about that p)] 
& not SM{p).
C) MN is false.
3.6 -  Options (part 2).
This argument is valid. So, to defend MN we have to deny premise 2, the 
premise supported with the example of Schroeder*. Is it plausible that 
Schroeder* has the combination of desires and dispositions required to show 
that premise 2 is true? He might fail to do so in at least two ways: he might
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not have both the straightforward desire that the committee chooses him and 
the self-passive desire that the committee chooses him and that he does not act 
to bring about that the committee chooses him. Alternatively, if he has both 
desires he might actually be disposed to act in ways he believes will bring 
about that the committee chooses him. I will discuss the second option in the 
following section but first, in the rest of this section I will discuss the first 
option.
Could Schroeder* have both the straightforward desire and the self­
passive desire at the same time? One reason to think that he could do is if 
desire distributes over conjunction in the same way as belief is commonly 
taken to do. It is standardly assumed that belief distributes over conjunction, 
that is that if someone believes that p and q then this entails that they believe 
that p  and they believe that q .57 If desire is like belief in this respect then in 
virtue of having the self-passive desire this entails that Schroeder* has both the 
straightforward desire and the self-passive desire together. A self-passive 
desire is a desire that p  and I do not act to bring about p, so its propositional 
object is a conjunction. If desire distributes over conjunction then desiring p  
and /  do not act to bring about p  entails desiring that p  and desiring that I do 
not act to bring about p. Indeed, if desire distributes over conjunction then
57 See, for example Sorensen (1988), who says ‘[ajnyone who believes there is a non-trivial 
logic of belief is committed to the view that belief is orderly. The order is standardly 
described in terms of belief expanding rules and belief restricting rules. For example, the
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there is no difference between Schroeder’s original example and the case of 
Schroeder*: Schroeder would have both a self-passive desire and the 
corresponding straightforward desire merely in virtue of having a self-passive 
desire.
However, in fact it is not plausible that desire distributes over 
conjunction in the same way as belief does. There are obvious cases in which 
someone desires to have two things together but does not want at least one of 
the things on its own. The propositional object of their desire is a conjunction 
but they do not desire each of the conjuncts individually. Suppose that Mr. 
Cunningham is a passionate supporter of the Milwaukee Bucks and desires 
that Lew Adcindor stays with the team and that he scores 30 points in the first 
game of the NBA Championship play-offs. The propositional object of his 
desire is a conjunction. Yet it is plausible that he does not desire each of the 
conjuncts individually. Suppose that his love of basketball is fervently one- 
eyed: he only likes the Bucks and despises all other teams and their players. It 
is plausible that Mr. Cunningham does not have a straightforward desire that 
Lew Alcindor scores 30 points in the first game of the NBA Championship 
play-offs. If Alcindor were to transfer to another team then he would not 
desire this: indeed he would more likely be strongly averse to it! So here Mr. 
Cunningham has a desire with a propositional object that is a conjunction but
principle that belief distributes over conjunction, B(p & q) D (Bp & Bq), enables us to
expand our list of beliefs given that the antecedent is on the list’ (Sorensen 1988, p22).
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does not have a desire for at least one of the conjuncts. So desire does not 
distribute across conjunction, and having a self-passive desire that p  and I do 
not act to bring aboutp does not entail having both a self-passive desire that p  
and I  do not act to bring about that p  and a straightforward desire that p.
Nonetheless, it seems plausible as an empirical fact that someone could 
have both a self-passive desire and the corresponding straightforward desire 
together. A self-passive desire is a desire that a certain state of affairs come 
about in a certain way. But if someone has a desire like this it is plausible that 
they might also desire that the state of affairs itself come about, independently 
of how it comes about. Suppose in the earlier example that it has been an 
ambition of Schroeder* for all of his adult life to get a job in that particular 
faculty. Perhaps it is in an extremely distinguished University, where 
Schroeder* senior was an established Professor during his own career: 
Schroeder* was raised according to the University’s principles and extolling it 
virtues, and he is an alumnus of the University himself. It would make his life 
fulfilled if he got the appointment. But suppose also that Schroeder* is less 
scrupulous than Schroeder. Of course, he wants to get the job in the right way 
so he has a self-passive desire that the committee chooses him and that he does 
not act to bring about that the committee chooses him. But he wants the job so 
much that he also straightforwardly desires that the committee chooses him, 
irrespective of how that decision is reached. So he has both a self-passive
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desire and a straightforward desire together. This kind of situation seems 
obviously possible and it is plausible that there are actual cases like this. So it 
is not plausible to defend MN by arguing that the example of Schroeder* does 
not show that the combination of desires described in premise 2 is possible.
3.7 -  Two Dispositions.
What about the second way that the example could fail to support premise 2: 
does the example show that it is possible for someone to have both a self­
passive desire and a straightforward desire together and not be disposed to act 
in ways that they believe will satisfy the straightforward desire? It does not 
show this. In fact, it is plausible that in such a case they will have two 
dispositions to act, corresponding to each of their two desires, the self-passive 
desire and the straightforward desire.
If someone has a self-passive desire like a desire that the committee 
chooses me and I do not act to bring about that the committee chooses me then 
they have recognized that there are a number of ways in which the committee 
could make a particular decision. And what they want is for the committee to 
make that decision in only some of those ways. This is what it is to have this 
particular self-passive desire. As discussed above, it is plausible that they are
110
disposed to act in ways they believe will bring this about, for example they are 
disposed to wear a nice suit, prepare in advance for the interview and give firm 
handshakes to the committee members. But if, in spite of recognizing this 
they nonetheless have the corresponding straightforward desire, they want the 
committee to make that particular decision in any of the ways they could make 
it, then it is also plausible that they are disposed to act in ways they believe 
will bring about that the committee chooses them. Consider Schroeder* once 
again. To make it seem plausible that it is a case in which he has both the self­
passive desire and the straightforward desire, I had to embellish Schroeder’s 
original example with respect to the importance to Schroeder * of getting the 
position and his being somewhat unscrupulous. In light of this it seems 
plausible that he will be disposed to act in ways he believes will bring about 
that the committee chooses him. This does not mean that he will readily act in 
these ways. Perhaps his respect for the traditions and principles of the 
University also disposes Schroeder* not to act in such ways. And this 
disposition may over-ride the disposition to act that he has in virtue of having 
the straightforward desire that the committee chooses me so that he does not 
act in ways he believes will bring about that the committee chooses him. But 
he has this disposition nonetheless. In which case there is no counter example 
to MN. Schroeder* may have both a desire that p and I do not act to bring 
about thatp  and a desire that p  but he also has both a disposition to act in ways
1 1 1
that he believes will bring about p and I do not bring about that p  and a 
disposition to act in ways that he believes will bring about p.
This is not merely an artifact of this particular example. Rather, it 
seems that in cases where it is plausible that someone has both a self-passive 
desire and a straightforward desire then it will be just as plausible that they are 
disposed to act in ways that they believe will bring about what they 
straightforwardly desire as that they are not so disposed. Consider another 
case, ‘the unscrupulous heir’: suppose that Robert has always had a difficult 
relationship with his father. When he was younger he and his father frequently 
argued and he has never really felt that his father has any pride in, or affection 
for him. Suppose also that his father’s prize possession is a football shirt worn 
by Sir Bobby Charlton in one of the matches in the 1966 World Cup, signed 
by Charlton himself and given to Robert’s father in appreciation of the work 
he did in support of Charlton’s charity. Suppose that Robert’s father is on his 
death bed. The shirt is the only thing of value that his father owns and Robert 
thinks it would finally show that his father’s loves him if he left it to Robert in 
his will without him having to solicit it. So Robert has a self-passive desire 
that his father leaves him the shirt and that he does not act to bring about that 
his father leaves him the shirt. It is plausible that he is disposed to act in ways 
that he believes will bring about that his father leaves him the shirt and that he 
does not act to bring about that his father leaves him the shirt: for example, he
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is disposed to visit his father in hospital, to bring him flowers and grapes, to 
reassure him that he is taking care of his home, and so on. Does Robert also 
have a straightforward desire that his father leaves him the shirt? It is easy to 
imagine a case in which this is plausible: suppose that he also has gambling 
debts to some vicious loan sharks and has no way of paying them off except 
by selling the shirt. So he has both a self-passive desire that his father leaves 
him the shirt and that he does not act to bring about that his father leaves him 
the shirt and the corresponding straightforward desire that his father leaves 
him the shirt. According to MN Robert is disposed to act in ways he believes 
will bring about that his father leaves him the shirt. It is surely as plausible 
that he does have this disposition as that he does not. If he believes that he 
could bring about that his father leaves him the shirt by confessing his 
situation to his father and asking for his help, or by secretly altering his 
father’s will then it is plausible that he is disposed to act in these ways. And 
we can easily imagine situations in which he manifests these dispositions and 
does act in these ways, say if he learns that his father is intent on leaving the 
shirt to charity or if they have another argument during one of the hospital 
visits. It seems reasonable to presume that any similar example will be the 
same: that if it is plausibly a case in which someone has both a self-passive 
desire that p  and I do not act to bring about that p  and a straightforward desire 
that p  then it will also be plausible that they have both a disposition to act in
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ways that they believe will bring about that p and I do not act to bring about 
thatp  and a disposition to act in ways that they believe will bring about that p. 
So this kind of case is not a counter example to MN.
3.8 -  Distinguishing Between Desires.
A final objection that I will discuss that is sometimes made to MN on the basis 
of self-passive desires is that MN cannot distinguish between different desires 
in respect of their content.58 It is a condition on an adequate theory of desire 
that it does at least two things:39 first, it must correctly distinguish desires 
from other kinds of mental states. It must say what it is for a mental state to be 
a desire that p  as opposed to, for example a belief that p, a perception that p, an 
intention that p, and so on. Second, it must correctly distinguish between 
desires that differ in content. It must say what it is for a desire to be a desire 
that p  as opposed to a desire that q, and so what determines that a desire has 
the particular object that it does.
According to this objection, MN cannot meet this second requirement 
of a theory of desire. The problem is supposed to arise in the following way. 
Recall the earlier example of Mrs. Cunningham: she has a self-passive desire
38 Thanks to Daniel Friedrich for raising this objection to me in discussions.
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that Joanie passes her high-school exams on her own, and believes that by 
encouraging Joanie to study she can bring this about. According to MN Mrs. 
Cunningham is disposed to encourage Joanie to study. Now consider Mrs. 
Cunningham*: she has a desire that Joanie studies, and believes that by 
encouraging Joanie to study she can bring this about. According to MN Mrs. 
Cunningham* is disposed to encourage Joanie to study. So according to MN 
if they have their respective desires then Mrs. Cunningham and Mrs. 
Cunningham* have exactly the same dispositions. Yet, ex hypothesis they 
have different desires: a desire that Joanie passes her high school exams on her 
own is not the same as a desire that Joanie studies. So MN does not correctly 
distinguish between desires that differ in content, so does not meet the second 
requirement of a theory of desire.
It should be obvious why this objection is misguided. It is an 
interesting question how to distinguish between desires that differ in content, 
and we can grant that an adequate theory of desire, a specification of necessary 
and sufficient conditions for having a desire must provide a way to do this. 
But MN is not such a theory: it is a necessary condition for having a desire, not 
necessary and sufficient conditions. So it is not a problem for MN if it cannot 
distinguish between desires that differ in content in all cases.60
59 See, for example (Smith 1998, p449) and (Strawson 1998, p481) for discussion.
60 Moreover, it is not obvious that MN cannot do this anyway. Consider again the cases of 
Mrs. Cunningham and Mrs. Cunningham*. These cases have been mis-described in the 
objection. It claims that MN entails that they have the same disposition if they have their
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3.9 -  Necessity and Impossibility Desires.
There are two other particular kinds of desire that are said to be counter 
examples to MN that I will discuss in this chapter. These are what I earlier 
called ‘necessity desires’ and ‘impossibility desires’. Recall, necessity desires 
are desires like a desire that there are infinitely many prime numbers, or a 
desire that 2 + 2 = 4. The propositional object of these desires is necessarily 
true. Impossibility desires, in contrast are desires like a desire that I have a 
square circle or a desire that 2 + 2 = 5. The propositional object of these 
desires is necessarily false. But it is important that in both of these kinds of 
cases the fact that their propositional objects have their respective truth-values 
necessarily is something that the desirer is aware of. Distinguish them from
different respective desires. But this is false: MN may entail that the dispositions they have 
are extensionally equivalent in terms of the bodily movements that each is disposed to 
perform. But they are not the same dispositions. Mrs. Cunningham’s disposition is a 
disposition to act in ways she believes will bring about that Joanie passes her high school 
exams on her own. Mrs. Cunningham*’s disposition is a disposition to act in ways she 
believes will bring about that Joanie studies. Clearly these are not the same disposition. To 
put this response a different way: the conditions in which each will be disposed to perform 
those particular movements are not the same. According to MN, Mrs. Cunningham is 
disposed to encourage Joanie to study only if she also believes that by encouraging Joanie to 
study she can bring about that Joanie passes her high school exams on her own. But Mrs. 
Cunningham* may be disposed to encourage Joanie to study even if she lacks such a belief. 
The conditions in which MN entails that they will each manifest their respective dispositions 
and actually encourage Joanie to study are not the same, so it does not attribute them with 
the same dispositions. So MN does not entail that having these different desires entails 
having the same disposition to act. While the objection might raise a problem for a purely 
behaviourist understanding of having a disposition to act it is not a problem for MN.
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cases in which someone has a desire that there are an infinitely many prime 
numbers or a desire that they have a square circle and does not believe that 
what they desire is necessarily the case or cannot be the case respectively:61 
MN can account for these other cases in the same way as ordinary desires with 
contingent propositional objects.
Why are necessity desires and impossibility desires a problem for MN? 
According to MN, if someone desires that p  then they are disposed to act in 
ways they believe will bring about p. So, if someone believes that by doing an 
action m they can bring about p  then they are disposed to do m. But if they 
have a necessity desire then the object of their desire is something that they 
believe is already the case, and is the case necessarily. Conversely if they 
have an impossibility desire then the object of their desire is something that 
they believe cannot be the case. So it is not plausible that they can also believe 
that there is some action that they can perform that will bring about what they 
desire in cases like these. Furthermore, these cases are unlike those where 
someone has a desire for something that is, or that they believe is contingently 
possible yet lack a belief about some action they can perform to bring it about. 
For example, someone might desire that they have a bar of chocolate but lack 
any belief about something they can do to get one. In that kind of case it is
61 As Schroeder discusses (Schroeder 2004, p i6-17), that alternative case is not a counter 
example to MN: if someone does not believe that what they desire is necessarily the case or 
necessarily not the case then, just as with other kinds of desire, if they believe that by doing
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nonetheless plausible that they are disposed to act as they might easily come to 
have such a belief about how they can get a bar of chocolate, and if they do 
have such a belief, and certain other conditions obtain then they will act. For 
instance, perhaps there is actually chocolate in their fridge and they have 
merely forgotten that they put it there earlier. They could easily come to 
remember this, so form a belief that by going to the fridge they can get a bar of 
chocolate. So it is plausible to attribute them with a disposition to act in this 
way. But with necessity desires and impossibility desires it is not possible for 
someone to come to have a belief about some action they could perform to 
bring about what they desire. Suppose that someone has a necessity desire like 
a desire that there are infinitely many prime numbers. They are aware that this 
is the case and is so necessarily. So it is plausible that they cannot also believe 
of some action m that by doing m they can bring about that there are infinitely 
many prime numbers. They would effectively then believe that by doing m 
they could bring about something that is necessarily already the case. But it is 
not plausible that someone can believe this, or at least, they cannot believe this 
insofar as they are rational. “ If it is not possible that someone who desires that 
there are infinitely many prime numbers can believe of some action m that by
some action, m, they can bring about what they desire then according to MN they are 
disposed to do m. It just happens that in this kind of case this belief will always be false.
62 So perhaps the explicit target of these cases is MN(rat) rather than MN. But as noted above, 
MN(rat) is a more restricted thesis than MN so it is entailed by it: so necessity desires and 
impossibility desire are putatively counter example to MN as well.
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doing m they can bring about that there are infinitely many prime numbers 
then they cannot have the kind of disposition that MN entails they will have: 
they cannot have a disposition to act in a way they believe will bring about that 
there are infinitely many prime numbers. So this is a counter example to MN: 
it is a case in which someone has a desire that p  and does not have a 
disposition to act in ways they believe will bring about p. The same problem 
for MN will arise, mutatis mutandis, if someone has an impossibility desire. 
So like necessity desires they are counter examples to MN.
3.10 -  Options (part 3).
There are a number of responses that are possible here in defense of MN. An 
initial response is to deny that this kind of case is possible at all. That is, deny 
that it is possible to have desires for things that you recognize are necessarily 
the case or that you recognize are impossible. According to this response there 
are no necessity desires or impossibility desires so there is no counter example 
to MN here. If someone makes this kind of response they might also claim 
that those cases where it appears that someone has a necessity desire or 
impossibility desire have been mis-described. Rather the cases are in fact 
more accurately described in one of the following ways: (i) it is a case in
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which the person is not aware that what they desire is necessary or impossible, 
so, by definition their desire is not a necessity desire or an impossibility desire, 
(ii) Or, the person is not in fact rational, so they could believe that there is 
some action they can perform that will bring about what they desire and they 
do have a disposition to act when they have their desire, (iii) Or, the kind of 
mental state they have is not a desire at all. Rather what they have is a hope or 
wish, or some other kind of pro-attitude towards something that they recognize 
is necessary or impossible. And as MN is a thesis about desires and not about 
other kinds of pro-attitude these cases are not relevant to MN.
I think that this response is quite plausible here. In contrast to self­
passive desires, actual cases in which someone seems to have a necessity 
desire or an impossibility desire are not common or familiar.6^  And those 
actual cases in which someone does claim to have such a desire are not 
obviously ones where we think the person has fully thought through what it is 
they desire, or where we think that they are being rational and their desire is a 
reasonable one for them to have. If there are other cases where the person is 
obviously rational and properly understands that what they claim to desire is 
necessary or impossible it is may be plausible that they may have mistaken 
their attitude for an attitude of hoping or wishing, for example. We are not
6j Although he claims that these desires are possible Schroeder, for example, does 
acknowledge that they are uncommon. He says, ‘[djesires regarding the necessary facts of 
the world, such as the facts of mathematics, are admittedly scarce, but not as scarce as might 
be imagined’ (Schroeder 2004, p i6).
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incorrigible about the content of our mental states, so it is plausible that we are 
not incorrigible about the kind of mental state we are having either.
Alternatively, we can consider this problem for MN as merely an 
example of a more general problem, what Stalnaker calls the problem of 
equivalence (Stalnaker 1984, pp. 24-25). This is the problem of how we can 
stand in different representational relationships to necessarily equivalent 
propositions. As he says when discussing the problem in the case of beliefs,
the alleged counter examples are not just counter examples to a 
particular analysis, but cases which are problematic in themselves. We 
lack a satisfactory understanding, from any point of view, of what it is 
to believe that P while disbelieving that Q where the ‘P ’ and the ‘(7 
stand for necessarily equivalent expressions (Stalnaker 1984, p24).
The problem arises from the standard account of propositions, which takes a 
proposition to be a set of possible worlds at which the proposition is true.64 
But a proposition that is necessarily true is true at all possible worlds, and 
conversely a proposition that is necessarily false is true at no worlds. So every 
necessary proposition corresponds to the same set, that is, the set of all worlds.
64 See, for example Lewis (1986): ‘[A] proposition is a set of possible worlds. A proposition 
is said to hold at a world, or to be true at a world. The proposition is the same thing as the 
property of being a world where that proposition holds; and that is the same thing as the set
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Analogously, every proposition that is necessarily false corresponds to the 
same set, but in this case it is the empty set.6:1 This leads to a number of 
familiar problems. For example it seems to rule out the possibility of non­
trivial belief in necessary truths: the propositional object of every contingent 
belief corresponds to a set of worlds that is entailed by the set of all worlds. 
So every contingent belief entails belief in necessary truths. Moreover, it 
entails belief in every necessary truth, as all necessary truths are equivalent. 
Yet intuitively someone can have a contingent belief like a belief that grass is 
green yet not believe something that is necessary, like a complex mathematical 
fact: when someone first comes to believe that there are infinitely many prime 
numbers they gain information that they appeared to be ignorant of 
beforehand. And what they learn appears to be different from the information 
they gain when they learn that i 1 is an irrational number. Yet according to this 
account of propositions if they already had any beliefs about some contingent 
fact then they already knew both of these necessary facts. So there is a general 
problem of understanding how we represent propositions that have their truth- 
value necessarily.
of worlds where that proposition holds.’ (Lewis 1986, pp. 53-54.) See also Stalnaker 
(1984).
6:1 See, for example Lewis again: ‘As possibility amounts to existential quantification over the 
worlds, with restricting modifiers inside the quantifiers, so necessity amounts to universal 
quantification. Necessarily all swans are birds iff, for any world W, quantifying only over 
parts of W, all swans are birds. More simply: iff all swans, no matter what world they are 
part of, are birds. The other modalities follow suit. What is impossible is the case at no 
worlds; what is contingent is the case at some but not at others.’ (Lewis 1986, p7.)
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It is plausible that the apparent problems for MN from necessity 
desires and impossibility desires are just particular examples of this general 
problem: according to this account of propositions all necessity desires have 
the same propositional object and all impossibility desires have the same 
propositional object. But we should not expect to have to solve this general 
problem in this context. Furthermore, as it is obvious that we can represent 
such propositions there must be a solution to the problem [see e.g. Stalnaker 
(1984), especially Ch. 4 and 5 for discussion of suggestions], and it is 
reasonable to assume that whatever this solution is it will apply to cases of 
necessity desires and impossibility desires. That is, when we have such a 
solution we will properly understand what the content of these desires is. It is 
plausible that when they are correctly understood they will no longer seem to 
be counter examples to MN.66
66 Why is it reasonable to assume this? Note that necessity desires and impossibility desires 
are a problem for any plausible account of desire. The problem arises for MN because it 
says that a desire that p  is connected with a disposition to act through having a belief that by 
doing some action m I can bring about p : it is connected with a representation of the object 
of the desire. And where the object of desire is something that is necessarily the case or 
impossible there is a general problem that it is not well understood how such things are 
represented. But any plausible account of desire says that when someone has a desire it is 
connected in some way with a representation of the object of desire.
Consider, for example, a typical hedonic theory of desire. Hedonic theories 
attempt to analyse having a desire in terms of having experiences of pleasure. A typical 
version might claim something like S has a desire that p iff S  is disposed to have an 
experience of pleasure if S believes that p has come about [see for discussion (Schroeder 
2004, p27)]. Like MN it claims that having a desire is connected in some way with a 
representation of the object of the desire: in this case, a belief that p  has come about. 
According to such a version of hedonic theory if someone has any necessity desire then they 
are disposed to have an experience of pleasure if they form a belief that any contingent state 
of affairs has come about. Any contingent state of affairs entails everything that is 
necessarily the case. If someone is rational, is aware that the object of their desire is 
something that is necessarily the case, and has thought things through then if they believe
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3.11 -  Conclusion.
According to MN, if someone has a desire then, whatever the object of that 
desire they are disposed to act in ways they believe will bring about that 
object. But some, like Schroeder for example, have argued that the particular 
objects of what I have called ‘self-passive desires’, ‘necessity desires’ and 
‘impossibility desires’ make them counter-examples to MN. They argue that 
where someone has one of these kinds of desire then it is not possible that they 
also have a disposition to act in ways they believe will bring about the object 
of their desire. So if someone has such a desire then they are not disposed to 
act as MN entails. However, although these cases appear to be counter-
that something contingent has come about they should also believe that anything necessary 
has come about. So according to this version of hedonic theory having a necessity desire 
like a desire that there are infinitely many prime numbers disposes someone to have an 
experience of pleasure if they form any belief that some contingent state of affairs has come 
about. The converse happens with impossibility desires: it is not possible to believe that 
something that is impossible has come about, insofar as someone is rational. So it is not 
possible to have a disposition to have an experience of pleasure if you form such a belief (for 
analogous reasons that it is not possible to have a disposition to act in ways you believe will 
bring can bring about something that you believe is impossible, as discussed in the main 
text). So necessity desires and impossibility desire are counter examples to this account of 
desire as well, and will plausibly be counter examples to any plausible theory.
If this is right, that these cases are counter examples to any plausible theory of 
desire then they suggest that it is not possible to give an analysis of desire. But this entails 
either that desires are sui generis, they cannot be analysed in terms of a relation to anything 
else, or that we do not have desires at all. But neither primitivism about desires nor 
eliminativism about desires is plausible. It is more plausible that there is something wrong 
with the supposed counter examples. So it is reasonable to assume that the solution to the 
general problem can be given to explain away these apparently problematic cases.
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examples this is because people have misunderstood what the content of these 
desires actually is. I have argued that once it is made clear what the objects of 
these desires are then we can see that they are not counter examples at all. In 
none of these cases is it plausible that someone has a desire but lacks the 
disposition to act that MN entails they will have. Indeed, in the case of self­
passive desires in particular once the content of those desires is properly 
understood the original cases that were supposedly counter examples more 
plausibly provide support for MN instead.
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CHAPTER 4
DEFENDING DISPOSITIONAL 
DIRECTION OF FIT
4.1 -  Introduction.
In Chapter One I highlighted the explanatory power that MN has with respect 
to some prominent facts about desire. In particular I appealed to the regular 
correlation that we see between having a desire and acting in ways you believe 
will bring about what you desire. I argued that this fact is most easily 
explained if MN is true and I took this as providing support for the thesis. But 
does this fact provide reason to think there is a connection between desiring 
and being disposed to act, or is it just reason to think there is a connection 
between having certain complexes of mental states and being disposed to act? 
The latter would not support MN, that there is a necessary connection between 
having a desire in particular and being disposed to act in ways that you believe 
will bring about what you desire. So why accept my stronger claim?
In fact there is independent reason to think that there is a connection 
between having a desire in particular and being disposed to act: it provides the
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most plausible, informative way of distinguishing between beliefs and desires. 
The standard way of making this distinction is in terms of what is sometimes 
called the different ‘Direction-of-Fif (hereafter DOF) of each kind of state. 
But what is it to have a particular DOF, and how does the DOF of belief differ 
from that of desire. I will argue that having a particular DOF is most plausibly 
understood in terms of having a particular functional role, that is having a 
particular set of properties and relations. Furthermore, I will argue that the 
most informative versions of functional role DOF account are ones that entail 
that MN is true. Not only does this provide independent support for MN, but 
it also justifies my earlier claim that the regular correlation between having a 
desire and acting in ways you believe will bring about what you desire is good 
reason to accept MN.
4.2 -  The Explanatory Power of MN.
Recall my argument in Chapter One: I described a prominent fact about desire, 
that there is a regular correlation between having a desire and acting in ways 
you believe will bring about what you desire. It is reasonable to expect that an 
adequate theory of desire, a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for
67 See Chapter One for a more detailed discussion of what having a particular functional role 
consists in.
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having a desire can explain this fact. I argued that motivational theories of 
desire, those theories that entail that MN is true, can explain this fact more 
easily then the standard alternative kinds of theory of desire. I took this to 
provide support for MN. But is this convincing: what exactly is in need of 
explanation and does MN have the privileged position for explaining it that I 
claimed?
It is uncontroversial that there is a correlation between desiring and 
acting. However, has it been under-described here? After all, it is not the case 
that there is a regular correlation between someone having just a desire, and no 
other mental states, and their acting in ways they believe will bring about what 
they desire. So is the correlation more accurately described as a correlation 
between having particular complexes of mental states, for example desires and 
beliefs, and acting in ways you believe will bring about what you desire? If 
so, then this fact does not support MN to the extent I claimed: according to 
MN if S  desires that p  then 5 is disposed to act in ways that S  believes will 
bring about p. So MN explains the fact in terms of a necessary connection 
between having desires in particular, and having a disposition to act. But if the 
fact that needs explaining is that there is a regular correlation between having 
certain complexes of, say desires and beliefs and acting then all that is needed 
to explain it is that there is a necessary connection between having such 
particular complexes of desires and beliefs and being disposed to act: there
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need not be any connection between having a desire in particular and having a 
disposition to act. So MN does not have a particularly privileged position with 
respect to explaining this fact. Strawson puts the point in the following way:
Any desire has the following property: it is necessarily true that there 
are beliefs with which the desire can combine in such a way as to give 
rise to, or constitute, a disposition to act or behave in some way. This 
is a conceptual truth, true even of desires to change the past and desires 
for logically impossible things (Strawson 1994, p276).
But Strawson says this in the midst of a sustained argument against MN. So 
obviously he does not accept that there is a necessary connection between 
having a desire in particular and being disposed to act in ways you believe will 
bring about what you desire. Rather, he thinks that there is a necessary 
connection between having a particular complex of desires and beliefs and 
being disposed to act in ways you believe will bring about what you desire. 
As this is sufficient to explain the regular correlation described above then 
according to Strawson, that correlation does not provide reason to think that 
the stronger claim made by MN is true. If Strawson is right then this 
undercuts what I took to be one of the strongest motivations for accepting MN.
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However, as I will argue below there is independent reason to think 
that the stronger claim made by MN is necessary for explaining this fact. 
According to what I will argue is the most plausible and informative way of 
distinguishing belief from desire, it is desire in particular, and not belief, that is 
connected with having a disposition to act in ways that you believe will bring 
about what you desire. This entails that MN is true. And it suggests that the 
stronger claim of MN is justified by this regular correlation.
4.3 -  Direction of Fit.
Intuitively a belief that there is chocolate in the cupboard is a different kind of
c  o
mental state from a desire that there is chocolate in the cupboard. In general 
we can easily distinguish our beliefs from our desires: we do not usually 
mistake one kind of state for the other when we have them. But what does the 
difference between these kinds of state consist in? It is difficult to specify 
what this is exactly. But the standard current approach is to distinguish 
between belief and desire in terms of their difference in DOF.
68 Of course, if someone held what Lewis called a ‘Desire as Belief (DAB) account of desire 
then they would deny this [see Lewis (1988)]. According to a DAB account having a desire 
is constituted by having an appropriate evaluative belief: for example, according to some 
versions of DAB account S desires that p iff S believes that p is good. However, there are 
good reasons to think that DAB accounts are false (see e.g. Lewis (1988), although see 
Hajek and Pettit (2004) for further discussion).
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According to DOF accounts belief and desire are distinguished from 
one another by their difference in DOF. Such accounts distinguish two 
properties: a belief direction of fit (call this ‘BDF’) and a desire direction of fit 
(call this ‘DDF’). They then claim that being a belief and not a desire consists 
in having BDF and not having DDF while being a desire and not a belief 
consists in having DDF and not having BDF. Note that they are not saying 
that having BDF and not having DDF is sufficient for being a belief, for 
example. Rather they are saying that it is necessary for being a belief that a 
state has BDF and does not have DDF. And they are saying that it is sufficient 
for not being a desire that a state has BDF and does not have DDF. They also 
claim that being a desire, having DDF and having BDF are related in an 
analogous way, mutatis mutandis. As I understand it the particular aim of 
DOF accounts is to specify the difference between beliefs and desires, not to 
give necessary and sufficient conditions for having each kind of state.69 So all 
DOF accounts are committed to the following two theses:
69 See e.g. Humberstone (1992) and his objection below. So on this understanding, for 
example a particular DOF account need not claim that having BDF and not having DDF is 
sufficient for individuating beliefs from all other kinds of mental states. They might 
concede that, say visual perceptions also have BDF and lack DDF. But they are committed 
to saying that having those particular DOF properties is sufficient to distinguish a belief 
from a desire in particular. Of course, someone could object to this way of understanding 
the aim of giving a DOF account. However, for the purposes of this dissertation I will 
follow it: it is adequate for my argument in this chapter in particular.
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(T l) For all mental states x if x is a belief that p  then x has
BDF and x does not have DDF.
(T2) For all mental states x if x is a desire that p  then x has
DDF and x does not have BDF.
Of course, merely giving (Tl) and (T2) is not yet saying very much of interest. 
So in addition DOF accounts must say what the respective DOF properties 
BDF and DDF are. This might be done in various ways by different versions 
of DOF account. For example, a simple suggestion is to analyse BDF as the 
property of being a belief and not a desire, and to analyse DDF as the property 
of being a desire and not a belief. But obviously such a simple account is 
unhelpfully circular: it just says that beliefs are not desires and vice versa. But 
if we are trying to characterise the distinction between these kinds of state then 
we already know that there is a distinction between them. So this simple DOF 
account is uninformative. A second version of DOF account is suggested by 
what Flume says about beliefs and desires.70 According to Flume beliefs 
provide information about how the world is whereas desires do not (Hume 
1975, p416). Although he did not use these terms, he might be understood as 
saying that beliefs purport to represent how the world is. In contrast he
70 Indeed, Hume is sometimes credited with introducing this general approach to distinguishing 
beliefs from desires, although not the name, of course [see e.g. (Sobel & Copp 2001, p44)].
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thought that desires did not purport to represent anything at all. He described 
desires as ‘motivating passions’, he took them to be feelings, like pains or 
pleasures, except that desires compel us to act in certain ways. Someone 
might follow what Hume says here in giving a DOF account and characterise 
BDF as the property of being representational and DDF as the property of 
being non-representational. Unfortunately for this kind of ‘Humean’ DOF 
account this is obviously false: the common consensus is that both beliefs and 
desires purport to represent something. As I discussed in the Introduction a 
desire is commonly taken to be a particular kind of attitude towards a 
proposition, and propositions are usually understood as representations in 
some sense. In this respect they are representational in an analogous way as 
beliefs are: it is just that believing that there is chocolate in the cupboard and 
desiring that there is chocolate in the cupboard involve having different 
attitudes to the same proposition. So this version of DOF account is 
implausible: it does not even draw the distinction between beliefs and desires 
correctly so cannot be characterizing the distinction in the right way. A third 
proposal for characterizing BDF and DDF, suggested more recently by Platts 
(1979) among others, is in terms of the conditions under which beliefs and 
desires are in error. According to Platts,
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[b]eliefs aim at the true, and their being true is their fitting the world; 
falsity is a decisive failing in a belief, and false beliefs should be 
discarded; beliefs should be changed to fit the world, not vice versa. 
Desires aim at realization, and their realization is the world fitting with 
them; the fact that the indicative content of a desire is not realized in 
the world is not yet a failing in the desire, and not yet any reason to 
discard the desire; the world, crudely should be changed to fit with our 
desires, not vice versa (Platts 1979. pp 256-257).
If we expressed this in the terms of a DOF account it says that a mental state 
has BDF iff being false ‘ is a failing’ in that state, and a mental state has DDF 
iff being false is ‘not yet a failing’ in that state. But again, this is unhelpful. 
What it is for a particular kind of mental state to have a failing in the sense that 
is relevant here is not something that is well understood. So if a version of 
DOF account attempts to characterise the difference between beliefs and 
desires in terms of something that itself stands in need of analysis then the 
account is merely postponing giving an informative answer to the question of 
what distinguishes beliefs from desires.
A more promising proposal is to characterise BDF and DDF in terms 
of the respective functional roles of belief and desire. Having a particular 
functional role is a matter of having a particular set of properties and relations:
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in the case of mental states these are typically relations with other mental 
states, sensory stimuli, bodily movements, and so on. Call a version like this a 
‘functional role DOF account’. Smith, for example gives a functional role 
DOF account when he says the following:
For the difference between beliefs and desires in terms of directions of 
fit can be seen to amount to a difference in the functional roles of belief 
and desire. Very roughly, and simplifying somewhat, it amounts, inter 
alia, to a difference in the counterfactual dependence of a belief that p  
and a desire that p on a perception with the content that not p: a belief 
that p tends to go out of existence in the presence of a perception with 
the content that not p, whereas a desire that p  tends to endure, 
disposing the subject in that state to bring it about that p  (Smith 1994, 
pl 15).
Expressing this in the terms used by a DOF account, Smith is saying that a 
particular mental state, x that p  has BDF iff it tends to go out of existence in 
the presence of a perception as of (with the content that) not-p. On the other 
hand, a particular mental state x  that p  has DDF iff it tends to persist in the 
presence of a perception as of not-p and disposes the person having the state to
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act in a way that aims at bringing about p. Smith’s DOF account can be 
summarized by the following two theses:
(Tl-SMITH) For all mental states x if x is a belief that p  then (x 
tends to go out of existence in the presence of a 
perception as of not-p) and (x does not tend to persist 
in the presence of a perception as of not-p and dispose 
the subject to act in a way that aims at bringing about 
that p).
(T2-SMITH) For all mental states x if x is a desire that p then (x 
tends to persist in the presence of a perception as of 
not-p and disposes the subject to act in a way that aims 
at bringing about p) and (x does not tend to go out of 
existence in the presence of a perception as of not-p).
Smith’s DOF account avoids the problems faced by the different versions of 
DOF account I described above: unlike the simple account it does not use the 
terms being analysed, ‘belief and ‘desire’ to explain how the states differ. So 
it does not appear to be unhelpfully circular. Unlike what I called the 
‘Humean’ DOF account, it is not based on an obviously false premise: there is
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at least a prima facie difference between the effect that having a conflicting 
perception has on ones beliefs and the effect that it has on ones desires that is 
like Smith describes. Finally, Smith does not invoke a notion that is itself 
technical or poorly understood, in contrast to the version of DOF account I 
attributed to Platts. Rather, Smith’s DOF account seems to be appealing to 
certain relations that are familiar from our own psychology. So, at least in 
comparison with these alternative kinds of DOF account, functional role DOF 
accounts such as Smith’s appear to give the most plausible characterisation of 
the difference between beliefs and desires.
4.4 -  Counter Examples to Smith’s DOF account.
As I have argued, Smith’s DOF account is prima facie plausible. Flowever, it 
will not do as it stands, expressed in terms of the theses (T1-SMITH) and (12- 
SMITH). I claimed that it was an advantage of Smith’s DOF account, for 
example over the kind of DOF account I attributed to Platts, that it does not 
appeal to anything that is itself technical or poorly understood in the way it 
characterizes BDF and DDF. For example, (T1-SMITH) and (T2-SMITH) 
describe someone’s beliefs and desires as tending to go out of existence or 
tending to persist if they have certain perceptions. But there are problems
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here. There are obvious counter examples to the two theses if these claims 
about tendencies are understood in what seems a natural way, as statistical 
claims about when someone will maintain or lose their beliefs and desires. 
Sobel & Copp (2001) describe cases in which someone will most often 
maintain a belief that p  despite having a perception as of not-p: counter 
examples to (T1-SMITH). And they describe cases in which someone will 
most often lose a desire that p  if they have a perception as of not-p: counter 
examples to (T2-SMITH).
Consider Sobel & Copp’s example of the first kind case, what they call 
‘stubborn beliefs’ (Sobel & Copp 2001, p47). Suppose that Ayrton, who is 
an experienced driver, is driving on a hot, cloudless day and believes that the 
road is dry. Now suppose that Aryton has a perception as of puddles being on 
the road ahead of him (a common experience when driving on a hot road), a 
perception as of the road not being dry. But as Ayrton is experienced he 
knows that this kind of perception is common in these conditions but that it is 
illusory. It is plausible that he will tend to maintain his belief that the road is 
dry when he has this perception. So this is a case in which he has .a belief that 
p  that does not tend to go out of existence in the presence of a perception as of
71 Although I have added details to Sobel & Copp’s examples, such as naming the individuals, 
this is merely to help with the presentation of the examples. I do not take any of the 
additional details to have any significance for what the examples are supposed to show.
138
not-p. According to (T1-SMITH) Ayrton’s mental state does not have BDF so 
is not a belief: so (T1-SMITH) is false.
Now consider Sobel & Copp’s example of the second kind of case, 
what they call a ‘fair-weather fan desire’ (Sobel & Copp 2001, p48). Suppose 
that Brenda is a fan of Gridiron who supports the 49ers in particular: she says 
that she wants the 49ers to do well. Now suppose that she sees that the 49ers 
are having a bad streak of losses and sit at the foot of the conference, a 
perception as of the 49ers not doing well. Brenda no longer says that she 
wants the 49ers to do well, no longer looks for their scores or cares when they 
lose. Perhaps, having seen that the Raiders are having a good season, she 
starts saying that she wants the Raiders to do well. It is plausible that Brenda 
will tend to lose desires like her desire that the 49ers do well when she had the 
perception as of the 49ers not doing well. So this is a case in which she has a 
desire that p  that does not tend to persist in the presence of a perception as of 
not-p. According to (T2-SMITH) Brenda’s desire does not have DDF so is 
not a desire: so (T2-SMITH) is false.
However, these putative counter examples are unconvincing. It is true 
that the examples refute (T1-SMITH) and (T2-SMITH) if the theses are 
understood as statistical claims about peoples’ beliefs and desires. But the 
theses were never intended to be taken in this way. Rather, these claims about 
tendencies of beliefs and desires to go out of existence or persist are intended
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to be understood as claims about the dispositions of someone who has a belief 
or a desire to maintain or lose that state in particular circumstances. Taken in 
this way, for a mental state x that p  to tend to go out of existence in the 
presence of a perception consists in someone who has this kind of state being 
disposed to cease having x if they have a perception as of not-p. Conversely, 
for a mental state x that p  to tend to persist consists in someone who has this 
kind of state being disposed to continue having x if they have a perception as 
of not-p.
Understood in this way it is plausible that Sobel & Copp’s cases are 
not counter examples to Smith’s DOF account. Consider again Ayrton the 
experienced driver with his stubborn belief. For this to be a counter example 
to Smith’s DOF account it must be a case in which Aryton has a belief that p  
and is not disposed to cease having that belief when he has a perception as of 
not-p. But Ayrton’s case is not like this. Ayrton is experienced at driving, so 
it is plausible that he also has beliefs about the unreliability of perceptions you 
have on hot days in which the road appears wet. In virtue of having this belief 
it is plausible that Ayrton will be disposed to maintain his belief that the road 
is dry if on a hot day he has a perception as of the road not being dry. And this 
disposition may out-weigh a disposition he has to cease having his belief that 
the road is dry when he has that perception. So the case does not show that 
Ayrton does not have the disposition to lose the belief that the road is dry (and
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it is as plausible that he does have it as that he does not): it is not a counter 
example to Smith’s DOF account.
Now re-consider Brenda with her fair-weather fan desire that the 49ers 
do well. For this to be a counter example to Smith’s DOF account it must be a 
case in which Brenda has a desire that p  and is not disposed to continue having 
that desire if she has a perception as of not-p. But Brenda’s case is not like 
this. It is as plausible that she does have this disposition as that she does not. 
But it is also plausible that she has other desires, in addition to her desire that 
the 49ers do well, like a desire that she supports a successful team: this is what 
makes her a fair-weather fan. In virtue of having such further desires it is 
plausible that she has a disposition to lose her desire that the 49ers do well if 
she has a perception as of the 49ers not doing well, and that this disposition 
out-weighs the disposition she has to maintain her desire that the 49ers do well 
when she has that perception. So the case does not show that Brenda does not 
have this disposition: again it is not a counter example.
Smith’s DOF account is more accurately characterized in terms of the 
following expanded theses:
(Tl-SMITH*) For all mental states x if x is a belief that p  then, in the 
absence of counter-veiling beliefs, (jc tends to go out 
of existence in the presence of a perception as of not-
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p) and (x does not tend to persist in the presence of a 
perception as of not-p and dispose S to act in ways that 
S believes will bring about p).
(T2-SMITH*) For all mental states x if x is a desire that p  then, in the 
absence of overriding desires, (x tends to persist in the 
presence of a perception as of not-p and disposes the 
subject, S  to act in ways that S  believes will bring 
about p) and (x does not tend to go out of existence in 
the presence of a perception as of not-p).
According to (T1-SMITH*) Ayrton’s stubborn belief that the road is 
dry does have BDF and does not have DDF. And according to (T2-SMITH*) 
Brenda’s fair-weather fan desire does have DDF and does not have BDF. So 
Sobel & Copp’s cases are not counter examples.
Note that according to (T2-SMITH*) there is a necessary connection 
between having a desire, a state that has DDF and does not have BDF, and 
having a disposition to act in ways you believe will bring about what you 
desire. So Smith’s DOF account entails that MN is true. If, as I have argued 
above in section 4.3, this is the most plausible way of characterizing the
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difference between beliefs and desires then this is independent motivation to 
accept MN.
Note also, that according to (T1-SMITH*) having a belief, a state that 
has BDF and does not have DDF, does not entail having a disposition to act in 
ways you believe will bring about what you desire. Recall the objection I 
discussed to begin with, in section 4.2: according to Strawson, for example, 
the regular correlation between having a desire and acting in ways you believe 
will bring about what you desire does not support MN as I had claimed. This 
is because the correlation is in fact between having certain complexes of 
beliefs and desires and acting in ways you believe will bring about what you 
desire. And this correlation is just as well explained by there being a 
necessary connection between having such complexes of beliefs and desires 
and being disposed to act in ways that you believe will bring about what you 
desire as it is by MN, that attempts to explain it in terms of a connection 
between desires in particular and such dispositions to act. So according to 
Strawson MN is not necessary to explain the correlation. But if (T1-SMITH*) 
is true then if someone has a disposition to act if they have an appropriate 
complex of beliefs and desires, it is not in virtue of having the beliefs that they 
have this disposition. So if they have a disposition to act when they have such 
complexes of states it must be in virtue of having the desires. MN is, in fact 
needed to explain the correlation. So if Smith’s DOF account is true then we
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can assume that MN gives the best explanation of this regular correlation: that 
fact about our psychology is evidence in support of MN.
Of course Sobel & Copp do not genuinely think that their counter 
examples to (T1-SMITH) and (T2-SMITH) show that Smith’s DOF account is 
false: they did not mis-interpret him as making statistical claims. As I 
understand them, their counter examples are intended to show that Smith’s 
DOF account must be understood in terms of something like the theses (Tl- 
SMITH*) and (T2-SMITH*) if it is to be at all plausible. But note that in each 
of these expanded theses the term being analysed appears in the analysandum: 
(T1-SMITH*) is an analysis of belief and it uses ‘belief on the right-hand side 
of the bi-conditional. Analogously (T2-SMITH*) is an analysis of desire and 
it uses ‘desire’ on the right-hand side of the bi-conditional. As we will see in 
the next sections it is this that is the target of both Sobel & Copp’s main 
objection to Smith, and the objection given by Humberstone: that is, that 
Smith’s DOF account is uninformative.
4.5 -  Sobel & Copp’s Uninformativeness Objection.
Both Sobel & Copp and Humberstone argue that Smith’s DOF account is 
uninformative. As noted at the end of the previous section, the account
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appeals to the notion being analysed in each of its analysis of belief and its 
analysis of desire. It is this that draws both objections. Nonetheless, the two 
objections are making quite different points: whereas Humberstone claims that 
it is the particular way the terms being analysed, belief and desire appear on 
the right-hand side of the bi-conditionals (T1-SMITH*) and (T2-SMITH*) 
that is objectionable about Smith’s DOF account, Sobel & Copp object to the 
appearance of those terms there in any way at all. Sobel & Copp argue that 
simply in virtue of having these terms ‘belief and ‘desire’ appear in the 
analyses is sufficient for Smith’s DOF account to be uninformative. In the 
following section I will discuss Humberstone’s objection in more detail. But 
first, in the rest of this section, I will respond to Sobel & Copp.
Sobel & Copp present their uninformativeness objection as an 
objection to functional role DOF accounts in general: although they present 
their objections against Smith’s DOF account in particular they claim that they 
generalize to all accounts of this kind. As we have seen, they argued by 
counter example that Smith’s DOF account is implausible unless it is 
understood in terms of something like the expanded theses (T1-SMITH*) and 
(T2-SMITH*). This is so that Smith’s talk of mental states ‘tending to go out 
of existence’, and ‘tending to persist’ is understood in the correct way, in terms 
of someone’s dispositions to lose or maintain those states in certain 
circumstances. But in theses like (T1-SMITH*) and (T2-SMITH*) each
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analysans is used in the respective analysandum: these theses are giving 
analyses of belief and desire respectively yet each uses that term to give their 
analysis. Sobel & Copp claim that because of this Smith’s DOF account is 
unhelpfully circular: to understand the analysis of belief in (T1-SMITH*) 
someone would already have to know what a belief is, and to understand the 
analysis of desire in (T2-SMITH*) someone would already have to know what 
a desire is. So Smith’s DOF account ‘cannot claim to explicate the real 
difference between beliefs and desires’ (Sobel and Copp 2001, p49). And as 
this is the aim of DOF accounts the version given by Smith is uninformative. 
Furthermore, they argue that any functional role DOF account will be like 
Smith’s in this respect: they claim that any version of functional role DOF 
account that is not refuted by their earlier counter examples will be unhelpfully 
circular in a similar way.72 So they claim that all functional role DOF 
accounts are uninformative.
As I understand them, Sobel & Copp’s objection to Smith’s DOF 
account can be summarized as follows:
72 Sobel & Copp consider a number of variations of (T1-SMITH). For example, they consider 
versions that describe relations between a belief that p and a perception that counts as not-p, 
relations between a belief that p and a perception that counts as evidence that not-p, relations 
between a belief that p  and a mere seeming that not-p, and so on (Sobel and Copp 2001, 
p49). They claim that either each version is refuted by the examples of stubborn beliefs or it 
must be understood in an expanded way that uses the notion of belief. In the latter case it 
will be circular like (Tl-SMITH*). Although they do not argue for it in the same way they 
also claim that this will be true for all versions of (T2-SMITH), mutatis mutandis with 
respect to desire.
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1) Smith’s DOF account uses the term ‘belief in the analysandum of 
its analysis of belief and it uses the term ‘desire’ in the analysandum 
of its analysis of desire.
2) If a DOF account uses the term ‘belief in the analysandum of its 
analysis of belief and it uses the term ‘desire’ in the analysandum of 
its analysis of desire then it is circular.
3) If a DOF account is circular then it is uninformative.
C) So, Smith’s DOF account is uninformative.
4.6 -  Responses to Sobel & Copp.
One way to respond here is to deny the further claim that Sobel & Copp make, 
that their objection generalizes to show that all functional role DOF accounts 
are uninformative. According to this response Sobel & Copp have not shown 
that there are no versions of (T1-SMITH) and (T2-SMITH) that are neither 
refuted by their counter examples nor use the terms ‘belief and ‘desire’ in 
their respective analysis. They merely showed that a number of particular 
versions face this dilemma. However, I will not pursue this response here. 
Rather, in the rest of this section I will argue that their objection to Smith’s 
DOF account in particular appeals to a different assumption that is false.
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Premises 1 and 2 of Sobel & Copp’s argument are true. But why 
accept premise 3? It is true that some versions of DOF account are 
uninformative in virtue of being circular. Recall in section 4.2 I described a 
simple version of DOF account, according to which BDF is the property of 
being a belief and not being a desire and DDF is the property of being a desire 
and not being a belief. This version of DOF account is uninformative: it is 
circular in a way that is unhelpful for understanding the notions of belief and 
desire. But just because circularity can make a particular DOF account 
uninformative this does mean that circularity entails that a particular DOF 
account is uninformative. We do not see this with certain other kinds of 
analysis, of different notions, so it does not follow that it is true for analyses of 
belief and desire.
Consider for example, analyses of colours. One kind of analysis that is 
sometimes given of colours is in terms of psychological dispositions. 
Roughly, such dispositional accounts of colours claim that having a particular 
colour consists in an object being such as to cause observers viewing the 
object to have psychological dispositions to have particular colour experiences 
in certain circumstances. For instance, a typical version of dispositional 
account of red might say something like, x is red iff x  has some feature in 
virtue of which x appears red to normal observers in standard observational
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conditions.74 This dispositional account of red is circular: it uses the term 
being analysed, ‘red’ on the right-hand side of the bi-conditional. However it 
is not obvious that this entails that the account is uninformative. Moreover, all 
dispositional accounts of colour will be circular for a similar reason. And 
many people think that at least some versions of dispositional account of 
colours would tell us something interesting about colours if they are true [see 
for example, Maund (2002) for discussion]. In general, merely being circular 
does not entail that an analysis is uninformative.74 But Sobel & Copp have 
given no reason to think that in the particular case of analyses of the difference 
between beliefs and desires merely being circular does entail being 
uninformative. So we can reject premise 3 of their argument.
In addition, Sobel and Copp have given no reason to think that the 
circularity in Smith’s DOF account is unhelpfully circular, like the circularity 
in the simple version of DOF account I described earlier, as opposed to being 
merely circular. We can concede that the circularity in that simple account is 
unhelpful and therefore the account is uninformative. Recall, the analysis 
given by the simple version of DOF account appeals to nothing other than the 
terms being analysed themselves: it proposes to analyse each of belief and 
desire in terms of being the kind of state it actually is and not being the other
7j See for example Maund (2002), and McGinn (1983).
74 Although, for a contrasting view see for example Bealer (1982) (1997).
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kind of state.7' But Smith’s DOF account is not circular in a similar way. The 
analysis given by Smith’s DOF account appeals to a number of relations, 
including relations between beliefs and other beliefs, desires and other desires, 
relations between perceptual states and each of belief and desires, relations 
between desires and dispositions to act, and so on. There is no reason to think 
that the circularity in Smith’s DOF account is unhelpful and that the account is 
therefore uninformative. So, Sobel & Copp’s uninformativeness objection 
fails.
4.7 -  Humberstone’s Uninformativeness Objection.
In contrast to Sobel & Copp, Flumberstone does not claim that Smith’s DOF 
account is uninformative merely in virtue of being circular. His objection is 
not to the fact that (T1 -SMITH*) and (T2-SMITH*) have the terms ‘belief 
and ‘desire’ respectively on the right-hand sides of each bi-conditional. As he 
says, ‘[t]he worry is not that some would-be analysis of the concept of belief 
fails in virtue of employing, in disguise, that very concept; for clearly no such 
analysis was being offered’ (Humberstone 1992, p64). Rather, according to
75 Consider what an analogous simple account of the colour red would be like: such an account 
might say something like x is red iff x has the property of being red. Like the simple version 
of DOF account, this is circular in an unhelpful way, and therefore it is uninformative. But
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what Humberstone calls ‘the mutatis mutandis objection’ it is in virtue of the 
particular way in which these terms appear in the two theses that Smith’s DOF 
account is uninformative (Humberstone 1992, pp. 63-64). And this is related 
to the particular aim of DOF accounts, what such accounts are supposed to 
provide information about.
Recall from section 4.3, as I understand it, the aim of giving a DOF 
account is usually taken to be to characterise the difference between beliefs in 
particular and desires in particular.76 The aim of giving such an account is not, 
for example, to give necessary and sufficient conditions for having a belief or 
having a desire. Rather, having BDF and not having DDF is supposed to be 
necessary and sufficient for being a belief rather than a desire, given that 
something is one or other of these kinds of state. Conversely having DDF and
this does not show that, for example a dispositional account of red that is circular is therefore 
uninformative
76 Although he does not explicitly state it in this way, this seems to be an assumption that 
Humberstone is making and that underlies the mutatis mutandis objection. He says ‘you 
cannot informatively characterise a fundamental disanalogy between the ways in which 
beliefs and desires relate to their objects by contrasting them in a respect itself specified by 
reference to one of these two ways. It’s as if one were to suggest that there is the following 
deep asymmetry between men and women as regards sexuality: whereas a heterosexual man 
will not be sexually attracted to males, a heterosexual woman will be’ (Humberstone 1992, 
p64, original emphasis). He takes a DOF account as characterizing a disanalogy or a deep 
asymmetry between belief and desire. But to characterise a disanalogy between two things 
is merely to say how they differ. It is not to say, for example what either of those things is, 
what are necessary and sufficient conditions for being each kind of thing. So it is plausible 
that Humberstone does make this assumption regarding the aim of DOF accounts.
Smith seems to make the same assumption. He introduces his account by saying 
‘the difference between beliefs and desires in terms of directions of fit can be seen to amount 
to a difference in the functional roles of belief and desire’ (Smith 1994, pi 15). He then 
proceeds to describe what he takes the functional roles of belief and desire to be. So it is 
plausible that Smith takes the aim of DOF accounts to be to characterise the difference 
between these kinds of state, and that this is what he takes himself to be attempting to do 
with his DOF account.
151
not having BDF is supposed to be necessary and sufficient for being a desire 
rather than a belief, given that something is one or other of these kinds of state. 
It is specifically the distinction between beliefs in particular and desires in 
particular that is being analysed by a DOF account, as opposed to, say the 
difference between beliefs and everything that is not a belief and the difference 
between desires and everything that is not a desire.77 In light of having this aim 
there are certain constraints on what an adequate DOF account must do. 
Obviously it must be true: it must distinguish between beliefs and desires 
correctly so that for any state that is either a belief or a desire it correctly says 
which kind of state it is. But in addition it must make this distinction in a 
particular way. it must distinguish between belief and desire in terms of the 
properties and relations of each kind of state that are constitutive of this 
difference between beliefs and desires.78 This imposes a constraint on the ways 
in which an adequate DOF account can characterise BDF and DDF if the 
account is to be informative, that is if it is to provide information about the 
kind of difference that DOF accounts are supposed to be concerned with.
77 This aim might be understood in epistemic terms in the following way: if someone knew of 
two mental states that one was a belief and the other a desire then the correct DOF account 
should allow them to distinguish which is the belief and which is the desire and should tell 
them what being the kind of state it is rather than the other consists in.
78 Humberstone says that Smith’s DOF account ‘does not meet a plausible requirement of 
universality’ (Humberstone 1992, p63). However, he does not say explicitly what he means 
by this. But as 1 understand his following discussion it is something like the second 
condition on an adequate DOF account that I describe in the main text.
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As I understand his mutatis mutandis objection, Humberstone claims 
that Smith’s DOF account fails this second condition. Note the problem is not 
supposed to be that it is false, that it does not draw the distinction between 
beliefs and desires in the right place. Rather, according to Humberstone it 
draws the distinction in terms of the wrong properties and relations. So, it fails 
to characterise the difference between beliefs in particular and desires in 
particular, and this is because of the particular way it is circular. Therefore, it 
is uninformative: it does not provide the kind of information that a DOF 
account is supposed to.
The problem, according to Humberstone, is that both the analysis that 
Smith’s DOF account gives of a belief and the analysis it gives of desire 
appeal to the notion of belief. This is because both kinds of state are analysed 
in terms of their relations with a perception as of not-p and, according to 
Humberstone, a perception as of not-p is itself a state that has BDF and does 
not have DDF.79 In this respect a perception as of not-p is like a belief and not 
like a desire.80 So both kinds of state are being analysed in terms of their 
relations with something that is belief-like. So Smith’s DOF account is 
circular: it uses a notion being analysed, ‘belief in its analyses. But it is not
79 For example, he says that ‘it is clear that we are here explicating the [belief] direction of fit 
by reference to states with the [belief] direction’ (Humberstone 1992, p63).
80 But to emphasize, having BDF and not having DDF does not entail that a perception as of 
not-p is a belief. Again, having these DOF properties is not claimed to be sufficient for 
being a belief. Rather it is necessary for being a belief. And it is sufficient for being a belief 
rather than a desire given that something is one or the other.
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this that Humberstone is objecting to. Rather according to him it is the way 
that each of belief and desire are said to relate to something that is belief-like, 
a perception as of not-p, that is problematic. Whereas Smith says that if x is a 
belief that p  then it tends to go out of existence in the presence of a belief-like 
state as of not-p, he says that if x is a desire that p  then it tends to persist in the 
presence of a belief-like state as of not-p. But to ‘tend to persist in the 
presence of something’ is, according to Humberstone to not ‘tend to go out of 
existence in the presence of something’. Call the relation of tending to go out 
of existence in the presence of something relation ‘R l \  Then according to 
Humberstone, Smith’s DOF account says that if x is a belief that p  then it has 
relation Rl to a belief-like state as of not-p, and if x is a desire that p  it does 
not have relation R l to a belief-like state as of not-p. The problem should now 
be clear. A DOF account is supposed to characterise the difference between 
beliefs in particular and desires in particular. According to Humberstone, 
Smith’s DOF account claims that this difference consists in beliefs having 
relation R l  to something that is belief-like and desires not having relation R l 
to something that is belief-like. This account might in fact be true: it is 
plausible that it will correctly distinguish between beliefs and desires. For any 
mental state that is either a belief or a desire Smith’s DOF account will 
correctly determine which kind it is. However, it does this in terms of the 
wrong relations: it makes this distinction in terms of beliefs having a certain
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relation to something that is belief-like that desires do not have. But, many 
kinds of thing are like desire in respect of not having relation R1 to something 
that is belief-like. For example, it is plausible that intentions, sensations, and 
emotions are like desires in being different from belief in this way: that they 
do not have relation Rl  to something that is belief-like. So, according to 
Humberstone, Smith’s DOF account does not distinguish beliefs and desires in 
terms of the features of each kind of state that are constitutive of the difference 
between belief in particular and desire in particular. So, it is uninformative.
Consider an analogy for illustration. Suppose you were trying to 
characterise the difference between dogs in particular and cats in particular. 
Like beliefs and desires we have little trouble distinguishing between dogs and 
cats: for example, it is unlikely that someone will mistakenly bring home a 
Labrador from the pet-shop if they want a cat, nor bring home a Siamese if 
they want a dog. But suppose that you wanted to know what the difference 
consisted in. Now suppose you were offered an account of the difference 
between dogs and cats that said the following: if x is a dog then x eats dog- 
food, and if x is a cat then x does not eat dog-food. It is plausible that this 
account distinguishes between dogs and cats accurately: of all things that are 
either a dog or a cat, it is plausible that this account will pick out all and only 
the dogs as dogs, and it will pick out all and only the cats as cats. However, it 
is clearly inadequate as a theory of the difference between dogs in particular
155
and cats in particular. It does not distinguish between dogs and cats in terms 
of the properties and relations of each kind of animal that are constitutive of 
their difference from animals of the other kind. Rather it does so in terms of 
the properties and relations common to lots of things that differ from dogs in 
this way yet are not cats. For example, emus, cows, and goldfish, among other 
things are like desires in this respect of not eating dog-food yet they are also 
not dogs. So this relation of not eating dog-food is not the feature of cats that 
makes them cats and not dogs in particular. This account of the difference 
between dogs in particular and cats in particular is uninformative.
Similarly, according to Humberstone Smith’s DOF account does not 
distinguish between belief in particular and desire in particular in an 
informative way. It characterizes the difference in terms of beliefs having 
relation R1 to something belief-like, and desires not having R1 to something 
belief-like. But as we have seen, this relation is something that desires have in 
common with many other mental states that are also not beliefs. So this 
relation of not having relation R1 to something belief-like is not the feature of 
desire that makes it a desire and not a belief in particular.
As I understand it, Humberstone’s mutatis mutandis objection can be 
summarized in the following way:
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1) If a DOF account is informative then it analyses belief in terms of 
the properties and relations that make it a belief and not a desire in 
particular, and it analyses desire in terms of the properties and 
relations that make it a desire and not a belief in particular.
2) Smith’s DOF account analyses belief in terms of having relation R1 
to something belief-like and it analyses desire in terms of not having 
relation R1 to something belief-like.
3) It is not the case that not having relation R l to something belief-like 
is the relation of desire that makes it a desire and not a belief in 
particular.
C) So, Smith’s DOF account is uninformative.
4.8 -  Response to Humberstone.
How might we respond to Humberstone’s mutatis mutandis objection in 
defense of Smith’s DOF account? The argument is valid, and premise 3 is 
very plausible. So we can either deny premise 1 or deny premise 2.
One way to deny premise 1 is by challenging the assumption about the 
aim of giving a DOF account: that is, deny that the aim of these accounts is to 
provide information about the difference between belief in particular and
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desire in particular. If that assumption is false then it would not follow that a 
DOF account could only be informative if it provided information about that 
specific difference. So Smith’s DOF account would not be uninformative in 
virtue of failing to do so, as Humberstone claims. We might question whether 
that is, in fact the aim that people in general take themselves to have when 
proposing a DOF account. Or we might question why we are interested in that 
difference in particular, and question whether it is a reasonable constraint to 
put on a theory. Flowever, I will not respond in this way here: we can grant 
Humberstone this assumption as his objection fails nonetheless.81 In the rest of 
this section I will argue that premise 2 of Humberstone’s objection is false.
According to premise 2, Smith’s DOF account attributes belief with a 
particular relation that it says desire does not have. This is true. However, 
what is not true is that this is all that Smith’s DOF account says to characterise 
the difference between these kinds of state: it does not say that the fact that 
belief has this particular relation with a perception as of not-p and desire does 
not have this relation with a perception as of not-p is what the difference 
between beliefs and desires consists in. Premise 2 ignores the details given by 
Smith’s DOF account. The account analyses belief and desire in terms of a
81 Indeed, premise 1 seems plausible. As we saw from the references earlier, it is plausible that 
people do aim to provide this particular information when giving a DOF account. And there 
might be good reason to be interested in this particular difference: for example, we might 
take it to be illuminating about the difference between cognitive and connative states in 
general. Or we might think it is important to understand how the states differ so as to 
understand how they are able to interact in causing actions, or in practical reasoning, for 
example.
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number of different relations that each state has, not just the relation R1 with 
something belief-like described in premise 2. Consider again the expanded 
theses (T1 -SMITH*) and (T2-SMITH*) that summarise the account:
(Tl-SMITH*) For all mental states x if x is a belief that p  then, in the 
absence of counter-veiling beliefs, (x tends to go out 
of existence in the presence of a perception as of not- 
p) and (x does not tend to persist in the presence of a 
perception as of not-p and dispose S  to act in ways that 
S  believes will bring about p).
(T2-SMITH*) For all mental states x ifx is a desire that p  then, in the 
absence of overriding desires, (x tends to persist in the 
presence of a perception as of not-p and disposes the 
subject, 5 to act in ways that S  believes will bring 
about p) and (x does not tend to go out of existence in 
the presence of a perception as of not-p).
According to (Tl-SMITFI*) what makes a mental state a belief that p  and not a 
desire that p  in particular is that it has a certain relation, what I called R1 with 
a perception as of not-p, and a different relation, call it ‘R 2 \ with counter-
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veiling beliefs, and it does not have a further relation, call it ‘R 3 \ with 
dispositions to act in ways that are believed to bring about p. And according 
to (T2-SMITH*) what makes a mental state a desire that p  and not a belief that 
p  in particular is that it does not have R1 with a perception as of not-p if it also 
does not have a different relation, call it LR 4 \  with overriding desires, and it 
does have relation R3 with dispositions to act in ways that are believed to 
bring about p. Clearly, saying all of this is saying much more than just that the 
difference between beliefs and desires consists in the fact that belief has and 
desire does not have a particular relation with certain perceptions.82 So 
premise 2 is false and the objection fails.
4.9 -  Relevance to MN.
Is there an analogous objection to Smith’s DOF account when all of the detail 
in the account is acknowledged? Such an objection will have premises 2 and 3 
appropriately modified in the following way:
82 In fact, it is plausible that Smith’s DOF account provides an even more detailed 
characterisation of the difference between beliefs and desires that is given by these theses. It 
is plausible that the analyses summarized in (T1-SMITH*) and (T2-SMITH*) are elliptical 
for some longer set of properties and relations that beliefs and desires have respectively. 
Recall, Smith describes his analysis in the text as rough and simplified (Smith 194, pi 15). 
And in a note on the passage he says ‘[w]hen I talk of states having directions of fit, I 
therefore have in mind whole packages of dispositions constitutive of desiring and 
believing’ (Smith 1994, p210 n8).
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1) If a DOF account is informative then it analyses belief in terms of 
the properties and relations that make it a belief and not a desire in 
particular, and it analyses desire in terms of the properties and 
relations that make it a desire and not a belief in particular.
2*) Smith’s DOF account analyses a belief that p  in terms of having 
relation R1 to something belief-like and relation R2 to something 
belief-like and not having relation R3 to dispositions to act in ways 
that are believed to bring about p, and it analyses a desire that p  in 
terms of not having relation R1 to something belief-like if it does 
not have relation R4 to overriding desires and having R3 to 
dispositions to act in ways that are believed to bring about p.
3*) It is not the case that not having relation R1 to something belief­
like if it does not have relation R4 to overriding desires and having 
R3 to dispositions to act in ways that are believed to bring aboutp  is 
the set of relations of a desire that p  that makes it a desire and not a 
belief in particular.
C) So, Smith’s DOF account is uninformative.
But premise 3* is much less plausible than premise 3 which was obviously 
true. Once the detail in Smith’s DOF account is properly taken into account
161
then it is plausible that it does characterise the difference between beliefs and 
desires in terms of the properties and relations of each kind of state that are 
what makes it the kind of state it is and not the other kind of state in 
particular.8^  So an analogous objection to the properly detailed version of 
Smith’s DOF account will also be unsuccessful.
Note the relevance for MN. According to this properly detailed 
version of Smith’s DOF account a desire that p  has relation R3 to dispositions 
to act in ways that are believed to bring about p. Consequently Smith’s DOF 
account entails that there is a necessary connection between desires that p  and 
dispositions to act in ways that are believed to bring about p, so it entails that 
MN is true. In addition, this properly detailed version claims that a belief that 
p  does not have R3 to dispositions to act in ways that are believed to bring 
about p. So it suggests that the regular correlation between having a desire and 
acting in ways you believe will bring about what you desire is evidence for 
MN, as I argued in Chapter One. Moreover, the relevance to this dissertation 
of DOF accounts of belief and desire, and Smith’s DOF account in particular 
is that it entails MN and suggests that this regular correlation provides support 
for MN. So a version of DOF account like the one Humberstone attributes to 
Smith, that does not do these things will be irrelevant here. But this properly
8j This is even more plausible if the details Smith gives explicitly in the text are taken to be 
elliptical for an even more detailed set of properties and relations that each state has (see 
previous footnote).
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detailed version of Smith’s DOF account, that entails MN and allows this 
regular correlation to provide support for MN, is not vulnerable to 
Humberstone’s objection. So to the extent that Smith’s DOF account is 
relevant to my defense of MN then Humberstone’s objection fails. If the 
objection were successful then the DOF account that it showed was 
uninformative would be irrelevant to my interests here in the first place.
4.10 -  Normative Objections to Smith’s DOF Account.
There is one final point I will note before concluding this chapter. I have 
defended Smith’s DOF account against a number of objections, raised by 
Sobel & Copp and by Humberstone. But according to some people merely 
doing this ignores what are the strongest objections to MN. People such as 
Anscombe (1957), Platts (1979), and Zangwill (1998) among others take 
direction of fit to be a normative notion. As I understand it, they think that 
what it means to say that a kind of mental state has a particular DOF is that the 
mental state has certain correctness conditions.84 So they take the difference 
between beliefs and desires to be a normative difference, a difference in the
84 Recall the passage from Platts quoted in section 4.3 above. See also Anscombe’s example 
of the shopping list and when it is mistaken that is commonly taken as a way of 
characterizing direction of fit (Anscombe 1957, p56).
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correctness conditions of each kind of state. But, according to people like 
Zangwill, Smith’s DOF account cannot account for any such normative 
differences between beliefs and desires, so it does not give an adequate 
account of what the difference between beliefs and desires consists in.85 
According to Smith’s DOF account, having a particular DOF consists in 
having a particular functional role, that is a particular set of properties and 
relations. And in this case these are natural properties and relations, like a 
disposition to act, dispositions to lose or maintain a mental state, and so on. 
But according to the objection natural properties like these do not entail
oz:
normative properties. So Smith’s DOF account does not characterise the 
difference between beliefs and desire as a normative difference. While beliefs 
and desires might very well differ in the way Smith claims, according to the 
objection this difference is not the difference in their respective directions of 
fit: so it is not what is constitutive of the distinction between beliefs and desire.
I mention this objection to set it aside. As I discussed in the 
Introduction, I am not concerned with any normative features of desires in this 
dissertation. I distinguished MN from what I called MN(rat), that says if S 
desires that p  then S is disposed to act in ways S believes will bring about p, to
85 See also Humberstone, who does not pursue this objection but says, ‘[w]e note that a further 
problem with Smith’s characterisation [...] is that this normative element is not so much left 
mysterious as, rather, left out of the account altogether’ (Humberstone 1992, p69, nl6).
86 This is like the point familiar from Moore (1903) that ‘you cannot derive an “ought” from an 
“is”’, also discussed by Kripke (1982).
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the extent that S  is rational. This objection is targeted more directly to 
MN(rat) than MN: issues about the correctness conditions of a kind of mental 
state are issues about when it would be rational for someone to have that kind 
of state, what it would be rational for them to do if they have that kind of state, 
and so on. Of course, MN(rat) is entailed by MN, so if this objection is correct 
then it will refute MN as well as MN(rat). So the objection needs addressing 
at some point. However, I will not attempt to do so in this dissertation.87
4.11 -  Conclusion.
DOF accounts attempt to analyse the difference between belief and desire in 
terms of what they call their different ‘directions-of-fit’. The most plausible 
DOF accounts characterise this in terms of particular properties and relations 
that each state has and the other lacks: and according to a plausible version, 
given by Smith, among the relations that constitute the DOF of desire is a 
relation with a disposition to act in ways you believe will bring about what you 
desire. If Smith’s version of DOF account is true this entails that MN is true. 
In addition, according to Smith’s DOF account it is partly constitutive of the 
DOF of belief that it does not have such a relation with a disposition to act in
87 I will briefly discuss certain normative features of desire like these in the dissertation’s 
Conclusion.
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ways you believe will bring about what you believe. This is relevant to MN in 
the context of the explanatory privilege that 1 argued it has with respect to 
explaining the regular correlation between desire and acting. If Smith’s 
version of DOF account is true then this correlation is not explained by any 
properties of beliefs that someone might have when they have a desire and 
they act. This suggests that it must be explained by properties of their desires: 
so this correlation provides support for MN. I have defended Smith’s DOF 
account against objections made by Sobel & Copp, and by Humberstone 
respectively who argued in different ways that it was uninformative. But these 
objections fail: contra Sobel & Copp, the fact that Smith’s DOF account is 
circular does not entail that it is uninformative. And contra Humberstone, the 
detail about the different relations given by its analyses of both belief and 
desire mean that Smith’s DOF account can meet the aims of this kind of 
account: it does provide an analysis that characterizes this difference, between 
beliefs and desire in particular. So Smith’s DOF account gives a plausible 
characterisation of an intuitive difference, the difference between beliefs and 
desires: and the account provides further reason to think that MN is true.
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CHAPTER 5
DESIRE AND REWARD.
5.1 -  Introduction.
It is often assumed that MN is entailed by a functionalist approach to analysing 
mental states. However, as we saw in Chapter One, this is a mistake: 
functionalism is a method for deriving an analysis of a particular thing from a 
set of claims about properties and relations that are taken to be essential 
characteristics of that kind of thing. So a particular version of functionalist 
analysis of desire will only entail MN if it is among the claims that are taken to 
be essential to desire. If someone thinks that MN is false then they deny that it 
should be among these initial claims: the objections that I have been 
addressing in previous chapters are, in effect, attempting to show this. These 
objections claim that the particular relation described by MN, between desire 
and dispositions to act, is not a relation that is essential to desire. But a 
different kind of objection has recently been made by Timothy Schroeder. 
Schroeder claims that the relation MN describes between desires and
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dispositions to act is not even the kind of relation that should be described by 
an analysis of desire. He thinks that an analysis that posits claims about this 
kind of relation will not yield an informative account of desire. Rather, it 
should de describing the kind of relations that are discovered by scientific 
investigation of desire.
Furthermore, Schroeder argues that the best scientific theories suggest 
that this relation with dispositions to act is not necessary for having a desire: so 
MN is not consistent with the discoveries of empirical science. This is what I 
call his ‘Natural Kinds objection’. Instead, according to Schroeder it is a 
relation with reward that science suggests is necessary for having a desire. So 
in addition to arguing against MN Schroeder argues in favour of an alternative 
account, what he calls a ‘Reward Theory of Desire’.
Suppose that we grant Schroeder’s claim about the kind of relations 
that desire should be analysed in terms of. Is MN inconsistent with what best 
scientific theories say about desire? And do these theories suggest that it is a 
relation with reward that is essential to desire instead, as Schroeder claims? In 
this chapter I will argue that Schroeder fails to show either of these things. 
The scientific information that he takes to support his reward theory in fact 
provides as much, if not more support for MN: the Natural Kinds objection 
does not show that MN is false. Moreover, I argue that the most plausible 
versions of reward theory appear to entail that MN is true.
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5.2 -  Two Functionalist Methodologies.
Schroeder’s claim about the kind of relations that should be described by an 
analysis of desire appeals to a distinction commonly made between two 
approaches to giving a functionalist analysis: this is the distinction between 
what are sometimes called ‘analytic functionalism’ and ‘empirical 
functionalism’ .88 One way of understanding this distinction is in terms of their 
different methodological assumptions. Both agree that an analysis begins 
from what are taken to be the platitudes and near platitudes, the accepted
88 It is uncontroversial that people do make this distinction, see for example Braddon-Mitchell 
and Jackson (1996), esp. Ch. 5, for discussion, although people sometime use different terms 
for each approach: for example, Block uses the term ‘psycho-functionalism’ for what I am 
calling ‘empirical functionalism’, while Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson use ‘common-sense 
functionalism’ and ‘analytic functionalism’ interchangeably. However, it is not exactly 
clear how to understand this distinction. For example, according to some the approaches 
differ just in terms of the content of the claims that they derive an analysis from: that is, they 
differ with respect to the constraints each imposes on what these claims can be about. 
Whereas analytic functionalists derive their theories from platitudes and near platitudes 
about the kind of relations familiar from the everyday way of understanding a mental state, 
empirical functionalists derive their theories from claims about relations and properties of 
that state discovered by scientific investigation. A different way of understanding the 
distinction is in terms of the kind of theory that each takes themselves to be giving: whereas 
analytic functionalist take themselves to be giving a theory of the meaning of the term being 
analysed, say ‘desire’, empirical functionalists take themselves to be giving a theory about 
the actual properties and relations of the state someone is in when they have a desire. They 
take the claims about relations familiar from the everyday way of understanding desire to 
merely fix the reference of the term ‘desire’, and thereby determine which state it is that has 
to be investigated scientifically to provide a theory of desire. I am not claiming that the way 
of understanding the distinction that I describe in the main text is the only way of doing so 
[and see, for example Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (1996) for further discussion]. 
However, I take it as a good way to illustrate the point that Schroeder is trying to make, and 
from personal communication with him it seems plausible that he would agree with this 
account.
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truths, about a particular kind of state, for example concerning its properties 
and relations. And they agree that the analysis that you end up with must be 
consistent with at least some of these: there must be some connection between 
the analysis that is given of a particular state and what we ordinarily take that 
state to be like. However, they differ with respect to the kind of relations they 
respectively analyse desire in terms of, they also differ with respect to the 
extent to which the analysis can be revisionary, and they disagree about what 
information can justify any such revisions. Analytic functionalists typically 
think that particular platitudes will only be revised to the extent necessary for 
the analysis to be internally consistent, and to be consistent with analyses of 
other kinds of state, for example, that have been formulated in a similar way. 
They tend to permit only moderate revision of the concept. In contrast, 
empirical functionalists tend to permit a larger extent of revision if necessary: 
they allow that an analysis of a particular kind of state can differ to a greater 
extent from the way in which that state is ordinarily understood. Empirical 
functionalists typically allow their analyses to deny a greater proportion of the 
platitudes about a state than analytic functionalists. In addition they think that 
this can be justified by conflicts between such platitudes and the claims made 
by empirical sciences, for example, about how the brain works, and so on. In 
contrast analytic functionalists tend to allow revisions only on the basis of 
conflict between the widely accepted truths themselves.
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These differences can affect the kind of analysis each kind of 
functionalism tends to give. Consider how they might each proceed when 
giving an analysis of desire. At first both the analytic and the empirical 
functionalist will follow the method of giving a functionalist analysis I 
described in Chapter 1. Recall, this begins by collecting together the 
platitudes and near platitudes about desire, the claims about particular 
properties and relations of desire that are widely taken to be true. These might 
include claims like, that if someone has a desire then they tend to act in ways 
that they believe will get them what they desire, that people tend to find it 
pleasurable to get what they desire, and so on. They will attempt to make 
these claims more precise: in these cases for example they might precisify to 
yield the claims, if S  desires that p  then S  is disposed to act in ways S  believes 
will bring about p, and, if S  desires that p  then S  is disposed to have 
experiences of pleasure if S  believes that p  has come about. At this stage there 
might be some revision of, or rejection of some of these claims where they 
conflict with others that are taken as being about features that are believed to 
be more important to our understanding of desire. There might also be some 
similar revision of, or rejection of some claims where they conflict with 
established facts about, for example other mental states. They will then 
conjoin all of these precisified platitudes and near platitudes about desire, and 
rearrange this conjunction to make desire the subject of the sentence: this will
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be a sentence something like, ‘if S  desires that p  then S is disposed to act in 
ways S  believes will bring about p  and S  is disposed to have experiences of 
pleasure if S  believes that p  has come about’. Next they identify and replace 
with variables all of the psychological terms in the conjunction, to get an open 
sentence like, ‘if S R V s that p  then (S  is disposed to R2 in ways S R3 's will 
bring about p) and (S  is disposed to have F  if S R3’s that p  has come about)’. 
They will then existentially quantify the sentence and present it as necessary 
and sufficient conditions for having a desire, something like the following: S 
desires thatp  iff [3(/?7, R2, R3, F) I f S R F s  thatp  then (S is disposed to R2 in 
ways S R3 's will bring about p) and (S is disposed to have F  if S R3 's that p)] 
and [S' R T s that p].
At this point the analytic functionalist will typically stop and take this 
sentence as their analysis of desire. This is supposed to be a conceptual 
analysis of what we mean by the term ‘desire’. It says that a desire is a state 
that has these properties and relations, and that having a desire consists in 
being in a state that has such properties and relations. But it does not say what 
kind of state people are in when they have a desire, for example whether this is 
a physical state, a non-physical state, a state of the brain, and so on, except for 
what was already claimed about this in the original platitudes that the analysis 
was derived from.
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In contrast the empirical functionalist will not take themselves to be 
finished in giving their analysis yet. Rather than taking this as a conceptual 
analysis of what we mean by the term ‘desire’, they take it as fixing the 
reference of that term: it says what we are attempting to pick out when we use 
that term. They then look to science, for example to investigate what kind of 
state, or states have these properties and relations. Or if nothing has exactly 
this set of properties and relations they investigate states that are a close fit, 
that have most of them, or most of the ones that are taken to be most 
important: they take this to be the state that we are in when we have desires, 
and what we are, in fact attributing to people when describing them as having 
a desire.89 It is sometimes said to be the state that ‘realises’ desire is us. 
Suppose that some scientific investigation is carried out and it is found to be a 
particular state of the brain that has these properties and relations, say a state 
of D-fibre activation. And suppose that this investigation discovers certain 
things about the properties of active D-fibres, for example, what neural 
connections they have with other parts of the brain, what typically causes us to
89 Of course, problems can arise here if it is discovered that there are no states that have 
enough of these properties and relations to deserve the name ‘desire’. And it seems that an 
empirical functionalist must accept that this is an open possibility. There are different ways 
to respond to this. For instance, you might take this to show that there are no desires and 
that our everyday talk about the mind in terms of desires is straightforwardly mistaken. A 
different response is to take this as a reductio of the original analysis that was taken to fix the 
reference of ‘desire’. If we took the assumption that we do have desires to be something that 
we are so sure of that any theory that denies this must be false then we might respond in this 
way. The problem then becomes how to give an analysis of desire that is correct. Other 
kinds of response are also possible: which is most appropriate can depend on the particular 
case, the particular thing that the analysis is of.
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be in a state of D-fibre activation and what being in this kind of state typically 
causes, and so on. An empirical functionalist will then attempt to incorporate 
this information into their analysis of desire. One way they might do this is to 
revise the analysis they derived from the platitudes about desire, the analysis 
that the analytic functionalist takes as a definition of desire. For example, they 
might alter that list of properties and relations that the analytic functionalist 
claims something must have if it is a desire: adding to that list some of the 
properties and relations of active D-fibres that were discovered by the previous 
scientific investigation, and deleting from that list certain properties and 
relations that active D-fibres do not have. Their subsequent, revised analysis 
of desire then says that having a desire consists in having something that has 
the properties and relations that active D-fibres have.
Note that this is still a functionalist analysis of desire despite the fact 
that it incorporates empirical information about the actual state that we have 
when we have desires: an empirical functionalist will not say that having a 
desire consists in being in a state of D-fibre activation, in the way that a type- 
type identity theory of desire might do. Rather, they say that having a desire 
consists in being in a state that has the properties and relations that active D- 
fibres do. So they do not identify desires with the state that is discovered by 
science to realize desire in us. So they are not straightforwardly vulnerable to 
an objection of chauvinism and their theory of desire permits that desires can
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be multiply realizable (provided that other kinds of state can have the same 
properties and relations as active D-fibres) . 90
Why do analytic and empirical functionalist differ in this way? As I 
understand it they disagree about what each considers it necessary for a good 
analysis to do. Empirical functionalists consider the kind of conceptual 
analysis that an analytic functionalist will typically give to be uninformative. 
What this kind of analysis does is make explicit the platitudes and near 
platitudes that people who understand the concept of desire already know so it 
does not provide any new information about desire to those who are familiar 
with desire: and this includes the same people who are trying to give an 
analysis of desire and so plausibly consider themselves not to know all there is 
to know about it. In particular this kind of analysis leaves unanswered 
questions like ‘why do desires have the particular properties and relations the 
analysis says that they do?’, and ‘why do we have this particular concept of 
desire, that leads us to produce this analysis, as opposed to having a different 
concept? ’ .91 As I understand them, empirical functionalists make a
90 See for example, Block (1978), and Lewis (1983) for discussion.
91 Note that the kind of analysis given by an empirical functionalist can give answers to these 
questions. This kind of analysis will typically claim that having a desire, for example 
consists in having a state the properties and relations of a physical state of the body or brain. 
This will be likely to include natural properties and relations, like causal properties and 
relations. The empirical functionalist can then answer, for example the question ‘why do 
desires have the particular properties and relations the analysis says that they do?’ by saying 
that this is because of the causal properties of the kind of natural state that desires are. They 
might answer the second question I mentioned, ‘why do we have this particular concept of 
desire, that leads us to produce this analysis?’, by saying that the properties of the state we
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methodological assumption that a good analysis of something must provide
09new information about that thing, even to those who understand the concept.
So by finding out which among the competing analyses is true, if any are, they 
will learn something. I will call this the empirical functionalists’ ‘information 
condition’: when applied in the context of a particular analysis it might entail 
that certain further constraints are imposed about what that analysis can be 
like, depending on background assumptions about the particular thing being 
analysed and what must be true of it so that it is possible to investigate it 
scientifically so as to provide the new information required.92
It is plausible that Schroeder is an empirical functionalist in these 
respects. For example, he describes the procedure he will follow to formulate 
his theory of desire in the following way:
I will begin with a combination of familiar philosophy and everyday 
common sense, describe scientific findings that either support or 
challenge what is believed, interpret the findings in the light of 
previous theory, and conclude with a new view (Schroeder 2004, p6).
are in when we have desires determines what this concept is like, and we have this concept 
in particular because we are most familiar with desires from our own case.
92 As I understand him, from private email correspondence, Schroeder makes this kind of 
complaint about the kind of analysis given by an analytic functionalist and makes this 
methodological assumption that I am calling the ‘information condition’.
9j As we will see in the next section.
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If the procedure I have described above, and that Schroeder claims to be 
following here is an accurate description of the empirical functionalist method 
then Schroeder is attempting to give an empirical functionalist analysis of 
desire. In addition, he seems to impose the information condition, or rather a 
further constraint that is plausibly entailed by it in this case, as a premise in his 
objection to MN. This is what I call the ‘Natural Kinds objection’, and will 
discuss in the following sections. It can be understood as a different kind of 
objection to MN from those I have discussed in earlier chapters: whereas those 
objections claim that MN conflicts with certain features and relations that are 
part of our common-sense understanding of desire, the Natural Kinds 
objection claims that MN conflicts with empirical information about the states 
that realize desires, that we are in when we have desires.
5.3 -  An Information Condition on a Theory of Desire.
As I understand him, Schroeder makes this methodological assumption of 
empirical functionalism, what I am calling ‘the information condition’, as a 
premise in his objection to MN: he takes it that an adequate theory of desire 
should provide us with new information. It should provide us with 
information about desire that we did not already know just in virtue of our
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everyday understanding of desire. He takes this to impose the following 
constraint on a theory of desire: that whatever properties and relations a 
particular theory claims are necessary and sufficient for having a desire it must 
be consistent with desire being a natural kind (Schroeder 2004, p6).94 By this 
he means that whatever a particular theory says is involved in having a desire, 
it must reflect that a desire is ‘a meaningful, unified scientific entity’ 
(Schroeder 2004, p6). As I understand it, this is so that desire can be the kind 
of thing that we can get new information about by scientific investigation, for 
example information about how having a desire causes the phenomena that are 
characteristically associated with it. According to Schroeder this particular 
constraint is implicit in both everyday and philosophical discourse about 
desire.
In fact Schroeder’s claim is quite plausible here. Consider, first, our 
everyday understanding of desire. We use the term ‘desire’ when making 
predictions about and giving explanations of peoples’ behaviour, their 
emotional reactions, their experiences of pleasure and displeasure, and so on. 
For example, if James says he desires some chocolate we might expect him to 
go to the cupboard to get himself some, we might expect him to find it 
pleasurable when he eats it, and we might expect that we could bring a smile
94 Indeed, Schroeder states this constraint explicitly in his introduction: ‘This phenomenon 
[what is called ‘desiring’, ‘wanting’ or ‘wishing’ and what Schroeder refers to as ‘desiring’] 
is a distinct, unified entity, a natural psychological kind’ (Schroeder 2004, p5).
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to his face by offering to share our own chocolate with him or make him upset 
by sneaking ahead and hiding the chocolate from him. Conversely, if we saw 
James doing these things and having these reactions we might attribute him 
with a desire for chocolate by way of explanation. But according to Schroeder 
when we do this we are not merely using the term ‘desire’ to refer to these 
characteristic phenomena. He says,
[p]eople normally assume that there are things, desires, the having of 
which robustly explains a myriad of associated phenomena: actions, 
feelings of joy and resentment, urges, the acquisition of new desires, 
and so on. (Schroeder 2004, p i78.)
That is, we take ourselves ‘to contain certain mental states, desires, which 
explain why we act as we do and feel as we do’ (Schroeder 2004, p i78). This 
seems plausible: that in everyday discourse we do understand having a desire 
to be a matter of having a certain kind of unified entity or, as I will say from 
now on, being in a certain kind of unified state.
Is this also true for philosophical discourse about desire, in particular in 
Philosophy of Mind? According to Schroeder, although people rarely state it 
explicitly, it is a working hypothesis that desire is a psychological natural
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kind:95 this is suggested by the way that people proceed when trying to give a 
particular theory of desire. Whether people are trying to analyse desire in 
terms of motivation and actions, experiences of pleasure, or reward, for 
example, they
recognize that there are a host of psychological phenomena associated 
with desire, and all three seek to explain these phenomena by first 
postulating a discreet psychological entity and then conjecturing about 
the relations between this entity and the various phenomena. And as 
psychological phenomena, motivation and pleasure are reasonably 
discrete entities (Schroeder 2004, pl77).
In contrast, if someone took the term ‘desire’ to refer just to certain 
characteristic phenomena then, according to Schroeder all that they would 
need to do to give an analysis of desire is identify which phenomena people do 
typically associate with desire and then say that having a desire consists in 
having any collection of states that someone might have when they have most 
of these phenomena.96 But this is not how people generally go about giving a
95 However, distinguish this from a different idea: Schroeder does not say that it is a common 
assumption that desire is a physiological or biological natural kind (Schroeder 2004, p i77). 
While that might be entailed by particular theories of desire, for instance a type-type identity 
theory, it is not an assumption that is generally shared.
96 As an example of what such a theory of desire would be like Schroeder describes what he 
calls ‘the mix-and-match theory’. This theory claims that “a desire is any mental state
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particular theory of desire in Philosophy of Mind, and Schroeder takes this to 
show that they do make something like an assumption that having a desire is a 
matter of being in a certain kind of unified state. If this is right, and both our 
everyday and philosophical understanding of desire assumes that having a 
desire consists in being in a particular kind of unified state then Schroeder’s 
constraint on an adequate theory of desire appears to be reasonable.
5.4 -  The Natural Kinds Objection.
Suppose we grant Schroeder this particular constraint, imposed by the 
information condition, that an adequate theory of desire must be consistent 
with desire being a natural kind. So, whatever the properties and relations that 
are essential to desire there must be a unified state that someone is in when 
they have a desire that has these properties and relations. But as we will see, 
this constraint seems in tension with our best current scientific information 
about the brain states that people are in when they have these various
having most of the features human beings associate with the term ‘desire’.” (Schroeder 
2004, p i77.) The mix-and-match theory specifies (for example) three conditions: (a) having 
a disposition to act, (b) having a disposition to experience pleasure, and (c) having the 
capacity to represent something as a reward. It claims that it is sufficient for having a desire 
that a subject has any two of (a), (b), or (c).
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phenomena that are characteristically associated with desire. This leads to 
what I will call Schroeder’s ‘Natural Kinds objection’.
What are the phenomena that are commonly associated with desire? 
According to Schroeder,
[i]n the case of desire the familiar features surrounding it are complex 
indeed. People’s desires lead them to travel to Cuba, to develop 
insomnia, to get butterflies in their stomachs; they gain and lose desires 
by maturing, by painful experience, by massive head injuries; they 
know what they want, they do not know what they want, they are sure 
they hate what they actually want very much. But in all this 
complexity, three phenomena stand out: motivation, pleasure, and 
reward (Schroeder 2004, pp. 5-6).
He takes the relations that desire has with motivation, pleasure, and rewards as 
commonly understood as being essential to having a desire. So it is these 
relations that someone would begin from to derive an analytic functional 
analysis of desire. Unsurprisingly they are the kind of relations that the 
standard alternative theories of desire claim are necessary for having a desire. 
These relations can be specified more precisely, similar to the way that they 
are described in such theories: for example, we can plausibly understand the
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relation between desire and motivation as a relation between having a desire 
and being disposed to act in ways that you believe will bring about what you 
desire. We can understand the relation between desire and pleasure as a 
relation between having a desire and being disposed to have experiences of 
pleasure if you come to believe that what you desire has come about. And we 
can understand the relation between desire and reward as a relation between 
having a desire and what you desire being a reward for you.
In light of the constraint imposed by the information condition, there 
must be a unified state that someone is in if they have a desire that has these 
relations with being disposed to act, with being disposed to have experiences 
of pleasure, and with something being a reward for you.
However, according to Schroeder the results of recent research in 
neuroscience suggest that in humans there is no unified state that has all of 
these relations. Rather, each phenomenon is caused by a kind of neurological 
state that is distinct from the kind of state that causes the others: the areas of 
the brain responsible for these different phenomena are distinct from one 
another. Schroeder claims that the best current theories in neuroscience 
suggest that the areas of the brain responsible for actions are the 
supplementary motor area (SMA) and anterior cingulated cortex (AC) that 
send signals to the motor cortex which then sends outputs to the spinal cord 
(and the (SMA) and (AC) also stimulate the spinal cord directly themselves)
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(Schroeder 2004, pi 10). In addition the best neuroscientific theories suggest 
that the neurological structure responsible for having experiences of pleasure 
(and displeasure) is the perigenural region of the anterior cingulate cortex 
(PGAC), found in the region known as Brodmann’s area in what is the 
phylogenetically old area of the cerebral cortex (Schroeder 2004, p76). 
Finally, such theories suggest that the neurological structures responsible for 
things being rewards for someone are two immediately adjacent neurological 
structures deep in the brain, the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and the pars 
compacta of the substantia nigra (SNpc) (Schroeder 2004, pp. 49-50). These 
structures are together commonly called the ‘reward system’. These different 
structures are distinct in terms of their location in the brain and also in their 
relations with the respective phenomena that each is involved in causing. If 
this neuroscientific information given by Schroeder is true then there is no 
unified state that humans have that is related in the right way to their 
dispositions to act, and is related in the right way to their dispositions to have 
experiences of pleasure, and is related in the right way to things that are 
rewards for them. Yet if it is a constraint on what desire can be that if 
someone has a desire then they are in a unified state that has at least these three 
relations then we are never in a state deserves the name desire. There is no 
state that we are ever in that has all of the relations that something must have 
for it to be a desire, according to this constraint. So we do not have desires.
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And consequently, all theories of desire are false as they all attempt to analyse 
what it is that we take ourselves to have when we have desires. But as it turns 
out, we never have anything that it is appropriate to call a desire.
Consider an analogy for illustration. Suppose that we were trying to 
give a theory of football managers and that it is an assumption about football 
managers, that, just like desires if something is a football manager then it is a 
unified entity, or, more naturally in this case, an individual person. Such a 
theory has to explain a number of different phenomena including the selection 
of the team each Saturday, the substitutions that are made during the game, the 
buying and selling of different players, the interviews that are given to the 
media, and so on. Suppose that there are three phenomena in particular that 
are identified as essential to a club having a football manager, on the basis of 
which clubs are described as having a manager and in the absence of which a 
club is commonly said to be manager-less: first, having someone who gives 
instructions from the bench on match-days, second, having someone who 
negotiates with players in the boardroom, and, third, having someone who 
conducts training with the players during the week. According to this 
assumption, if a club has a football manager then there must be an individual 
at the club who does at least all of these three things. And any adequate theory 
of football managers must be consistent with their being individuals at football 
clubs who do all of these things. Now imagine that an investigation is
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conducted into all of the football clubs and it discovers that in each case there
is no single person at any club who does all of these three things: at each club 
the different tasks are carried out by three different people each doing one of 
the tasks exclusively. So the empirical evidence shows that in all the clubs, 
having these three things done involves having three different people rather 
than a single person. So according to this assumption none of the clubs ever 
have a football manager and every theory of football managers, to the extent 
that it is analysing this concept is false.
This problem that Schroeder raises seems to rule out the possibility of 
having a desire, and to show that all theories of desire are false. Call this the 
‘Natural Kinds objection’: it can be summarized as follows:
1) If S desires that p  then S is in a unified state, jc, such that x causes S 
to be disposed to act to try to bring about that p, and x causes S to be 
disposed to experience pleasure if S  comes to believe that p  has 
come about, and x causes p  to be a reward for S. (Information 
condition.)
2) For all humans, //, if H  is disposed to act to try to bring about that p 
then this is caused by / / ’s (SMA) and (AC), and if H is disposed to 
experience pleasure then this is caused by / / ’s (PGAC), and ifp  is a
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reward for H then this is caused by / / ’ s VTA and SNpc ( f f s  reward 
system). (Best theories from neuroscience.)
3) For all humans, H, it is not the case that there is a unified state x 
such that x causes 5 to be motivated to act to try to bring about that 
p, and x causes S  to be disposed to experience pleasure if S comes to 
believe that p  has come about, and x causes p  to be a reward for S 
(from 2).
C) For all humans, H, it is not possible that H  desires that p  (from 1 
and 3).
(Corollary) All theories of desire are false.
5.5 -  Schroeder’s Response to the Natural Kinds Objection.
If the Natural Kinds objection is successful then it entails that we never have 
desires. A natural response here is to take this as a reductio of the argument: 
this conclusion is so counter-intuitive that it shows that there is a fault in the 
argument somewhere. Either, one of the premises must be false, or there must 
be a mistake in the reasoning at some point. Indeed, this is the kind of 
response that Schroeder gives. Furthermore, he gives a theory of desire
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himself, so obviously thinks that there are desires and that they can be 
analysed. So, what does Schroeder diagnose as the fault in the argument?
As we saw in section 5.3 above, Schroeder accepts the information 
condition on a theory of desire. So, he accepts that whatever desire is, if 
someone has a desire then they are in a unified state that is related in the right 
way to the phenomena that are essential to desire. And he accepts the 
information, given by what he takes to be the best current theories in 
neuroscience, about the different areas of the brain and what they are 
responsible for. Rather, according to Schroeder, the mistake in the Natural 
Kinds objection as I have summarized it above is in premise 1. His response is 
to deny this premise, by denying that all of the three relations it describes are 
essential to desire: that is, he denies that the unified state that someone is in if 
they have a desire must be related with having a disposition to act, having a 
disposition to have experiences of pleasure, and having something that is a 
reward for you. Rather, according to Schroeder what is necessary is that this 
unified state is related in the right way with having something that is a reward 
for you.
We can understand Schroeder as responding to the empirical findings 
about desire by revising the concept of desire, revising the set of relations that 
the analysis of desire is derived from. The way he does this is to exclude the 
relations between desire and being disposed to act and between desire and
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being disposed to have experiences of pleasure as necessary conditions for 
having a desire. But why revise it in this particular way? As Schroeder 
himself acknowledges, of the three relations he initially claimed are commonly 
taken to be essential to desire the relation between desire and having 
something that is a reward for you is the least familiar:
It is uncontroversial and familiar that desiring has something to do with 
being motivated to act and something to do with feeling pleased or 
displeased on various occasions. If I want my father to be healthy, for 
instance, I will tend to do certain things (make sure he sees a doctor 
when sick, say) and l will be open to certain feelings (unhappiness if he 
has high blood pressure, relief if a tumor proves to be benign, etc). It is 
less familiar, but also true, that desiring has something to do with 
reward and punishment. If I want to play with my nephew, say, then I 
can be rewarded for mending my relationship with my sister by being 
given opportunities to play with my nephew, and I can be punished for 
quarrelling with her by being denied such opportunities (Schroeder 
2004, p6).
But according to Schroeder there are convincing counter examples that show 
that the first two relations are not necessary conditions for having a desire. In
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the case of a relation between desire and dispositions to act, these are the kind 
of examples I have discussed in previous chapters. As I have discussed there, 
if these counter examples are successful, as Schroeder takes them to be, then 
MN is false. There are analogous kinds of case that he takes to show that a 
relation between desire and dispositions to have experiences of pleasure is also 
not necessary for having a desire.97 In addition he does not seem to think that 
there is some other relation, different from this original three that is a plausible 
candidate to be an essential feature of desire. This leaves the relation between 
desire and something being a reward as the only relation that is essential to 
desire: he takes this to show that being in a unified state that has the right kind 
of relation with having something that is a reward for you is what having a 
desire consists in.
5.6 -  Schroeder’s Reward Theory of Desire.
By this process of elimination in response to the Natural Kinds objection, 
Schroeder reaches the conclusion that having a desire consists in being in a 
particular kind of unified state that is related in the right way with having 
something that is a reward for you. He then uses empirical information about
97 See Schroeder (2004), especially Chapters 1 and 3 for extensive discussion.
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this relation to give a more detailed analysis. This is what he calls a ‘Reward 
Theory of Desire’ (RTD), summarized in the following thesis:
RTD To have a [...] desire thatp  is to [have] the capacity to
perceptually or cognitively represent that p  to 
constitute p  as a reward (Schroeder 2004, p 131).98
We can see that this analysis is not vulnerable to an analogous Natural Kinds 
objection. Such an objection, appropriately modified so as to target the 
phenomena that RTD says are essential to desire would be something like the 
following:
1 *) If S desires that p  then S' is in a unified state, x, that causes p  to be a 
reward for S. (Information condition.)
98 Schroeder presents this as a restricted thesis: he takes it to be an analysis of ‘positive’ desires 
alone, and proposes a parallel account of negative desires, or aversions. I will not discuss 
that account here. In addition, he proposes RTD as an analysis of ‘intrinsic’ desires. By this 
he means to contrast them with ‘instrumental’ desires. It is not clear what the exact 
difference between these kinds of desire is, but one way of understanding it is as follows: a 
desire that p is an intrinsic desire if p  is desired because of some features of p  itself. For 
example, if James desires the bar of chocolate in the cupboard because of the taste of the 
chocolate then James’ desire is intrinsic. In contrast a desire that p  is an instrumental desire 
if p  is desired as a means to achieving something else that is desired intrinsically. For 
example, if James desires the bar of chocolate in the cupboard because he believes that by 
eating it he can annoy his sister Louisa and he desires to do that then James’ desire for the 
chocolate is an instrumental desire. As I will argue below, the fact that his theory is 
restricted in this second way is a problem for Schroeder, although it is one that he is 
prepared to accept [see e.g. (Schroeder 2004, p i72)].
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2) For all humans, H, if H is motivated to act to try to bring about that 
p  then this is caused by / / ’s (SMA) and (AC), and if H  is disposed 
to experience pleasure then this is caused by / / ’ s (PGAC), and ifp 
is a reward for H then this is caused by / / ’s VTA and SNpc ( //’s 
reward system). (Best theories from neuroscience.)
3*) For all humans, //, it is not the case that there is a unified state x 
that causes p  to be a reward for H  (from 2).
C) For all humans, H, it is not possible that H desires that p  (from 1* 
and 3*).
(Corollary) RTD is false.
But premise 2 entails that premise 3* is, in fact, false. So the argument is 
unsound: RTD is not vulnerable to this appropriately modified version of 
Natural Kinds objection.
But is RTD even prima facie plausible? Recall, Schroeder denied that 
the relations between desire and dispositions to act, and desire and dispositions 
to have experiences of pleasure are necessary conditions of desire on the basis 
of counter examples to those relations. Yet there seem to be analogous 
counter examples to RTD: it is plausible that there are cases in which someone 
desires that p  yet does not represent p  so that it is a reward. Unfortunately, it is
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not clear exactly what is involved in representing something so that it is a 
reward. But we can get some idea of this by considering ordinary cases in 
which we represent something as a reward, like seeing a ‘WANTED’ poster 
that says that there is a $1000 reward for capturing the outlaw, or a case in 
which a small child believes that if they behave at Grandma’s house then their 
parents will give them a bag of sweets on the journey home, or perhaps a case 
in which a monkey believes that by pointing to the researcher’s cards in an 
experiment they can get a banana, so takes the banana to be a reward. 
Obviously it is not necessary for being able to represent something so that it is 
a reward that someone has the concept of reward. But these ordinary cases 
seem have in common that someone makes a positive evaluation of something 
that they believe that they can get only if they fulfill certain explicit conditions. 
While this is merely an approximation of representing something so that it is a 
reward I will not attempt to specify it more precisely. It is plausible that there 
can be cases in which someone desires something that they do not represent 
like this. Consider, for example, Peter, who desires that his wife and child are 
in good health. Intuitively, Peter does not represent his wife and child being in 
good health as a reward. Undoubtedly he will evaluate positively his wife and 
child being in good health. But it is unlikely that he will believe that this is 
something that will only come about if he fulfills certain explicit conditions, in 
the way that someone seeing the wanted poster believes that they can get the
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$1000 reward only if they capture the outlaw. Peter might believe that there 
are certain things that he can do to try to bring about that his wife and child are 
in good health: for example, he might believe that he can bring this about by 
buying family health insurance, or by insisting that they all eat a healthy, 
balanced diet. But intuitively the way that he understands his wife and child 
being in good health to be conditional on his doing these things is not the same 
way that the person seeing the poster understands that getting $1000 is 
conditional on capturing the outlaw. Moreover, it does not seem to be a way 
of representing his wife and child having good health so that that is a reward 
for him. So this seems to be a case in which Peter has a desire that p  yet does 
not represent p so that it is a reward: a counter example to RTD.
Of course, this counter example is not successful. Schroeder does not 
mean by ‘reward’ here the ordinary notion of reward familiar from the 
examples above. Rather he has a technical notion of reward, the notion that is 
used in behavioural science, and it is a relation between having a desire and 
representing something so that it is a reward in this sense that he claims is 
constitutive of desire. Schroeder illustrates this sense of reward with a famous 
example from behavioural science, B. F. Skinner’s (1948) operant 
conditioning experiments. In these experiments
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hungry pigeons [were placed] in a cage that released food every 15 
seconds regardless of the pigeon’s behaviour. After a number of trials 
each pigeon had developed distinctive and consistent behaviour 
patterns [...] Each behaviour had been produced spontaneously by the 
pigeon and had been (purely by coincidence) immediately followed by 
food; the coincidence between spontaneous behaviour and food had 
caused the pigeon to produce the spontaneous behaviour more 
frequently, which led to another coincidence of behaviour and food, 
and so on. Each pigeon’s behaviour was thus shaped by the pattern of 
reinforcements it received following its spontaneous behaviour 
(Schroeder 2004, p44).
In these cases food is a reward for the pigeons in Schroeder’s technical sense: 
it is used to influence the pigeons’ behaviour by processes of reinforcement 
learning. Of course, the kinds of things that can be a reward for someone, the 
ways in which someone can be influenced by something that is a reward, the 
capacities that it can have an effect on, and the ways in which something that 
is a reward can have its effects can vary for different kinds of individual and 
for different individuals of a particular kind. For example, something that is a 
reward need not have its effects by brute conditioning like in the experiments 
with the pigeons, for example. There are more sophisticated reinforcement
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learning processes by which rewards can have their effect in different cases. 
But these cases illustrate the kind of relation that Schroeder is concerned with 
when saying that something is a reward for you.
So, in the sense of reward that Schroeder is using in RTD, p  is a reward 
for S if p  can be used to influence S 's behaviour, emotional responses, 
intellectual dispositions, sensory capacities and so on by processes of 
reinforcement learning. According to RTD having a desire consists in having 
the capacity to represent something so that is has these kinds of effects on you. 
And according to Schroeder, for someone to have such a capacity it is not 
necessary that they can have representations of the thing that is a reward at 
what is sometimes called a ‘personal level’: it is not necessary that they can 
have, say beliefs about it having these effects. Rather, what is necessary is that 
they have the right kind of neurological connections such that some kind of 
representation of that thing can initiate specific reinforcement learning 
processes." To put this more precisely, having the representational capacity 
necessary and sufficient for having a desire consists in having two capacities 
and having them connected in the right way. First, the subject must be able to 
represent p  perceptually or cognitively. Second, they must have the capacity 
to represent something so that it is a reward so that it initiates processes of 
reinforcement learning. Third, these two capacities must be connected such
99 Although Schroeder does not seem to say this explicitly, it is plausible that he thinks that 
quite rudimentary representations can have these effects.
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that when the subject perceptually or cognitively represents that p  this causes 
(or contributes to causing) p  to be represented so that it is a reward.100
In light of this, Schroeder’s Reward Theory is more accurately 
summarized in the following way:
RTD* To have a [...] desire thatp  is to have the capacity to
perceptually or cognitively represent that p to initiate 
the production of reward signals that cause a 
characteristic, mathematically describable change in 
the connectivities of units that are describable at an 
appropriately abstract level.
Note that expressing Schroeder’s theory in this way, in terms of RTD* rather 
than RTD, does not change the fact that it is not vulnerable to an appropriately 
modified versions of the Natural Kinds objection. According to one of the 
clauses of premise 2 of the objection, the best current theories in neuroscience 
suggest that there is unified state that people are in that causes something to be
100 Thanks to Schroeder for clarifying this in his generous personal correspondence with me. 
He says that this way of characterizing having the capacity to represent something so that it 
is a reward is necessary to accommodate two intuitions: first that it is possible for someone 
to have a desire for almost anything that they are able to represent cognitively or 
perceptually, so there is some connection between the ability to desire something and the 
ability to perceive it or think about it. Second that there is more to having a desire for 
something than merely having the capacity to represent it perceptually or cognitively, so just 
because someone can perceive or think about something this does not entail that they have a 
desire for it.
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a reward for them. This is a state of a structure in the brain that is sometimes
called the ‘reward system’: in humans this is a state of the VTA/SNpc. In fact, 
according to these neuroscientific theories, the VTA/SNpc works by 
producing neural and chemical signals that have reinforcement learning effects 
on other structures in the brain. These include the areas that are responsible 
for behaviour and action, emotional responses, experiences of pleasure and 
displeasure, and so on. In fact the VTA/SNpc is thought to have connections 
to almost every other structure in the brain, and these connections release the 
neuro transmitter dopamine at their synapses, a chemical that these other 
structures are known to have receptors for and be sensitive to. The signals 
from the VTA/SNpc have effects on, for instance the activity levels of 
different structures, the threshold level of stimulation at which they become 
active, and so on. So the VTA/SNpc has the extent of influence, and the right 
kind of effects for its states to be what causes things to be rewards for people 
in the sense of reward in RTD*. And it is taken in neuroscience to be a 
distinct structure, the reward system, and its state to be unified states. So as 
before, there is a unified state that people have that causes something to be a 
reward for them. An appropriately modified version of the Natural Kinds 
objection to RTD* is unsound: its third premise is false for the same reason as 
for RTD.
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If Schroeder is right, and his response is the most plausible way of 
avoiding the counter intuitive conclusion of the Natural Kinds objection then 
RTD* is true. In which case, the relation between desire and dispositions to 
act is not essential to desire: it is not necessary that having a desire entails 
having a disposition to act in ways you believe will bring about what you 
desire. So MN is false.
5.7 -  Alternative Responses to the Natural Kinds Objection.
Is Schroeder’s response to the Natural Kinds objection the most plausible? Is 
the most plausible way of avoiding the conclusion that we do not have desires 
to revise premise 1 as premise 1*: that is, to deny that the relations between 
desire and dispositions to act and between desire and dispositions to have 
experiences of pleasure are essential to desire, and say instead that being in a 
unified state that is related in the right way with something being a reward for 
you is necessary and sufficient for having a desire?
An alternative response to the objection is to deny premise 2 by 
challenging Schroeder’s claims about the different causes of the three 
phenomena described in premise 1. According to Schroeder this is what is 
suggested by the best current theories in neuroscience, but someone could
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dispute this, as Katz does (Katz 2004). However, I will not pursue this 
response here.
Instead, note that Schroeder’s response is not the only way of denying 
premise 1: there is a symmetrical response with respect to each of the other 
two relations. Schroeder revises premise 1 in terms of the relation between 
desire and something being a reward for you, to get premise 1*. But in an 
analogous way someone might revise it in terms of the relation between desire 
and dispositions to act, to say that the relations between desire and dispositions 
to experience pleasure and between desire and reward are not essential to 
desire. This would lead to something like 1**:
(1**) If S' desires that p  then S  is in a unified state, x, that causes S to be 
disposed to act to try to bring about that p.
Or someone might revise premise 1 in terms of the relation between desire and 
dispositions to have experiences of pleasure in an analogous way, to yield 
something like 1***;
( 1***) if  £  desires that p  then S is in a unified state, jc, that causes S  to 
be disposed to experience pleasure if S  comes to believe that p  
has come about.
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Each of these responses is symmetrical and avoids the conclusion of the 
Natural Kinds objection, that we do not have desires. So why accept that 
Schroeder’s way of denying premise 1 is most plausible? Recall, according to 
Schroeder there are counter examples to the each of the other two relations. 
He would take these examples to show that 1** and 1*** are false. However, 
as I noted above in section 5.5, the counter examples to 1** are the kinds of 
example that I have argued are unsuccessful in previous chapters. If my 
arguments are successful then there is no symmetry breaker between 1 * and 
1** at least. So 1* has no privilege over 1** as a more plausible response 
here. And note that 1** entails MN. So, to the extent that the Natural Kinds 
objection does not show that Schroeder’s own theory of desire, RTD* is false, 
it does not show that MN is false.
If the Natural Kinds objection cannot be sound, yet denying premise 1 
and revising it as 1*, which entails RTD* and denying premise 1 and revising 
it as 1**, which entails MN are equally plausible responses to it then 
Schroeder has not shown that MN is false. But in fact there are reasons to 
think that the second of these responses, revising as 1** is more plausible, so 
that the Natural Kinds objection provides support for MN. This is because 
RTD* seems to face a dilemma. On one horn the theory is ill-motivated, there 
is no reason to think that it is an analysis of what we ordinarily mean by
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‘desire’. On the other horn, to the extent that there is reason to think that it is 
an analysis of desire it is implausible, it has implications that conflict with our 
ordinary understanding of desire. Consider the first horn of the dilemma. 
Recall how Schroeder motivated the theory initially: he appealed to a relation 
between having a desire for something and that thing being a reward for you 
that he claims is familiar from our everyday understanding of desire. Suppose 
we grant that there is such a relation that we are familiar with. Perhaps there is 
evidence of this from the way we use the terms ‘desire’ and ‘reward’. This 
will be a relation between having a desire and having something as a reward 
for you in the ordinary sense of reward. That is, the sense of reward in which 
someone who sees the wanted poster believes that the $1000 is a reward for 
capturing the outlaw, or the sense in which the small child thinks of the bag of 
sweets as a reward for behaving on the visit to Grandma. Yet RTD* does not 
say that desire is related to something being a reward in this ordinary sense. 
Rather, it says that desire is related to something being a reward in a technical 
sense, in terms of a connection with processes of reinforcement learning. But 
there is no reason to think that this relation, between having a desire for 
something and it initiating processes of reinforcement learning is something 
that we are familiar with from our everyday understanding of desire. There is 
no linguistic evidence, for example as there is for the relation between desire 
and reward in the ordinary sense. So there is no reason to think that RTD* is
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an analysis of our ordinary concept of desire: there is no reason to think that 
whatever has the kind of relation with processes of reinforcement learning that 
is described in RTD* is the mental state that we attribute to someone when we 
say they have a desire.
In fact, Schroeder is aware of this problem and attempts to motivate 
RTD* by appealing to the original relation that there is evidence for, the 
relation between desire and reward in the ordinary sense. According to 
Schroeder this ordinary sense of reward coincides with the technical sense, the 
processes of reinforcement learning. He claims that cases that are ordinarily 
described as rewards are in fact cases where processes of reinforcement 
learning are taking place. So he claims that this is what we actually refer to 
when we use the term ‘reward’ in the everyday sense. But this is implausible. 
There are counter examples in both directions: there can be cases in which 
someone would be described as having something as a reward for them in 
which it is not associated with any processes of reinforcement learning, and 
there can be cases in which processes of reinforcement learning are taking 
place but that would not be described as cases where something is a reward for 
someone. As an example of the first kind of case, consider Mavis, an avid 
admirer of the Royal family who is in unwell in hospital. In addition Mavis 
intensely dislikes, and is terrified of, being in hospital to such an extent that 
she finds it unpleasant even to think of herself in hospital and tries to do
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everything she can to avoid having to spend any time there. Suppose that 
Princess Anne is the patron of the hospital that Mavis is staying at and one 
morning visits the hospital to officially open a new ward. During her visit she 
walks around some of the other wards and talks with some of the patients at 
their bedside. Suppose that Mavis is one of the patients that Princess Anne 
stops to talk with. Mavis considers herself to have been rewarded by this visit. 
But it is not plausible that Mavis’s representations of Princess Anne visiting 
her in bed in hospital will cause any processes of reinforcement learning in 
Mavis that could be characteristic of it being a reward. It is not even clear 
what such effects might be: that is, it is not clear in what ways her thoughts 
about Princess Anne visiting her in bed in hospital could have effects, by 
processes of reinforcement learning, on her dispositions to act, her dispositions 
to have certain emotional responses and experiences of pleasure and 
displeasure, her intellectual dispositions and sensory capacities that were 
characteristic of that being a reward for her. 101 So it is plausible that, in this
101 Consider some possible alternatives: it is not plausible that Mavis’s thoughts about Princess 
Anne visiting her bed in hospital could have characteristic effects on her dispositions to act 
or her dispositions to have experiences of pleasure, for example. If this is a reward for 
Mavis then it seems that representing it should effect such dispositions so as to make Mavis 
more disposed to act in ways that will tend to bring it about, and make her more disposed to 
have experiences of pleasure if it comes about. If representing this had the opposite kind of 
effect then, according to Schroeder this would be a punishment for Mavis. But any such 
thoughts represent that Mavis is in hospital, and as we have described the case having 
thoughts representing this situation makes Mavis feel displeasure and plausibly makes her 
more disposed to act in ways that she believes will prevent her having to go into hospital. In 
addition, it does not seem plausible that Mavis’s thoughts about Princess Anne visiting her 
bed in hospital could have characteristic effects on her sensory capacities or intellectual 
dispositions. There do not seem to be any particular thoughts or perceptions that are 
characteristically associated with of this kind of event, Princess Anne visiting you in your
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case, there is something that is a reward for Mavis in the ordinary sense but 
not in the technical sense as her representations of that thing do not have 
characteristic effects by initiating processes of reinforcement learning.
As an example of the second kind of case, consider a simple perceptual 
discrimination experiment like an experiment in which a subject is briefly 
shown in succession two images of diagonal lines with different orientations 
and must choose which is the closest to the horizontal of the two. As they 
repeat the task their capacity to discriminate the more horizontal line will 
improve. This is a process in which a sensory capacity is improved through a 
process of reinforcement learning, initiated and maintained by their visual 
perceptions of the lines that become less distorted, or less ‘noisy’, as their 
ability to discriminate improves. But it is not plausible we would describe the 
lines in the stimulus as a reward for the subject. It might be true that they also 
have perceptions of, and thoughts about their improving performance on the 
task, or of praise from the experimenter, and so on: things that we might think 
of as rewards for them. But it is not these perceptions and thoughts that are 
responsible for the reinforcement learning effects. So in this kind of 
experiment the subject has perceptual representations of something, the lines
bed in hospital. So, there seems to be no characteristic ways in which such things can be 
effected by Mavis’s perceptual and cognitive representations of it. So, in this case Mavis’s 
perceptual and cognitive representations of Princess Anne visiting her bed in hospital do not 
have characteristic effects by reinforcement learning processes on Mavis’s dispositions to 
act, her dispositions to have experiences of pleasure, her intellectual dispositions or her 
sensory capacities, so this is not a reward for her in the technical sense. Nonetheless, it is a 
reward in the ordinary sense. So these senses of reward are not always co-instantiated.
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in the stimulus, that initiate and maintain a process of reinforcement learning 
that has characteristic effects on a sensory capacity, so this is a reward for 
them in the technical sense. But what they represent that has these effects, the 
lines in the stimulus, is not a reward for them in the ordinary sense of reward.
Contrary to Schroeder’s claim the ordinary and technical senses of 
reward are not co-instantiated. So what linguistic evidence there is in support 
of there being a relation between having a desire for something and it being a 
reward for you in the ordinary sense of reward does not support the claim in 
RTD*, that there is a relation between having a desire for something and it 
being a reward for you in the technical sense of having characteristic effects on 
you through processes of reinforcement learning. So RTD* is unmotivated-, 
there is no reason to think that it is an analysis of desire, the mental state that 
we attribute to people when we say that they have a desire in everyday 
discourse.
Of course, Schroeder could insist that we should accept the analysis 
given by RTD* despite these problems, perhaps on the grounds that it has 
greater explanatory power than alternative analyses of desire. But then it 
seems he is committed to a significant revision of the ordinary concept of 
desire if he is proposing an analysis in terms of something for which there is 
no intuitive support. Yet with such an extent of revision it is then as plausible
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that Schroeder is in fact giving an analysis of a different kind of mental state, 
call it ‘desire*’ rather than an analysis of desire. 102
This brings us to the second horn of the dilemma. Suppose that 
Schroeder can provide some evidence that it is part of our everyday 
understanding of desire that has a relation with reward in terms of processes of 
reinforcement learning like in RTD*: so he can provide independent 
motivation for RTD*. Nonetheless, it is not a plausible analysis of desire: it 
has a number of implications that conflict with our intuitions about desires. 
First, it implies that it is only possible to have a desire for a fast car, for 
example if it is already a reward for you: that is, if you already have the sub­
personal capacities, connected in the right way to be able to have states that 
represent fast cars so that they initiate processes of reinforcement learning. 
That is, if you can have a desire to have a fast car then fast cars must already 
be a reward for you. Yet this gets the order of explanation wrong. Intuitively 
you will only be rewarded by being given a fast car if it is something that you 
have a desire for. Suppose you were an environmental lobbyist, or you are 
afraid of driving fast, or you already have a collection of fast cars and are
102 Moreover, this response is especially counter-intuitive here. Recall the dialectic: the natural 
Kinds objection has an unacceptable conclusion, that we never have any desires. In 
response Schroeder proposes to deny premise 1 of that objection and revise it to be like 1*. 
But 1* entails RTD*, which is not a plausible analysis of desire. So revising premise 1 of 
the objection to 1* does not avoid the conclusion: it does not give an analysis of desire that 
is not vulnerable to the objection. It merely says that there is some other kind of state, 
desire* that has a certain relationship with processes of reinforcement learning. But this is 
effectively to concede the objection, that there is nothing that deserves the name ‘desire’. It 
does not respond to it.
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bored with them. If you were like this then it seems that you will not have a 
desire for a fast car: so you would not be rewarded by being given one.
Second, RTD* implies that there is a deep distinction between intrinsic 
desires and instrumental desires. Recall from above (see footnote 98), a desire 
that p is an intrinsic desire if p  is desired because of some features of p  itself, 
whereas a desire that p  is an instrumental desire if p is desired as a means to 
achieving something else that is desired intrinsically. As I noted, RTD* is 
restricted: Schroeder intends in only as an analysis of intrinsic desire. But in 
fact this is not something that he can avoid anyway: RTD* is not plausible as 
an analysis of instrumental desire. It is possible to form a new instrumental 
desire for something very quickly, for example if you suddenly come to 
recognize that by bringing it about you can bring about something else that 
you desire intrinsically. Conversely an existing instrumental desire for 
something can be lost very quickly, say if you suddenly realize that bringing it 
about will not, as you previously believed, bring about something that you 
desire intrinsically. According to RTD* having a desire for something 
consists in having specific representational capacities and sub-personal, neural 
connections in place, as discussed above. So it says that forming a new desire 
is a matter of forming new representational capacities or neural connections, 
while losing a desire consists in losing specific representational capacities or 
specific neural connections that you previously had. It is not plausible that
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such capacities and connections can be formed and lost at the same rate as 
instrumental desires can be formed and lost. So having an instrumental desire 
cannot consist in having the representational capacities and neural connections 
for representing something so that it is a reward for you. According to RTD* 
having an intrinsic desire does consist in having these representational 
capacities and neural connections. So it implies that intrinsic desires and 
instrumental desires are genuinely distinct kinds of mental state (perhaps 
analogous to the way that beliefs and desires are distinct kinds of mental state). 
Yet, while Schroeder seems prepared to accept this it seems to conflict with 
how we ordinarily understand desires: intuitively, intrinsic desires and 
instrumental desires are varieties of the same basic kind of mental state. It 
seems to be more than a mere terminological accident, for example, that we 
use the term ‘desire’ to refer to both kinds of state. In addition, both are 
thought to be able to cause and justify actions, and both can be considered in 
the same way when we engage in practical reasoning. So if RTD* entails that 
intrinsic desires and instrumental desires are distinct kinds of mental state then 
it is not plausible as an analysis of desire as it is ordinarily understood.
So Schroeder faces a dilemma: he wants to avoid the conclusion of the 
Natural Kinds objection, that we never have any desires, and claims that the 
most plausible response to that objection is to deny premise 1 and modify it to 
1*. This modified claim entails RTD*. But it is possible to deny premise 1
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and modify it in a different way, to 1**, which entails MN is true. Moreover, 
Schroeder’s response, modifying the first premise of the objection to 1* is not 
plausible. Either, RTD* is not giving an analysis of desire at all, as it is 
ordinarily understood, but rather is an analysis of a different kind of mental 
state, or RTD* is giving an analysis of desire and it is false. As Schroeder’s 
response to the Natural Kinds objection entails RTD* then if RTD* is not 
giving an analysis of desire it is not relevant to the conclusion of that 
objection. On the other hand if RTD* is giving an analysis of desire, but one 
which is false, then it is not a plausible response to the Natural Kinds 
objection: Schroeder’s response is either implausible or is not a response at all. 
Therefore, the alternative response to the Natural Kinds objection, modifying 
the first premise of the objection as 1** is more plausible than Schroeder’s, 
and it entails that MN is true. So the Natural Kinds objection does not refute 
MN.
5.8 -  The Reward Theory of Desire and MN.
According to Schroeder, as desires are ordinarily understood we take them to 
have characteristic relations with rewards and to have characteristic relations 
with motivation, or dispositions to act. Is there also a relation between
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rewards and dispositions to act?IOj In this last section of the chapter I will 
argue that there is such a relation: I will argue that according to the most 
plausible way of understanding Schroeder’s Reward Theory of Desire, RTD*, 
if something is a reward for you then you are disposed to act in ways that you 
believe will bring it about. This would be interesting in itself, but note also the 
relevance it would have for the discussion so far. I have defended MN against 
the Natural Kinds objection by arguing that the conclusion of that objection, 
that we do not have desires, is unacceptable, and that the most plausible 
response that avoids this also entails that MN is true. But if, as I will argue 
below, having something as a reward for you entails that you are disposed to 
act in ways that you believe will bring it about, and RTD*, that is entailed by 
Schroeder’s preferred response to the Natural Kinds objection also entails that 
MN is true. Then MN will not be refuted by the Natural Kinds objection 
whatever the result of the dialectic with Schroeder above about which is the 
most plausible response to that objection.
Recall how we summarized RTD*, in terms of the following thesis:
RTD* To have [a] desire that p  is to have the capacity to
perceptually or cognitively represent that p to initiate
10j Recall, in Chapter Two we saw that there are relations between desires and intentions and 
between intentions and dispositions to act. Might there be analogous relations in this case, 
between rewards and dispositions to act?
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the production of reward signals that cause a 
characteristic, mathematically describable change in 
the connectivities of units that are describable at an 
appropriately abstract level.
As we have seen from the discussion above, according to RTD* having a 
desire that p  consists in being constituted such that certain perceptual and 
cognitive representations of p  initiate processes of reinforcement learning that 
have characteristic effects in you. But what kind of effects will these be? One 
version of RTD* does not commit to there being a certain kind of effect or 
certain set of kinds of effects that result from the reinforcement learning 
processes that are entailed by having a desire. According to this version of 
RTD* if S  desires that p  then there are reinforcement learning effects in S that 
are characteristic of S having a desire that p. It says that if S  has this desire 
then there are some kinds of effect E that typically occur in S, but that E can be 
any kinds of effect that can be brought about by a process of reinforcement 
learning. But this is implausible: it implies that when S  has a desire that p  the 
effects that are characteristic of S having this desire are (i) only contingently 
related to the object of the desire, p, and (ii) only contingently like those that 
other humans have if they have a desire for the same object, p. Consider when 
people have a desire that they have some chocolate. If someone has a desire
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for chocolate they will typically be disposed to act to certain ways that they 
believed will get them chocolate, they will typically have experiences of 
pleasure if they eat some chocolate, they will typically believe that chocolate 
tastes nice, and so on. Now consider a particular person, Steve, who has a 
desire that he has some chocolate. Whenever Steve has this desire then the 
only effects in Steve are that he is disposed to whistle ‘The Blue Danube’ and 
he is disposed to feel sad if he comes to believe that Australia have lost their 
last cricket match. If this version of RTD* is true then someone like Steve is 
possible. But this is counter intuitive: if we came across Steve and he claimed 
to have a desire that he has some chocolate then we would be unlikely to 
believe him: we might think that he was making a mistake about what it is that 
he wants. Conversely, if we saw Steve exhibiting these effects then we not 
take ourselves to be justified in attributing him with a desire that he has some 
chocolate. But this version of RTD* entails that someone like Steve is 
possible, so it is false.
So the kinds of effects that can be the characteristic effects of having a 
particular desire cannot be completely unrestricted. Any plausible version of 
RTD* must impose some constraint on what kinds of effects can be the 
characteristic effects of having a particular desire. 104 Such a constraint could
104 Of course, someone could bite this bullet and insist that someone like Steve is possible 
despite this being counter intuitive. They might simply take this as an interesting and deep 
fact about desires that science has revealed about desire. Alternatively they might claim that 
this kind of dissociation between the object of a desire and the effects that having the desire
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be imposed in one of two ways: on one hand it could entail that the 
characteristic effects of having a particular desire are a subset of those that in 
humans are the characteristic effects of having that desire, and that are related 
to the object of the desire, but that having a disposition to act in ways that you 
believe will bring about what you desire is not part of this subset. On the other 
hand it could entail that the characteristic effects of having a particular desire 
are any of those that in humans are the characteristic effects of having that 
desire, and that are related to the object of the desire, where this includes 
having a disposition to act in ways that you believe will bring about what you 
desire. Call a version of RTD* that imposes the first kind of constraint 
‘RTD* a’, and call a version of RTD* that imposes the second kind of
has is metaphysically possible, but is nonetheless nomologically impossible. That is, that 
given the natural laws in the actual world the typical effects of having a particular desire are 
necessarily related in some way to the object of that desire. For example, they would claim 
that it is just a fact that, given the natural laws if someone has a desire for chocolate then the 
typical effects on them of having this desire will be related to chocolate in some way.
However, these responses are inadequate here. The first option, to bite the bullet 
and insist that Steve is possible, and that the connection between the effects of having a 
particular desire and the object of that desire is merely contingent, leaves it unexplained why 
in actual cases the effects of having a particular desire are almost always related to the 
content of the desire. But if we think that explanatory power is a theoretical virtue (and 
presumably someone who is giving this kind of empirical analysis does) then we should not 
accept this kind of account when there are other versions that do not leave such a prominent 
fact about desire unexplained.
On the other hand if someone says that while Steve is metaphysically possible he is 
nonetheless nomologically impossible then they owe an account of the natural features or 
laws that make this the case. Otherwise they similarly leave it unexplained. It is no 
explanation to merely insist that there is a natural law that entails that the typical effects of 
having a particular desire must be related to the object of the desire. More worryingly, the 
kind of natural laws that would be required here would include psychophysical laws, that 
concerned connections between mental phenomena, the content of someone’s desire and 
physical phenomena, any physical effects that are characteristic of having a particular desire. 
It is controversial whether there are any psychophysical laws at all. And even if there are
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constraint ‘RTD*b\ RTD*b entails that MN is true: it entails that if someone
has a desire that p  then they are disposed to act in ways that they believe will 
bring about p. On the other hand, RTD*a is vulnerable to the Natural Kinds 
objection.
According to RTD*a it is necessary and sufficient for having a desire 
that p  that someone has the capacity to perceptually or cognitively represent 
that p  to initiate the production of reward signals that cause characteristic 
effects such as disposing them to have experiences of pleasure if they come to 
believe that p  has come about, altering their perceptual sensitivity for 
discriminating that /?, disposing them to make positive evaluations of p, and so 
on. But also according to RTD*a it is not necessary for having a desire that p 
that someone has the capacity to perceptually or cognitively represent thatp  to 
initiate the production of reward signals that cause them to be disposed to act 
in ways that they believe will bring about p. Yet, if what Schroeder claims is 
the best current information from neuroscience is true then there is no unified 
state that we have that has all and only the effects that, according to RTD*a 
are necessary and sufficient for having a desire. Recall, according to this 
neuroscientific evidence, in humans it is the reward centre, the VTA/SNpc that 
initiates the reinforcement learning processes that have effects on dispositions 
to have experiences of pleasure, sensory capacities, intellectual dispositions,
any it would be a matter for speculation what particular connections they can involve. So
the prospect of giving the required explanatory account in terms of natural laws is poor.
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and so on. But it is also the VTA/SNpc that initiates the reinforcement 
learning processes that have effects on dispositions to act. According to 
RTD*a it is necessary and sufficient for having desires that someone has those 
parts of the VTA/SNpc that initiate the reinforcement learning processes that 
have the first kinds of effects, and not necessary that they have the parts that 
initiate the reinforcement learning processes that have the second kind of 
effect, on dispositions to act. So RTD* says that when a human has a desire 
this consists in their being in a state of some particular parts of the VTA/SNpc. 
But this is not a unified state. The VTA/SNpc might be considered to be a 
distinct neurological structure by current neuroscience, and states of the 
VTA/SNpc might be considered to be unified states. But this does not mean 
that states of some of its parts are together a unified state: it is more plausible 
that the states of only some, but not all, of the parts of a unified state do not 
together comprise a unified state. Consider, for example a car at time t. 
Intuitively the car is in a unified state at t. But also intuitively the state at t of 
each of its left rear tire, its steering wheel, its passenger side head-rest and its 
exhaust pipe taken together do not comprise a unified state, in the sense of 
being unified that is relevant here.103 106 So according to RTD*a there is no
1(b That is, according to Schroeder, something that is suitable for meaningful scientific 
investigation [recall, (Schroeder 2004, pp. 5-7)].
106 Of course, there are difficult and controversial mereological issues here. However, I will 
not attempt to address these: the example and the intuitions seem to support the distinction 
between unified and non-unified states in the sense that is relevant to the discussion.
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unified state that we are in when we have desires. Yet, the intuitive 
assumption underlying the Natural Kinds objection is that it is necessary that if 
someone has a desire then they are in a unified state: so if RTD*a is true then 
we do not have desires. But this is just the conclusion of the Natural Kinds 
objection, so RTD*a does not provide a way of responding to that argument. 
It cannot be the version of reward theory that follows from Schroeder’s 
response to that objection: Schroeder must intend his theory to be understood 
as RTD*b.
Now consider RTD*b: according to this version of reward theory it is 
necessary and sufficient for having a desire that p  that someone has the 
capacity to perceptually or cognitively represent that p  to initiate the 
production of reward signals that cause characteristic effects such as disposing 
them to have experiences of pleasure if they come to believe that p  has come 
about, altering their perceptual sensitivity for discriminating that p , disposing 
them to make positive evaluations of p, and disposing them to act in ways that 
they believe will bring about p. This version of reward theory is not 
vulnerable to the Natural Kinds objection: according to the neuroscientific 
evidence, in humans it is the VTA/SNpc that initiates such reinforcement 
learning processes, and states of the VTA/SNpc are unified states. So 
according to RTD*b when we have a desire we are in a state of the VTA/SNpc 
(as opposed to a state of some but not all of its parts as with RTD*a), so we are
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in a unified state. Hence, RTD*b is consistent with the assumption underlying 
the Natural Kinds objection: this version of reward theory allows us to avoid 
the conclusion that we do not have desires. Yet it claims that it is a necessary 
condition for having a desire that someone is disposed to act in ways they 
believe will bring about what they desire. So RTD*b entails that MN is true. 
Of course, it makes a stronger claim than MN: it also claims that this 
disposition must be brought about in a particular way, by reinforcement 
learning processes. But it entails that someone with a desire has this 
disposition nonetheless. So if this is the version of reward theory of desire that 
follows from Schroeder’s response to the Natural Kinds objection then MN 
follows from Schroeder’s response as well.
It seems that there are relations between reward and dispositions to act 
just as there are relations between desire and reward and between desire and 
dispositions to act. Having something that is a reward for you, in Schroeder’s 
sense of the term, seems to entail having a disposition to act in ways that you 
believe will bring it about. So the most plausible versions of Reward Theory 
of Desire are not alternatives to motivational theories of desire but are 
themselves versions of motivational theory: they entail that MN is true.
5.9 -  Conclusion.
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According to what I have called ‘the Natural Kinds objection’, recently made 
by Timothy Schroeder, MN conflicts with the best current empirical evidence 
that we have from neuroscience. This objection appeals to a methodological 
assumption from empirical functionalism and to empirical evidence to a 
greater extent than the objections to MN that I have considered in earlier 
chapters. According to this assumption, a plausible analysis of desire must 
entail that whatever desires are they are the kind of thing that can be 
investigated by empirical science. Yet, Schroeder claims that the results of 
current best theories in neuroscience suggest that there are no suitable, 
empirical states that have all of the properties and relations that desires are 
commonly taken to have. So, if we are to avoid the conclusion that we never 
have any desires then we must accept that some of these properties and 
relations are not, in fact properties and relations of desire. In addition, 
Schroeder claims that this empirical evidence suggests that the relation 
between having a desire and having a disposition to act is among the relations 
that are not necessary for having a desire, so MN is false. He argues that the 
neural correlate of having something as a reward for you is a better candidate 
to be the empirical state that we are in when we have a desire than the neural 
correlate of having a disposition to act. Hence, according to Schroeder we
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should analyse desire in terms of a relation with reward, his Reward Theory of 
Desire, RTD*.
However, to the extent that the empirical evidence supports 
Schroeder’s claim that a relation between desire and reward is necessary for 
having a desire it also supports MN, that a relation between desire and 
dispositions to act is necessary for having a desire. Moreover, Schroeder’s 
analysis in terms of a relation with reward is implausible: it conflicts with our 
common sense understanding of desire to too great an extent. If the Natural 
Kinds objection entails that desires are the kind of state that Schroeder’s 
analysis implies then it seems that we do not have desires after all. So, 
contrary to Schroeder’s claims, empirical evidence suggests that the relation 
between having a desire and being disposed to act is necessary for having a 
desire: there is empirical support that MN is true.
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CONCLUSION
I will now briefly summarise what I have argued in the previous chapters and 
what I have attempted to show. I will then return to a number of issues that 
have arisen during the course of these arguments that I have bracketed or been 
unable to address at those points. Dealing with such issues adequately would 
go beyond the scope of this dissertation. Nonetheless they are not irrelevant to 
my interests here as they raise a number of important questions about desires. 
If our aim is to gain a proper understanding of desire then they need 
addressing at some point. Although I will not attempt to do so in this brief 
discussion I will highlight some that I take to be relevant, interesting, and 
important areas for future research.
My overall aim in the dissertation has been to defend a view about a 
relation between desire and dispositions to act I call ‘the Motivational 
Necessity of Desire’ (MN). MN is the following thesis:
(MN) If S desires that p  then S  is disposed to act in ways S
believes will bring aboutp.
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According to MN, if Chris desires that he sees a film this evening and Chris 
believes that he can see a film by going to the local cinema at 8 pm then Chris 
is disposed to go to the local cinema at 8pm. If he also believes that he can see 
a film by going to the video rental shop then he is disposed to go to the video 
rental shop. MN is prima facie plausible, and it is a claim that has been both 
traditionally made about desires and that has been very influential in 
discussions about desire in philosophy. There are good philosophical reasons 
to accept it.
I discussed a number of these reasons in Chapter One, Motivations for 
Motivational Necessity. I highlighted the prevalence of the view through a 
range of fields of philosophy and how it is presupposed by certain important 
debates in those fields. I then discussed some of the theoretical benefits of 
MN for work in philosophy of mind in particular. MN provides a plausible 
way of answering at least two traditional and persistent problems in 
philosophy of mind: that is, how to give an analysis of motivation and how to 
give an analysis of the relation between a person and the intentional objects of 
their mental states like desires that are consistent with naturalism. In addition, 
there are explanatory benefits for a theory of desire if it accepts MN. It 
provides the most straightforward explanation of a prominent fact about 
desire, that there is a regular correlation between having a desire for something 
and acting in ways that you believe will bring it about. Other features that
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Standard theories of desire attempt to analyse desire in terms of, like 
experiences of pleasure, evaluations, and rewards, must make further claims 
and arguments, in addition to their claim that desire is related to that particular 
feature, in order to explain this fact.
So there are good reasons to accept MN. Nonetheless, a number of 
seemingly persuasive objections have been made to the view. I addressed 
each of what I take to be the strongest objections that have been made to MN 
in turn in the Chapters Two to Five. In Chapter Two I defended MN against 
Galen Strawson’s objection based on his counter example of the Weather 
Watchers. Strawson argued that it is possible that there are creatures like the 
Weather Watchers that can have desires but cannot have intentions. But he 
claimed that it is necessary for having a disposition to act that someone can 
have intentions. So if the Weather Watchers can have desires but cannot have 
intentions then they also cannot have dispositions to act: they are a counter 
example to MN. However, I argued that the case was under-described. I 
argued that none of the ways in which it could be coherently filled out that do 
not beg-the-question against MN, are cases in which the Weather Watchers 
both have desires and cannot have intentions. If the case is properly described 
in a way in which it is plausible that the Weather Watchers cannot have 
intentions then it is also plausible that they cannot have desires. On the other 
hand, if the case is properly described in a way in which it is plausible that the
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Weather Watchers do have desires then it is plausible that they also have 
intentions to act and dispositions to act. Hence, the Weather Watchers are not 
a counter example to MN.
Next, in Chapter Three I discussed further objections that appealed to 
putative counter examples: these are examples of desires for particular things 
that someone cannot be disposed to act in ways that they believe will bring 
about. I considered three kinds of such desires: first, what I called ‘self­
passive desires’, like a desire that your child passes their exams on their own. 
These are cases in which someone desires that they have something that they 
do not bring about by their own actions. Second, what I called ‘necessity 
desires’, like a desire that there are infinitely many prime numbers. These are 
cases in which someone desires something that they believe is necessarily the 
case. Finally, what I called ‘impossibility desires’, like a desire that I have a 
square circle. These are cases in which someone desires something that they 
believe necessarily cannot be the case. The objection in each case is that it is 
not plausible that someone who has such a desire is disposed to act in ways 
that they believe will bring about what they desire. The idea is that at least 
those people who are rational cannot believe that there are any ways that they 
can act that will bring about what they desire: hence they cannot be disposed 
to act in any such ways. But it is plausible that someone who is rational can 
have a desire of one of these kinds. So they are a counter example to MN:
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they are cases in which someone both has a desire and is not disposed to act in 
ways that they believe will bring about what they desire.
However, I argued that none of these cases is a successful counter 
example to MN. In the cases of self-passive desires this is because of a 
misunderstanding about what the object of these desires actually is, and so a 
misunderstanding about the disposition that is entailed by MN. The 
disposition to act that people with a self-passive desire cannot have, according 
to the objection, is not a disposition that MN claims they will have if they have 
a self-passive desire. So these cases are not counter examples to MN. In 
addition, it is possible for someone who is rational to believe that there are 
ways in which they can act to bring about what the actual object of a self­
passive desire is, properly understood, and it is plausible that in these 
examples the person with a self-passive desire is in fact disposed to act in 
these ways.
I argued that the cases of necessity desires and impossibility desires 
similarly fail to provide counter examples to MN: again this is because of a 
misunderstanding of the object of these desires. They are particular cases of a 
general problem about how we can have mental states that represent one and 
not another of two propositions that are necessarily equivalent. As the 
propositional objects of necessity desires are necessarily true, and the 
propositional objects of impossibility desires are necessarily false then all
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necessity desires appear to have necessarily equivalent propositional objects, 
and all impossibility desires appear to have necessarily equivalent 
propositional objects. Yet all necessity desires do not appear to be the same, 
and all impossibility desires do not appear to be the same. Because of this 
general ‘problem of equivalence’, as Stalnaker calls it, it is not clear what the 
propositional objects of necessity desires and impossibility desires actually 
are. And if this is not clear then we cannot know what disposition to act is 
entailed by having such desires according to MN, and cannot know if someone 
with such a desire does not have that disposition. So these cases do not show 
that it is possible to have a desire and not be disposed to act in ways you 
believe will bring about what you desire. Neither self-passive desires, 
necessity desires nor impossibility desires are counter examples to MN.
My argument in Chapter Four was defensive again but if successful 
then I take it to provide positive support for MN. It does this in two ways: 
first, it provides independent motivation for thinking that MN is true, and 
second, it justifies the claim I made in Chapter One concerning the 
explanatory advantages of MN for an analysis of desire. I defended a 
particular way of analysing the difference between belief and desire. I argued 
that the most plausible way of analysing this is in terms of the different 
directions-of-fit of the respective kinds of state, where having a particular 
direction-of-fit consists in having a particular functional role, a particular set of
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properties and relations. A plausible version of this kind of functional role 
DOF account of the difference between beliefs and desires is given by Michael 
Smith: Smith analyses the particular directions-of-fit of belief and desire in 
terms of their respective relations with conflicting perceptions and with 
dispositions to act, among others. I defended Smith’s DOF account against a 
pair of objections, made by Sobel & Copp and by Humberstone. They argued, 
in different ways, that Smith’s DOF account is uninformative: they claim that 
the difference between the properties it attributes to beliefs and desires is not a 
difference that is constitutive of the distinction between these kinds of states. 
So they claim that Smith’s DOF account cannot be the right analysis of 
direction-of-fit. However, I argued that neither objection is successful: Sobel 
& Copp appeal to an implausible and overly-demanding claim about what is 
necessary for an analysis to be informative. Humberstone does not take 
account of the detail that is provided by Smith’s DOF account in the 
characterisations it gives of the different directions-of-fit of belief and desire. 
These characterisations provide exactly the kind of information that 
Humberstone claims is necessary for this kind of analysis to be informative. 
So neither objection is successful.
If something like Smith’s DOF account is correct then, as I said above, 
this supports MN in two ways: on one hand it is independent support for MN. 
It is the best way of analysing the different between beliefs and desires, and it
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is intuitive that there is such a difference. But according to the account having 
a desire that p  entails having a disposition to act in ways that you believe will 
bring about p. So this intuitive difference between beliefs and desires appears 
to entail MN. On the other hand, Smith’s DOF account justifies what I earlier 
claimed was an explanatory benefit of MN: that it provided the best 
explanation of the fact that having a desire is regularly correlated with acting 
in ways that you believe will bring about what you desire. This might be 
challenged if someone thought that the correlation that we observe, and that 
needs explaining is not between having a desire and acting but rather between 
having a complex of beliefs and desires, and acting. But if Smith’s DOF 
account is true then having a belief does not entail having a disposition to act. 
So even if the correlation that needs explaining is between having a complex 
of beliefs and desires, and acting then, if Smith’s DOF account is true this 
correlation is also best explained in terms of the properties and relations of the 
desires in such complexes of mental states. In other words, Smith’s DOF 
account suggests that MN has explanatory benefits for a theory of desire with 
respect to explaining this prominent fact about desire, the regular correlation 
between having a desire and acting, as I had earlier claimed.
Finally, in Chapter Five I addressed what I called the ‘Natural Kinds 
objection’, made by Timothy Schroeder, that MN is incompatible with the best 
empirical evidence. According to Schroeder it is both assumed by our
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everyday understanding of desire, and is a plausible constraint on an 
informative analysis of desire that, whatever a particular analysis claims that 
desires are, they must be the kind of thing that are appropriate for scientific 
investigation: in this particular case, having a desire must consist in being in a 
unified state. But, he claims that the best current neuroscientific evidence 
suggests that there are no unified states that we have that have all of the 
properties and relations that are commonly attributed to desire in our everyday 
understanding of it. In addition, Schroeder claims that the most plausible 
candidate for being a desire from among the unified states that we have is one 
that does not have a necessary connection with dispositions to act: rather it is a 
kind of state that is connected with something being a reward for you. So, 
according to Schroeder the best empirical evidence suggests that desire is 
related with reward and is not related with dispositions to act, so MN is false.
However, I argued that, contrary to Schroeder’s claim, this empirical 
evidence supports MN to the same extent that it supports his own Reward 
Theory of Desire, that analyses desire in terms of a relation with reward. In 
addition, I argued that this kind of reward theory has implications that conflict 
with a number of intuitions that we have about desire. So it is not a plausible 
analysis of desire. In light of this it is reasonable to take the empirical 
evidence to suggest that desire is related with dispositions to act, rather than 
with reward if they are supported by it to an equal extent. So MN is not
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incompatible with the best empirical evidence, as Schroeder claims: rather it 
appears to be supported by this evidence.
If my arguments are correct then none of these objections to MN 
succeed. And if these are the strongest objections to MN, as I take them to be, 
then in light of the prima facie plausibility and the theoretical benefits of this 
thesis we should accept it.
My aims in this dissertation have been fairly modest, and the 
arguments I have given mainly defensive. I have restricted myself to 
addressing objections to MN alone, the view that there is a necessary 
connection between having a desire and being disposed to act in particular 
ways. And I have merely attempted to show that these objections are 
unsuccessful against that particular view. I have not, in addition to this, 
attempted to give a theory of desire, a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for having a desire. Neither have I attempted to defend some 
related theses, for example that make claims about what kind of relation this 
connection between desire and dispositions to act is, or why they are 
connected in this way. But there are a number of claims that are often made 
about such things that are both interesting in themselves and are related 
specifically to the connection between desire and dispositions to act that MN is 
concerned with. In the rest of the conclusion I will briefly discuss some of 
these.
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First, as I have noted at a number of points throughout the thesis, 
desires are often taken to have certain normative properties and relations. For 
instance, some people claim that desires can provide reasons to act in 
particular ways [see for example Stampe (1987)], while others claim there are 
constraints on what can be the proper objects of desire, that is what it is 
rational to desire [see for example Anscombe (1957)]. Both of these claims 
concern what someone has reason to do, or what it is rational to do: they say 
that, insofar as someone is rational then they should act in a certain way, or 
they should not desire a particular kind of thing. So these are claims about 
normative properties and relations of desire.
Consider the first of these, the claim that having a desire can provide 
someone with a reason to act in a particular way. This is what Stampe calls 
the ‘per se authority' of desire’ (Stampe 1987, p343). According to Stampe, if 
Adam desires to go to Peterborough, and he believes that he can get to 
Peterborough by getting on the 11.10 from Euston station then he has a pro 
tanto reason to get on the 11.10 from Euston station. Moreover, Adam has this 
reason merely in virtue of having this particular desire. Stampe gives the 
following example to illustrate the claim:
Consider two people who do exactly the same thing, between whom 
there is no difference save that one of them did the thing because that
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one wanted to do it. (Suppose they both spent their weekend studying 
German, with the intention of learning the language.) Beyond that 
neither of them has any belief about the act that would explain their 
curious behaviour; neither believes that there is any point in his 
learning German. Then the one who has no desire to do this thing has 
absolutely no reason to do it (none in view of which he does it), and the 
act is utterly irrational. But the act of the one who wants to do it is not 
utterly irrational. He does at least have a reason -  something of a 
reason, surely -  to do it, for it is something that he wants to do. And if 
he has a reason then there is a reason for him to do it. What can this be 
but the only thing that he has that the other party lack? That is: the 
desire itself. The desire, it may be, is irrational, but it does not follow 
that the act that it inspires is irrational. For the action is done for a 
reason: the desire the agent has to do it. Desire, it seems, has an 
extraordinary authority: if there is no reason to do a thing, my 
intending to do it is no reason to do it, and neither is my believing that 
it would be a good idea to do it, if in fact it would not. But even then, 
the fact that I want to do it is a reason to do it (Stampe 1987, p344).
Note the particular claim that is being made here. Stampe is not saying merely
that there are normative facts about desire. Rather he is saying that there is a
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particular normative fact about desire that is not true about other kinds of 
mental state, like beliefs, intentions and so on. That is, that if someone has a 
desire for something they thereby have a reason to act to try to get what they 
desire.
Note also that it is a restricted claim: it is merely a pro tanto reason that 
someone has in virtue of having a desire, a reason that can be over-ridden by 
other reasons they might have (say, on the basis of other desires, or on the 
basis of other facts about themselves or the situation they are in). Having a 
desire does not thereby provide someone with an all-things-considered reason 
to act to try to get what they desire.
It is plausible, and widely agreed that having a desire can provide 
someone with such a reason to act. 107 And this normative fact about desire 
seems particularly relevant to what I have been arguing here. It is closely 
related to the thesis that I called MN(rat) in the Introduction when 
distinguishing it from MN. Recall, it is the following, restricted thesis:
[MN(rat)] If S desires that p  then S  is disposed to act in ways S 
believes will bring about p, insofar as S is rational.
107 Although, see for example Dancy (1999), Scanlon (1998), etc for disagreement.
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Whereas MN is a claim about all things that have a desire, MN(rat) is a claim 
about all of the things that are rational that have a desire. To put this another 
way, MN(rat) says that if someone has a desire then they have a reason to be 
disposed to act in ways that they believe will bring about what they desire. 
Someone can have a reason to do something only to the extent that they are 
rational: to say that someone is irrational is to say that they are not sensitive to 
reasons. And it would be very peculiar if someone could have a reason to be 
disposed to act in a particular way but not have a reason to act in that way. 108 
Although I have concentrated on MN rather than MN(rat) in the dissertation, 
as I noted at a number of points MN(rat) is weaker than, and is entailed by 
MN. So if this normative fact is relevant to MN(rat) then it is also relevant to 
MN.
Now consider the second kind of normative claim about desire that I 
mentioned above: the claims that there are certain constraints on the proper 
objects of desire. This idea might be expressed by saying that there are
108 Although, there are likely to be exceptions to this: situations in which someone has a reason 
to be disposed to act in a certain way but does not have a reason to act in that way. Perhaps 
Kavka’s ‘toxin problem’ can be thought of like this. This is a case in which you have a 
reason to sincerely intend to drink some a non-lethal poison in the future despite the fact that 
(you know) at that time you will have no reason to actually drink the poison. If having a 
disposition to act entailed having an intention to act (see below, and Chapter Two, section 
2.3 for more on this) then this might be a case in which you have a reason to have a 
disposition to act in a particular way but do not have a reason to act in that way. 
Nonetheless, the possibility of such cases would not show that Stampe’s claim and MN(rat) 
are unrelated. Stampe’s claim is that having a desire can thereby give someone a reason to 
act, not that it entails having such a reason. So if there are situations in which it would be 
rational to act in the way you are disposed to act then this normative fact will follow from 
MN(rat).
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correctness conditions for the objects of desire, such that someone is 
criticisable if they have a desire for something that violates these correctness 
conditions. Perhaps violating such conditions can be understood in terms of 
the object of someone’s desire lacking certain properties that, according to 
claims about these constraints a desire should have. According to Anscombe 
for example, if something is an appropriate object of desire then it has some 
desirable characteristic (either intrinsically or in virtue of being a means to 
obtaining something that has some desirable characteristic intrinsically). That 
is, insofar as someone is rational then they cannot have a desire for something 
that they believe does not have any desirable characteristics. So she says that 
insofar as someone is rational then they cannot have a desire for a saucer of 
mud, or a desire for a twig of mountain ash (where these things are not being 
desired as means to obtaining something else). Anscombe takes it to be 
inconceivable that this kind of object has any desirable characteristics 
intrinsically. So if someone is rational, and so can only have desires for things 
that do not violate the correctness conditions on the objects of desire then they 
cannot have a desire for a saucer of mud. It is plausible that there are 
constraints like this on the proper objects of desire. For example, it is intuitive 
that there is something wrong with having a desire to inflict pain on someone 
merely for the sake of inflicting pain [rather than, for example, to punish them 
for some wrongdoing or for the pleasure someone might get from inflicting
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pain, (which might be wrong because of other, for example ethical, constraints 
rather than because of constraints on the objects of desire)]. But it is 
controversial what exactly the constraints actually: whether they include this 
constraint described by Anscombe, that the proper objects of desire have some 
desirable characteristic, and if so whether there are others in addition to it, 
what these are, and so on.
Although this issue about the constraints on the proper objects of desire 
has not come up itself in the arguments in the previous chapters, it is related 
some of issues that have been relevant. For example, in Chapter Three, 
section 3.10 I considered a response that is sometimes given to the putative 
counter examples to MN of necessity desires and impossibility desires, desires 
like a desire that there are infinitely many prime numbers and like a desire that 
I have a square circle respectively. Recall, that response denies that it is 
possible to have these kinds of desire: it denies that someone can genuinely 
desire something that they believe is necessarily the case or that they believe 
necessarily cannot be the case. Rather, according to this response, in cases 
where it seems as though someone has a desire for such an object they in fact 
have a different kind of pro-attitude towards it, like a hope or a wish. That is, 
the putative examples in which someone is said to have a desire that there are 
infinitely many prime numbers are really cases in which they hope that there 
are infinitely many prime numbers, for example. So they are not counter
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examples to MN as this is a thesis about desire and not about other kinds of 
pro-attitude as well. The motivation behind this response is plausibly that 
things that are believed to be necessarily the case or are believed to be 
impossible are not proper objects of desire: they violate some constraint on the 
proper objects of desire. So insofar as someone is rational then they cannot 
have a necessity desire or an impossibility desire. How plausible this response 
is therefore depends on what the particular constraints on the proper objects of 
desire actually are.
The fact that desires have such normative properties and relations is 
often thought to be a problem for MN . 109 The idea is that MN is a claim about 
a natural relation of desire, and that normative properties and relations cannot 
be derived from natural ones. So MN is thought to be inconsistent with desire 
having normative properties and relations, which would entail that MN is 
false. But this is a mistake, for a number of reasons. First, MN is merely a 
claim about a necessary condition for having a desire. It is not a claim about 
necessary and sufficient conditions. So even if these normative facts about 
desire cannot be explained in terms of the relation that MN describes, this does
109 Recall, for example the objection to Smith’s DOF account raised by Zangwill (1998) 
among others, that I mentioned in Chapter Four, section 4.10, but did not discuss in detail. 
According to Zangwill, Smith’s DOF account is uninformative because it attempts to 
analyse the difference between beliefs and desires in terms of the natural properties and 
relations of each kind of state. He claims that this difference is a difference in the normative 
properties and relations that each kind of state has, and that normative facts cannot be 
explained in terms of natural facts. Hence, the differences described by Smith’s DOF 
account are not the ones that distinguish between belief in particular and desire in particular.
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not entail that they cannot be explained in terms of whatever other conditions 
are necessary for having a desire. So MN is not inconsistent with desires 
having normative properties and relations even if it does not entail that desire 
has them.
Moreover, it has not been established that MN cannot explain these 
normative facts about desire. People who raise the normative facts about 
desire as a problem for views like MN often appeal to things like Moore’s 
‘Open Question’ argument, and the slogan that ‘you cannot derive and ought 
from an is’ . 110 But although this slogan is often taken as a dogma, it is 
controversial whether we should accept Moore’s argument, and controversial 
what it actually shows if it is sound. 111 So, we should not merely accept 
without further argument the claim that normative facts cannot be derived 
from natural facts: we should not accept this premise in these objections that 
appeal to the natural facts about desire.
Note, also, that these normative facts about desire are a problem for all 
standard kinds of theory of desire, irrespective of the properties or relations 
that they claim are necessary conditions for having a desire, just as they are for 
MN. This is obvious in the case of hedonic theories and reward theories of 
desire. These kinds of theories respectively attempt to analyse desire in terms 
of relations between desires and dispositions to have experiences of pleasure
110 Kripke (1982) also discusses this in the context of following a rule.
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and relations between desires and something being a reward, where this is 
usually understood in terms of the conditioning, or reinforcement learning 
effects of the object of desire [see, for example, Schroeder (2004)]. But these 
are natural properties and relations, just like dispositions to act described by 
MN. So if MN cannot account for the normative facts about desire because it 
is a claim about a natural relation of desire then hedonic theories of desire and 
reward theories of desire cannot account for these facts either. But, perhaps 
surprisingly, these normative facts are also a problem for evaluative theories of 
desire, that attempt to analyse desire in terms of making positive evaluations of 
the object of desire. It might seem that evaluative theories have an advantage 
over the other kinds of theory with respect to this problem. Because they 
attempt to analyse desire in terms of evaluations they presuppose that desire 
has relations with facts about value, which are normative facts. So they do not 
face the problem of explaining how desire can have any normative properties 
or relations at all. However, recall what it is that needs accounting for. It is 
not merely that desires have normative properties and relations, that there are 
some normative facts about desire. What stands in need of explanation is that 
desire has the particular normative properties and relations that it does, as 
opposed to having the same ones as belief, for example. What Stampe was 
concerned to show with his example of the two people studying German was
111 See for example, Joyce (2006) for discussion, especially the Introduction.
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that it is only having a desire, and not having any other kind of mental state, 
that can thereby provide someone with a reason to act. Similarly, it is not 
especially interesting that desires have correctness conditions: it is 
uncontroversial that mental states can have correctness conditions, no one 
takes this to be particularly problematic in the case of belief, for example. 
What is most interesting and controversial is that desires have the particular 
correctness conditions that they do, for example that insofar as someone is 
rational someone cannot desire something that they take to have no desirable 
characteristic. 112 Indeed, it seems that even those who appeal to the normative 
facts about desire when making an objection to MN are appealing to the fact 
that desires have the particular normative properties and relations that they do. 
Consider Zangwill’s objection to Smith’s DOF account once again. He claims 
that this account is inadequate because it fails to give an account of what is 
constitutive of the difference between beliefs in particular and desires in 
particular. That is, their difference in normative properties and relations. So 
this objection depends on their being a difference between the normative facts 
about each kind of state. Zangwill’s objection against Smith’s DOF account 
for example, could not even get started if desires had the same normative 
properties and relations as beliefs. So what stands in need of explanation is
112 This is not to claim that it is not controversial whether or not there are correctness 
conditions for desire. Instrumentalists about desire, for example, deny that there are any 
normative constraints on the possible objects of desire [see for example Fehige (2001) for 
discussion].
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that desires have the particular normative properties and relations that they do. 
But evaluative theories of desire do not have a clear advantage over other 
kinds of theory with respect to explaining this. The fact that they analyse 
desire in terms of positive evaluations of the objects of desire might thereby 
entail that there are normative facts about desire. But it does not thereby entail 
that there are the particular normative facts about desire that, in fact, there are, 
and that are what stands in need of explanation. So, in order to explain this 
evaluative theories must make further claims about the feature that they 
analyse desire in terms of, just as the other kinds of theory of desire that 
analyse desire in terms of natural properties and relations must do. So if there 
are normative facts about desire and this is a problem for MN then it is also a 
problem for all of the standard kinds of theory of desire. However, this is not 
to deny that these normative facts about desire cannot be explained in a 
straightforward way by MN, in contrast to the way in which the regular 
correlation between having a desire and acting in a way you believe will bring 
about what you desire can be straightforwardly explained. If there are 
normative properties and relations of desire, as seems plausible, then there are 
interesting questions about what exactly they are: and there are interesting 
questions about whether, and how they might be explained in terms of MN. 
Both kinds of question deserve further attention.
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A different issue that I left unanswered earlier concerns the relations
between desires and intentions and between intentions and dispositions to act. 
Recall, from Chapter Two, Strawson claimed that it is a necessary condition 
for having a disposition to act that you can have an intention to act. In 
addition he claimed that it is possible that someone can have desires but cannot 
have intentions, attempting to show this with the Weather Watchers example. 
If both of these claims were both true then MN would be false, it would be 
possible for someone to have a desire yet not have a disposition to act, because 
they cannot have an intention to act. In Chapter Two I responded to this 
objection by arguing that the Weather Watchers do not show that it is possible 
that someone can have desires but cannot have intentions, and that there is 
reason to think that it is not possible. I granted Strawson his assumption that 
having an intention is necessary for having a disposition to act. Indeed it is 
very plausible that there is some kind of relation between intentions to act and 
dispositions to act, as I discussed in Chapter Two, section 2.3. But does 
Strawson describe it correctly? Recall from that section, I discussed a reason 
someone might have to deny Strawson’s claim. If someone thought that cases 
like those described by Hursthouse (1991), in which someone performs an 
action in the grip of, or as the expression of, an emotion are cases in which 
they do not have an intention then it seems that Strawson’s claim is false. 
Nonetheless, it seems that even someone like Hursthouse would accept that
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cases in which someone does have an intention to perform a particular action 
and that this causes them (in the right way) to make the appropriate bodily 
movements are cases in which they have acted. It is plausible that even 
someone like Hursthouse who might deny that having intentions is necessary 
for having dispositions to act might accept that having an intention is sufficient 
for having a disposition to act. Might Strawson have mis-described the 
direction of the entailment relation between intentions to act and dispositions 
to act?
Note the implications this would have for Strawson’s objection. If my 
argument in Chapter Two is correct then if someone can have a desire then 
they can have an intention to act. In addition, if having an intention to act is 
sufficient for having a disposition to act, then MN follows by logical 
implication: MN is the conclusion of the following hypothetical syllogism:
1) If S' desires that p  then has an intention to act in ways that S  believes 
will bring aboutp.
2) If S  has an intention to act in ways S believes will bring about p  then 
S  is disposed to act in ways S  believes will bring about p.
C) If S  desires that p  then S is disposed to act in ways S believes will 
bring about p.
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In fact, the problem for Strawson is even more acute. Even if having an 
intention is not, after all, related to each of desires and dispositions to act in 
these ways, Strawson must deny that there is anything that has these relations: 
Strawson must deny that there is any property or relation that is both a 
necessary condition for having a desire and a sufficient condition for having a 
disposition to act such that it can be an intermediary between desires and 
dispositions to act in an analogous way. Of course, Strawson will deny this: as 
I described in Chapter One, section 1.5, Strawson seems to deny that there are 
any properties or relations that are necessarily connected with desire. He 
seems to accept a primitivist theory of desire. But note a further implication of 
this. If someone denies that there is any property or relation that is an 
intermediary between desires and dispositions to act in this way then they are 
effectively denying that there is any interesting explanation, in terms of the 
properties of desire, of the fact that people often act in ways that they believe 
will bring about their desire. They must claim that it is a merely contingent 
fact that there is a regular correlation between having a desire and acting to try 
to get what you desire. This is counter intuitive: it is reason to think that there 
is some such property or relation that is both entailed by having a desire and 
entails having a disposition to act. In which case, MN is true.
There are many other issues about desire in addition to these that I 
have not even mentioned either in the body of the dissertation or in this
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conclusion. But at least these issues raised here, that are closely related to my 
defense of MN are things that are in need of, and deserve further investigation.
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